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People desire to have influence/power over other people to different degrees and in 
different ways. In this research we looked at three different desires (also called 
motives) to influence others: the dominance, prestige, and leadership (DoPL) 
motives. The dominance motive describes a desire to coerce others against their will 
to be able to make them do what one wants. The prestige motive describes a desire to 
gain others’ admiration and respect for ones’ skill and knowledge so that these 
others’ voluntarily do what one requests. The leadership motive describes a desire to 
direct others and take initiative in one’s group; others follow a leader because this 
helps them to achieve a common group goal. As a first step, we developed a 
questionnaire with which we could measure these DoPL motives. We showed that 
they were similarly related to a general desire to have influence on others but 
differently related to a range of personality characteristics that should be helpful to 
achieve the specific motive goal. For example, the dominance motive was most 
strongly related to anger and aggression. Across several studies we could show that 
the DoPL motives were also differently related to other relevant behaviours and 
characteristics. For example, the dominance motive was most strongly related to the 
amount of money people kept for themselves in an exchange game. The prestige 
motive was most strongly related to how much people valued morality (presumably 
because more moral people gain more admiration). The leadership motive was most 
strongly related to the employment ranks (e.g., normal employee, middle 
management, upper management) people held across a range of different professions. 
Further studies investigated the different roles the DoPL motives played regarding 
donation behaviour, excuses made in the 2016 US election, or the amount of effort 
people put in motive-relevant tasks. In conclusion, this research showed that it is 





This work represents a theoretical and empirical study of distinct subcomponents of 
the explicit power motive (broadly defined as conscious desires to attain control and 
prestige) matching distinctions between social hierarchies (e.g., hierarchies based on 
forced or voluntary deference). Three factor analytic studies showed a consistent 
three factor structure in existing and newly created questionnaire items matching the 
power motive definition and selected for being able to distinguish between different 
kinds of hierarchies. These factors represented distinct motives for dominance (i.e., 
the desire to coerce others), prestige (i.e., the desire to attain others’ respect), and 
leadership (i.e., the desire to direct others): the DoPL motives. Several further studies 
were conducted to provide evidence for the DoPL motives’ validity and their distinct 
properties. First, mostly in line with the theoretical predictions, the DoPL motives 
showed differential correlations with relevant personality characteristics such as the 
BIG 5 personality traits or self-reported anger/aggression. Second, the DoPL motives 
explained more than 80% of variance in two power motive scales, showing that they 
indeed represent constituent parts of the power motive. Third, whereas the leadership 
motive predicted full-time employees’ rank across different fields of work, the 
prestige motive predicted participants’ endorsement of moral concerns. Fourth, the 
dominance motive predicted the amount of money participants kept for themselves in 
two dictator games. Fifth, whereas the dominance motive was negatively, the 
leadership motive was positively related to charitable giving behaviour. Sixth, a 
sample of Donald Trump voters in the 2016 US election showed more agreement 
with accusations of unfair treatment of their candidate as a function of their 
dominance motive. This effect was stronger before as compared to after the election. 
Seventh, a study related to effort mobilisation in tasks ostensibly related to the DoPL 
motives found no significant effects. In conclusion, this work amplifies the 
importance of differentiating between subcomponents of the explicit power motive 
by showing their differential relationship to a range of behavioural and cognitive 
outcomes and other relevant characteristics. 
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1 Chapter 1: Prolog 
1.1 Context of the research 
People live in social hierarchies in which they have asymmetrical access to 
resources, attention, and control over others (e.g., Chase, Tovey, Spangler-Martin, & 
Manfredonia, 2002; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Although there are clear benefits to 
hierarchical structures, as they satisfy a need for stability and make exchanges more 
efficient (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), having a higher rank is more beneficial than 
having a lower rank (e.g., Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Hill, 1984; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1995). This incentivises rising through the hierarchy. In the 1970s 
researchers postulated a general power motive (McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1973), 
defined as a desire for control and prestige, which is arguably at the core of this 
desire to improve one’s standing in a hierarchy. However, others (e.g., Bischof, 
2008; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008) have postulated that 
humans live in distinct kinds of hierarchies simultaneously. For example, hierarchies 
based on people’s ability to make others do what they want, or based on the amount 
of prestige people receive from others for their skills and knowledge. Thus, a general 
power motive is insensitive to meaningfully different hierarchies and to date no 
research has investigated whether there are distinct motives related to them. 
 
1.2 Aim and scope 
This thesis investigates whether the general power motive can be decomposed into 
distinct motives related to desires to rise in social hierarchies, which are primarily 
based on being able to make others comply to one’s will and on garnering others’ 
respect and admiration for one’s skills and knowledge. This investigation will 
involve distinguishing these motives, showing their relationship to the power motive 
as well as their relationship to the aforementioned hierarchies. The latter will be 
achieved by demonstrating the motives’ distinct relationships with behaviours and 
personality traits that would theoretically be useful to rise in the respective hierarchy. 
Note, that this research, with the exception of one study (Chapter 5), will not directly 
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investigate hierarchies but only the motives underlying it. Moreover, this research 
will only investigate conscious but not unconscious motives (see explicit-implicit 
distinction in Chapter 2.3.2). 
  
1.3 Significance of the research 
This research marks an important addition to recent theories about hierarchies as it 
takes two competing theories regarding hierarchies into account: the dominance vs 
prestige theory (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 2016) and the power vs status theory (Blader & 
Chen, 2012; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Mannix & Sauer, 2006). It shows that while 
dominance and power seem to be underpinned by different motives, status and 
prestige seem to be driven by the same desire, thus showing that these two competing 
theories can indeed complement each other. Moreover, this research reveals that the 
power motive is too heterogeneously defined and that motivational psychologists 
would benefit from assessing its individual components. Further, it opens up 
possibilities for researchers interested in hierarchy differentiation as it supplies them 
with a tool to measure the driving forces in distinct hierarchies. The many validation 
studies reported here not only demonstrate this tool’s viability but also show many 
interesting findings regarding these motives themselves. The motivational framework 
applied here allows for precise distinctions within these motives, such as conscious 
and unconscious motives, which are related to different kinds of behaviour and 
cognition. In general, we believe that understanding the driving forces that make 
people want to move within human hierarchies is important for a comprehensive 
theory of these omnipresent social structures. 
 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
In Chapter 2, we give an overview of the historical development of research into the 
power motive and hierarchy differentiation, outline some important distinctions 
within the two areas and argue for a synthesis of these two strands of research. In 
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Chapter 3, we take this theoretical argument one step further and show that when 
combining the two strands of research three subcomponents of the power motive 
emerge: namely distinct motives for dominance, prestige, and leadership (DoPL). In 
Chapter 4, we define these DoPL motives and report the development of 
questionnaire scales (the DoPL scales) to measure these motives. Moreover, we show 
the DoPL motives’ occurrence in the relevant nomological network and demonstrate 
that two established scales to measure the power motive can be decomposed into 
differently weighed combinations of the DoPL motives. Chapters 5 through 7 report 
further validation studies, specifically providing evidence for the discriminant 
validity of the DoPL scales. In Chapter 5, we test the relationship between the 
leadership motive and employees’ rank positions across various companies. 
Moreover, we investigate the relationship between the prestige motive and the 
endorsement of moral values. In Chapter 6, we test the relationship between the 
dominance motive and selfish behaviour in two dictator games. In Chapter 7, we 
investigate the relationship of the DoPL motives with charitable giving behaviour. In 
Chapter 8, we report a study conducted around the US election 2016 in which we 
tested whether voters for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton would be more likely to 
buy into excuses to explain an anticipated or actual defeat as a function of their 
dominance motive. In Chapter 9, we report an attempt to show a relationship 
between effort mobilisation and the DoPL motives in tasks ostensibly related to the 
DoPL motives. In Chapter 10, we provide a discussion of all of these findings, point 
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2 Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 General background 
Since the 1970’s, there has been a general growth in democratic values and equality 
throughout Europe and the Western world, extending to non-European countries such 
as Russia or Turkey. However, in the present year of 2017 the tide seems to be 
turning. Autocratic leaders, which enjoy strong support in part of their population 
and which do not hesitate to forcefully silence their critics, yet again rule countries 
such as Turkey, Russia, and Hungary. Even the United States, the self-proclaimed 
leaders of the free world, elected Donald Trump into presidency, a man with 
documented racist and sexist tendencies who seemingly tries to undermine the 
judiciary (e.g., by firing FBI director James Comey) and has repeatedly attacked 
critical media outlets. The revitalised strength of these socially regressive forces 
highlights two prominent features of the human experience. First, it shows people’s 
desire for powerful leaders as well as their willingness to give up control and submit 
to very strict hierarchical structures. Second, especially in case of said leaders and 
their benefactors, it shows a strong human desire for having control over other 
people. Although this seems to draw a negative picture of power (at least from a 
liberal/democratic viewpoint), not all power must be negative and not all leadership 
must mainly benefit the leader. Throughout recent history spiritual leaders, 
revolutionaries, and politicians such as Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Ghandi, 
and Nelson Mandela have provided examples for strongly positive uses of control. 
Since these both kinds of leaders deliberately held their positions at the top of the 
hierarchy, it seems reasonable to assume they were all driven by some kind of desire 
for power over other people. Given these vastly different leaders, it begs the question 
whether this desire can manifest itself in distinctly different kinds of ways and 
whether these ways relate to different kinds of hierarchies?  
This question certainly is not limited to prominent global leaders as power and 
hierarchies are ubiquitous in our social world, whether in a football team, in schools, 
at university, at different levels of management in a company, or in the relationship 
between parents and their children. The omnipresence and impact of these 
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phenomena strongly suggests the need for, and potential benefits of, a scientific 
inquiry into them. Any such attempt must begin with a clear description and 
understanding of the constructs in question. Thus, we will first briefly describe the 
concept of power, which provides the basis for both a motive to attain it and 
hierarchies (Chapter 2.2). However, this description will be restricted to a functional 
level (i.e., what do we need to know about power to investigate its incentives/motive 
and related hierarchies). We will then introduce the concept of the “power motive” 
which may underlie individuals’ desire for control/influence/power (Chapter 2.3.1). 
As the power motive is at the core of this thesis, we will provide a more in-depth 
overview regarding its varying conceptualisations and modes of measurement 
throughout its history. Importantly, although the power motive is mostly proposed to 
be unidimensional, we will highlight aspects of its historical development that 
indicate the existence of distinct components. We will also introduce the terms 
explicit and implicit motives, which are important as this investigation is only 
concerned with motives at a conscious/explicit level (Chapter 2.3.2). Next, we will 
briefly define the term “social hierarchy” (Chapter 2.4.1) and describe recent theories 
regarding distinct kinds of hierarchies relating to dominance and prestige, as well as 
power and status (Chapter 2.4.2). Finally, we will argue that synthesising research 
into the power motive and research into social hierarchies is not only necessary to 
answer the above stated research question but also beneficial to both fields of 
research (Chapter 2.5). 
 
2.2 What do we need to know about power? 
The concept of power has made its way into our daily language and is a popular 
theme in movies, books, and other media. Moreover, nearly everyone has an intuition 
of the nature of power, however, if one wants to pinpoint what precisely constitutes 
power one quickly finds that there are indeed many different conceptualisations of it. 
This is not least because many related but slightly different terms could be subsumed 
under power, such as “leadership”, “dominance”, “prestige”, “status”, “hierarchy”, 
“influence”, “control”, or “autonomy” (Schmalt & Heckhausen, 2008; Schopler, 
1965; Winter, 1973). To provide some structure to the power concept, researchers 
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have attempted to categorise different kinds of power. Arguably, the most famous of 
such categorisations is French and Raven’s (1959; Raven, 1974) six bases of power. 
These consist of influence on others through rewards (reward power), punishment 
(coercive power), by means of norms and laws (legitimate power), identification with 
the person of power (referent power), needed skills and knowledge (expert power), 
and possessing information crucial to the other person (informational power). A 
broader approach describes even as many as 64 different forms of power, consisting 
of an 8*8 grid of base/means of power and scope/goals of power (Lasswell & 
Kaplan, 1950). However, even this “tour de force” (Winter, 1973, p. 7) of power 
classifications has been criticised for falling short of describing all aspects of power. 
For example, it neglects the influence person A has on person B by sheer anticipation 
of person A’s intention (may it be harmful or beneficial; Winter, 1973).  
To overcome this problem, Winter (1973) broadly defined power as “the capacity to 
produce effects (consciously or unconsciously intended) on the behaviour or feelings 
of another person” (p. 10). He suggested, within this broad definition, to explore 
which distinctions relate to measurably different effects and to evaluate the 
importance of these differences. Using this rationale he investigated and defined a 
general power motive (see Chapter 2.3.1) with the intent to consider distinctions if 
they provide meaningfully different predictions (e.g., personalised vs socialised 
power; Winter & Stewart, 1978). In this research, we are employing a similar 
rationale by trying to cast a wide net on potentially power-related terms such as 
“dominance”, “prestige”, and “leadership”. Moreover, when investigating 
distinctions within the power motive, we will be guided by theoretical concerns (e.g., 
which different kinds of power motives would make evolutionary sense), by whether 
these distinctions can actually be measured (e.g., whether questionnaire items 
measuring each distinction load on the same or different factors), and by whether 
these distinctions predict meaningful and different kinds of behaviour.  
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2.3 Power motive 
2.3.1 Background 
In general, the term “motive” describes a relatively stable personality disposition, 
theorised to be mostly rooted in a person’s individual learning experience in their 
childhood, and is often contrasted with motivation, which describes a state rather 
than a disposition (Bischof, 2008; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; McClelland, 
1987). The function of motives is to energise, direct, and maintain behaviour 
(Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008). The power motive in particular has been the 
subject of many decades of psychological inquiry and has been investigated from 
many angles and using different methods. Below we provide a summary of the 
historical development of this investigation and highlight subtle distinctions across 
and within conceptions of the power motive by different researchers employing 
different methods. 
The first systematic classification of something like a power motive was introduced 
by Murray as early as 1938. Murray and his colleagues at the Harvard clinic set 
themselves the ambitious goal to develop a comprehensive framework of personality 
classifications (Murray, 1938). The initial concepts for their theory of personality 
were informed by their own experiences, patients, friends, and historical as well as 
fictional characters. These concepts were then refined, redefined, or discarded on the 
basis of interviews and the experimental testing of, for the most part, a group of 51 
males, mostly college students. The tests involved among others ability tests such as 
tests for memory and learning as well as projective tests such as thematic 
apperception tests (TAT) or the Rorschach Tests. Murray states that the result of this 
classification could only be regarded as a preliminary framework, which included at 
its final stage 20 needs, 8 latent needs, 4 inner states, and 12 general traits. Motives 
are synonymous to needs, which Murray (1938) describes as an “organic potentiality 
or readiness to respond in a certain way under given conditions” (p. 61) or “a force 
which (if uninhibited) promotes activity which (if competent) brings about a situation 
that is opposite (as regards its relevant properties) to the one that aroused it” (p. 42). 
Through successive activation a need gets more and more engrained in an 
individual’s personality. The need that seems to best resemble a desire for power was 
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called n Dominance (need for Dominance) and is described among other things as a 
desire to control, command and seduce others, and to act as to influence, govern, 
persuade, punish and magnetise others. However, other needs postulated by Murray 
could also fall under a definition of the power motive such as n Aggression (e.g., the 
desire to fight opposition with means such as aggression, punishment or ridicule) or 
n Autonomy (i.e., the desire to be independent from others’ controlling influence). 
Strongly influenced by Murray’s (1938) work, Jackson (1967) developed a 
questionnaire scale to measure n Dominance as part of a comprehensive set of scales 
to measure personality, called the Personality Research Form (PRF). Jackson’s 
definition of n Dominance was largely based on Murray’s, however, a notable 
distinction was that Jackson’s definition did not include Murray’s suggested 
component of “magnetising, gaining hearing, being imitated or setting the fashion” 
(Murray, 1938, p. 152). This aspect was somewhat covered in the PRF’s Social 
Recognition scale, whose defining features describe a desire for recognition and 
social approval. Jackson (1967) validated his n Dominance scale by a) showing that 
self- and peer-ratings of the presence or absence of dominance-related attributes 
correlated highly with the n Dominance score and b) showing moderate to high 
correlations between n Dominance scores and vocational interests to pursue careers 
such as army officer, public administrator, and personnel manager. A revised version 
of this PRF dominance scale is still used today and can be regarded as one of the 
most widely used tools to measure the power motive. In summary, Murray’s (1938) 
first description of a power-related need (n Dominance) grew out of an effort to 
categorise a range of needs and personality traits, which was based on very little 
theory but mostly on the subjective clustering of multiple methods and insights by 
Murray and his colleagues. Jackson then formalised this first approach by Murray by 
developing reliable questionnaire scales for n Dominance and other needs and 
provided a preliminary validation. Importantly, whereas Murray’s definition of n 
Dominance included desires to gain others attention, Jackson categorised this 
behaviour in a separate need called Social Recognition. 
Independent from this research line, Veroff (1957) investigated the first explicitly 
labelled “power motive”. This motive was mainly based on  Adler's (1927) idea of 
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desires for power arising from experiences of being controlled during ones’ 
childhood as well as Adorno and colleagues’ (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
& Sanford, 1950) thoughts on authoritarian personalities (see Veroff, 1992). It was 
defined as a “disposition directing behaviour toward satisfactions contingent upon 
the control of the means of influencing another person(s)” (Veroff, 1957, p. 1) and 
was created to parallel McClelland and colleagues’ (McClelland & Atkinson, 1948; 
McClelland, Clark, Thornton, & Atkinson, 1949) research on hunger and 
achievement motives. Instead of using self-report questionnaire items, McClelland 
utilised content-coded stories participants had written in response to TAT pictures 
(e.g., a captain on a boat behind a steering wheel). The coding system was developed 
by comparing stories from participants in neutral conditions with participants whose 
relevant motive was aroused (e.g., if they were hungry or felt the need to excel in 
something). The idea being that stories written in the arousal conditions would be 
ridden by unconscious desires for food or achievements. To develop his coding 
system Veroff (1957) compared stories written by students in a neutral condition 
with stories written by students who were waiting for their election results 
determining whether or not they would become student leaders. However, this 
particular arousal method possibly resulted in a coding system biased towards a fear 
of powerlessness (Schmalt & Heckhausen, 2008; Veroff, 1992), which was 
substantiated by findings of high power motives (as measured with Veroff’s coding 
system) in participants with little money, little education, and coming from broken 
homes (Veroff, Atkinson, Feld, & Gukin, 1960).  
Following Veroff’s work, Uleman (1972) developed another coding system in the 
McClelland tradition. Similarly to Veroff, Uleman was inspired by the works of 
Adler (1927), but also Murray (1938), and White (1959) who argued that the root of 
power is one’s feeling of efficacy. In order to derive his coding system, Uleman 
(1972) conducted an arousal study on 42 members of a student fraternity. The 
students were paired up and told to play two card games and a match-stick game, 
however, unknown to one of the students (the “participant”) the other student (the 
“experimenter”) was given additional instructions. The “experimenter” was 
instructed to frustrate the “participant” by beating them in all of the three games and 
was thus given clues on how to win in all of them. Every student wrote five stories in 
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response to TAT pictures just before the game was actually played; differences 
between the stories of the aroused group (the “experimenter” group) and the non-
aroused group (the “participant” group) thus constituted the basis for Uleman's 
(1972) coding system. Because of this more active arousal method, Uleman's (1972) 
coding system was more focused on a hope to gain power rather than Veroff's (1957) 
fear of powerlessness. Both coding systems include a prestige-component, for 
example in Veroff's (1957) system, instances of a character trying to convince 
another or provide unsolicited teaching should be scored as power motivated. In 
Uleman's (1972) system, a power scoring was warranted if characters in the story 
were particularly wealthy or famous or actively sought to give other people advice. 
In summary, based on McClelland’s arousal methodology (McClelland & Atkinson, 
1948; McClelland et al., 1949) both Veroff (1957) and Uleman (1972) developed 
coding systems to measure the power motive. However, whereas Veroff’s coding 
system seemed to reflect more of a fear of powerlessness Uleman’s coding system 
described a more forceful hope to gain power.  
Another student of McClelland, David Winter (1973), attempted to encompass all of 
these different conceptualisations of power. After briefly reviewing literature on 
power he acknowledged that the many conceptualisations of power including 
Murray's (1938) might aim at different kinds of power and concluded that the 
common theme between all of these conceptualisations of power was the “the 
capacity to produce effects (consciously or unconsciously intended) on the behaviour 
or feelings of another person” (Winter, 1973, p. 10). He used this very broad 
definition to guide the development of his initial coding system. Using the 
McClelland arousal methodology he compared stories written to TAT-like pictures 
by students who had either watched the inauguration speech of John F. Kennedy 
(arousal group) or a film about a businessman explaining some equipment (non-
arousal group). He then revised this initial coding system by incorporating elements 
of Veroff's (1957) and Uleman's (1972) coding systems including their ideas of the 
power motive being related to prestige in terms of wealth, fame, and unsolicited 
helping behaviour/advice giving. He further cross-checked the revised coding system 
with his arousal study as well as Veroff's (1957) and Uleman's (1972) arousal studies 
and found that this revised coding system, unlike any coding system before, 
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successfully distinguished between the arousal and the non-arousal group across all 
these studies.  
 
Table 2.1. Examples of research findings regarding the power motive. 
The power motive positively predicted… Type of 
motive 
Published in 
Alcohol consumption, pretending to have better grades, reading 
sport and sex magazines in student a sample. 
Implicit Winter, 1973 
Basal testosterone levels in males. Implicit Stanton & Schultheiss 
(2009) 
Choosing power-relevant occupations (e.g., psychotherapist, 
journalist, or business management) in females.  
Implicit Jenkins (1994); Winter 
(1988) 
Self-reported preference for choosing power-relevant 
occupations. 
Explicit Jackson (1967) 
Making utilitarian choices (e.g., killing someone to save five 
others) in hypothetical moral dilemmas. This was even more 
pronounced if the utilitarian choice benefitted the power-
motivated person directly. 
Explicit Suessenbach & Moore 
(2015) 




The likelihood of rejecting offers in the ultimatum game. Explicit Baumert et al. (2014) 
 
Based on this coding system Winter (1988) defined the power motive as “a concern 
for having impact on others, arousing strong emotions in others, or maintaining 
reputation and prestige” (p.510), which is the predominant definition of the power 
motive today (e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 
2012; Suessenbach & Moore, 2015). Many research findings have since supported 
the validity of this coding system showing that, for example, highly power motivated 
students held more positions of power at the university, preferred competitive sports, 
appeared more convincing and influential in discussion groups, or possessed more 
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status-signalling objects like sports cars or expensive watches (Winter, 1973; see 
Table 2.1 for more exemplary findings regarding the power motive). In summary, in 
an effort to combine previous research on the power motive, Winter (1973) 
developed a coding system for TAT-like stories employing the McClelland arousal 
methodology and incorporating the earlier coding systems by Veroff (1957) and 
Uleman (1972). Based on this encompassing coding system he defined the power 
motive as a desire for control and gaining prestige, whose function is to energise, 
direct, and maintain behaviour related to achieve these goals. 
 
2.3.2 Implicit and explicit motives 
The two different ways to measure the power motive – and in fact all other motives – 
by using self-report questionnaire items or coding the content of stories to TAT-like 
pictures have caused some friction within the motivational psychology community. 
This was due to inconsistencies in results between the two approaches (although they 
were supposed to measure the same motive; e.g., Fineman, 1977) and consistently 
low correlations between motives measured by these two different methods (e.g., 
Child, Frank, & Storm, 1956; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; McClelland, 
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). Nonetheless, in their seminal paper McClelland, 
Koestner, and Weinberger (1989) argued that the two methods indeed measure the 
same motive but measure different kinds of motive expression. Originally, 
McClelland and colleagues proposed that motives measured with self-report 
questionnaires predict specific choice behaviour in response to specific situations 
whereas motives measured with the TAT method would predict more spontaneous 
behavioural trends over a longer timeframe.  As such, they proposed that whereas the 
former method predicts whether, for example, somebody chooses a power profession 
(e.g., lawyer, politician) the latter method predicts how much power behaviour they 
then show in this profession. Schultheiss (2001) later improved and refined this 
theory based on a dual process account (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Frankish & 
Evans, 2009). More precisely, he proposed that there are implicit and explicit 
motives, which underlie two independent systems, an experiential system (ES) and a 
verbal-symbolic system (VSS).  
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Implicit motives (i.e., the motives assessed through content coding of TAT-like 
fantasy stories) are proposed to be underpinned by the ES, which is characterised by 
an immediate processing of stimuli without the need of symbolic mental 
representations. This refers to stimuli which can be described as unconditioned in a 
Pavlovian sense (e.g., the sight of a snake; Pavlov & Anrep, 2003) eliciting 
emotional-motivational responses (e.g., a fear reaction) but also stimuli that have 
been conditioned to elicit emotional-motivational responses. This extends to 
unconscious instrumental learning, which is characterised by internalising, through 
trial-and-error or even just through observation and imitation, the behaviours 
instrumental to achieving a desired emotional-motivational response. Schultheiss 
(2001) argued that, when confronted with a conditioned stimulus, people feel an urge 
to display the learnt behaviour to achieve the desired goal state. He concluded that 
the stimuli and correspondent urge can remain completely unconscious (hence the 
term implicit) whereas the goal states (e.g., fear or happiness) may reach one’s 
awareness. Following this logic it seems sensible to assume that a simple, non-verbal 
stimulus such as a TAT picture (e.g., showing a captain on a ship) can unconsciously 
arouse motives (e.g., the power motive) which triggers motive-relevant behaviours 
(e.g., dominating another person), which in lack of the possibility of actually doing 
so are thus represented in a person’s fantasy story. 
Explicit motives (i.e., the motives assessed by self-report measures such as 
questionnaires) are proposed to be underpinned by the VSS, which is characterised 
by processing spoken or written language. This system is argued to be 
phylogenetically younger as well as developmentally older than the ES (e.g., babies 
make simple stimulus-reaction connections before they understand language). 
Whereas knowledge in the ES is stored as unconscious stimuli-reaction 
contingencies in the limbic system, knowledge in the VSS is stored as conscious 
mental representations in the declarative memory (hippocampus). This latter 
knowledge is acquired by fitting and connecting it to already existing language-based 
concepts and contexts. Lasting mental representations of the VSS could therefore be 
helpful when working on tasks whose rewards will only be given in the future (see 
delay of gratification studies; e.g., Mischel, 1996) but might also lead to putting 
much effort into tasks with an expected reward at the end, which then turn out to be 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 14 
non-rewarding. Schultheiss (2001) argued that there would have been no 
evolutionary need for two systems to evolve to do the same task. Since the 
phylogenetically older ES already covers the immediate connections of stimuli with 
motivational-emotional states, the function of the VSS’s role would therefore be to 
consciously (hence the term explicit) represent the self, one’s role in a social group 
as well as the needs of this social group. He argues that this dissociation lies at the 
core of the consistently reported low correlations between implicit and explicit 
motives. Following this logic it seems sensible to assume that reading questionnaire 
items regarding oneself (e.g., “I want to be a leader”) arouse the conscious self-
concept of a person (e.g., conscious goals to gain power), which then guide a person 
to provide an answer to the question in line with their consciously retrieved self-
concept (e.g., the explicit power motive).  
In summary, motives assessed through TAT-like fantasy stories and self-report 
questionnaires have been labelled implicit and explicit motives, respectively. 
Consistently reported low correlations between these motives can be explained by 
two independent systems underlying them, the ES and VSS. Whereas the ES is based 
on simple and unconscious stimulus-reaction contingencies, the VSS is constituted of 
mental representations of language-based knowledge. Implicit motives are therefore 
aroused by non-verbal stimuli such as pictures or facial expressions and represent an 
immediate urge to attain a positive emotional-motivational state (e.g., happiness) by 
eliciting the corresponding learned behaviour. Explicit motives, on the other hand, 
are aroused by symbolic stimuli such as written text or verbal instructions and 
represent a desire to act in line with one’s consciously retrieved self-concept.  
 
2.4 Social hierarchies 
2.4.1 Background 
Humans and other animals live in social hierarchies in which they have asymmetrical 
access to resources, attention, and influence on others (e.g., Chase et al., 2002; 
Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The higher an individual ranks in a hierarchy the more 
such benefits do they obtain. Ranks are determined by the extent individuals are 
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perceived to possess attributes related to relevant social dimensions (e.g., their 
potential to threat or having valuable skills). This definition stresses two important 
points. First, rank ordering does not necessarily depend on the actual possession of 
socially relevant attributes, but the perceived ones. A person who can, at least 
temporarily, pretend to possess amazing healing skills might be highly respected for 
this and thus at the top of this hierarchy even though the person has only faked this 
skill. Second, humans are not only ranked within a single hierarchy. For example, a 
person who is physically threatening but also unintelligent can be highly ranked in a 
physical dominance hierarchy but low ranked in terms of knowledge. As the ability 
to form social hierarchies is argued to be highly evolutionarily beneficial, such 
hierarchies are proposed to have appeared very early in the human/primate history 
(Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010). A large part of these evolutionary benefits can 
be explained by three important functions hierarchies still hold in our daily lives: 
providing desired social order, aiding cooperation, and providing individual 
incentives (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2011; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). 
Social hierarchies satisfy an inherent need for social order. For example, researchers 
found that in task-related contexts people preferred dominance asymmetries even 
when they were the submissive partner (Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young, 2007). 
Moreover, in another study Tiedens and Fragale (2003) showed that in an interactive 
task participants spontaneously assumed complimentary body postures in response to 
confederates’ body postures (e.g., dominant if confederates were submissive and 
submissive if confederates were dominant) and if done so felt more comfortable and 
liked their confederate more. Besides providing social order, the desire for 
hierarchies might also be due to it facilitating cooperation between individuals. In 
line with this researchers found a coordination advantage between pairs of 
participants whose statuses were experimentally manipulated (i.e., low and high 
status) as opposed to equal status participants (de Kwaadsteniet & Dijk, 2010). 
Moreover, better performances were found in an interdependent group task if groups 
consisted of a mix of high and low power primed individuals as opposed to groups 
with only high or only low power primed individuals (Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, 
& Galinsky, 2012).  
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Most essential for the research in this PhD thesis, hierarchies hold many important 
incentives. For example, researchers could show that having a higher rank in a 
hierarchy is more beneficial than having a lower rank in terms of general health 
(Adler et al., 2000), reduced stress as long as hierarchies are stable (Knight & Mehta, 
2017), reproductive success in males (Hill, 1984), or higher salaries and higher job 
satisfaction (Tannenbaum, Kavcic, Rosner, Vianello, & Weiser, 1974). These 
benefits arguably create an incentive to attain a higher rank in the hierarchy and to 
show hierarchy-enhancing behaviour such as trying to get control over other people 
or attaining other’s admiration. Allport (1937) has argued that it would be 
evolutionarily beneficial for functionally autonomous motives to develop, which 
incentivise people to show such behaviour (e.g., wanting to control others) without 
necessarily focussing on the long-term goals (e.g., increasing one’s rank in a 
hierarchy to reap its benefits) in order to keep these behaviours refreshed in one’s 
memory. It seems reasonable to assume that the aforementioned power motive (e.g., 
Winter, 1973) represents exactly this kind of functionally autonomous motive related 
to hierarchies.  
In summary, social hierarchies describe rank differences along perceived socially 
relevant attributes, which are characterised by asymmetrical access to resources, 
control, and attention. The prevalence of these hierarchies is arguably due to several 
important functions hierarchies fulfil such as establishing desired social order, 
facilitating coordination and cooperation, and providing incentives to attain higher 
ranks. The latter incentives might be underpinned by a motive to attain control over 
others and attain prestige and reputation (i.e., the power motive). 
 
2.4.2 Bases of social hierarchies: Power vs status & dominance 
vs prestige 
As highlighted in the definition of social hierarchies, they can be regarded as 
multidimensional constructs, allowing a person to be low ranked on one, and high on 
another. Early theories considered several bases for hierarchies such as “force and 
force threat”, “wealth”, “prestige” and “friendship-love-affection” (Goode, 1978, p. 
3), or “traditional” grounds (e.g., birth right), “charisma”, or “legality” (e.g., by 
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making and adhering to laws; Weber, 2009, p. 79). However, recently researchers 
argued that there are only two bases of hierarchies, one determined by an actor’s 
ability to make others do what the actor wants and one determined by the voluntary 
deference of others to an actor as a function of the others’ admiration and respect 
(Bischof, 2008; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Nonetheless, 
researchers are divided across two theoretical approaches to describe this dichotomy 
of hierarchies using different labels and emphasizing somewhat different aspects: 
power vs status and dominance vs prestige approach.  
The first approach differentiates between hierarchies based on power and status (e.g., 
Blader & Chen, 2012; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; 
Mannix & Sauer, 2006) where power is defined as having asymmetrical access over 
valued resources and status is defined as having the respect and admiration in the 
eyes of others
1
. This approach has grown out of an attempt to organise research 
regarding hierarchies described by Magee and Galinsky (2008) as “in sorting through 
the history of research on hierarchy, our analysis has revealed a focus on status and 
power as the primary dimension of hierarchy differentiation even if those terms were 
not always used.” (p. 364) This categorisation effort observed research on hierarchies 
from many angles, for example, it included research on power (Emerson, 1962), 
status (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980), stratification (Baron, 1984), social 
exchange (Blau, 1964) and authority (Weber, 2009). As such, it highlights the wide 
applicability of this approach. Nonetheless, the power vs status approach suffers 
from two major weaknesses. First, as this approach was born out of a mere 
categorisation effort of existing findings regarding hierarchy, it lacks a clear 
theoretical framework and thus, for example, does not explain how and why these 
two kinds of hierarchies came to existence. Second, as power is conceptualised as 
having asymmetrical access to resources it confounds both the base and the outcome 
of a hierarchy (Cheng et al., 2013). Nonetheless, we hold that the power vs status 
framework can still provide useful insights when using a slightly different 
                                                 
1
 To avoid confusion we will use these definitions for power and status throughout this thesis. 
However, note that many researchers have defined status differently, as a measure of rank position in 
terms of influence or prominence (Bai, 2017; Cheng et al., 2010). Moreover, the term power is not 
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conceptualisation of power. Thus, instead of regarding power as asymmetrical access 
to resources we propose regarding power as some formalised right to asymmetrical 
access such as when being the manager of a company.
2
 In line with our definition of 
social hierarchies, it follows then that the more primary others perceive these rights 
to be, the higher is the individual’s rank in the power hierarchy and the more actual 
asymmetrical access to resources will they obtain.  
The second approach to differentiate between two types of hierarchies is embedded 
in a more comprehensive theoretical framework. This approach differentiates 
between hierarchies based on dominance and prestige (e.g., Cheng et al., 2013; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 2016). Dominance is defined as 
attaining a higher social rank through intimidation and coercing others. Prestige is 
similarly defined as status but with a stronger focus on admiration and respect for 
valued skills and knowledge instead of just general admiration and respect. The 
dominance vs prestige approach is based on the evolutionary assumption that having 
a higher rank in a hierarchy increases the chances of survival for oneself and one’s 
offspring. The historically oldest way to achieve a higher rank was through 
threatening or physical violence, dominance, which can be observed in humans as 
well as many animals (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Prestige 
hierarchies are assumed to have developed specifically in humans. This is explained 
by an evolutionary benefit for others to keep in close proximity to individuals from 
which they could learn valuable skills and knowledge. However, as there would be a 
competition for this individuals’ attention, people would try wooing this person with 
their admiration, respect, and voluntary deference, in short, prestige. Having prestige, 
in turn, would become evolutionarily beneficial for the person who has it, thus 
suggesting that natural selection would favour people who have the ability to respect 
and admire others as well as people who are actually respected and admired (Henrich 
& Gil-White, 2001). 
                                                                                                                                          
synonymous to the power motive. As such we do not define the power motive as a desire for having 
asymmetrical resources but as desire for control and prestige (Winter, 1973).  
2
 This slight modification of power seems to be legitimate as most research regarding power involves 
hierarchies in organisations in which scholars investigate positions of power with formal rights such 
as different levels of management (e.g., Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Mannix & Sauer, 2006). 
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These two approaches show substantial overlap, some differences and in some cases, 
can complement each other. Both approaches agree that power/dominance is a 
property of actors used to compel others to do things. Both approaches also agree 
that status/prestige is a state granted by others accompanied by a voluntary deference 
of others to this person of high status or prestige. However, whereas power refers to 
influencing others through reward and punishment (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), 
dominance only refers to influence through coercion/punishment (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). In the dominance vs prestige approach, prosocial behaviour is only 
related to prestige, as, for example, it signals a higher level of morality (often a 
valued dimension; Cheng & Tracy, 2014), but not dominance. Contrary to that, in the 
power vs status approach, prosocial behaviour can be related to both power (the 
reward part) and status (for the same reason as prestige). Despite, or maybe because 
of the differences in these two approaches they can also complement each other in 
their shortcomings. For example, whereas the dominance vs prestige approach is 
perfectly suited the power vs status approach seems poorly suited to explain the 
spontaneous emergence of power/dominance hierarchies in groups of strangers who 
cannot assess their respective access resources (Cheng et al., 2013) or right to access 
resources. Nonetheless, if power is regarded as a formal right to asymmetrical access 
to resources, in line with our suggestion above, the power vs status approach 
becomes more suitable to explain rank differences such as between team member 
and leader. Whereas in the power vs status approach the team leader is afforded a 
higher rank in the hierarchy due to their perceived right to asymmetrical access to 
resources. In the dominance vs prestige approach the team leader would only be 
afforded with a higher rank if the team members where afraid of punishment 
(dominance) or if they attributed valuable skills to the team leader (prestige). Neither 
necessarily needs to be the case, however the team leader would arguably still be 
perceived to be hierarchically superior. Hence, there are nuanced differences 
between the dominance vs prestige and power vs status approaches, which might 
make the dominance vs prestige approach more suitable to explain the natural 
emergence of hierarchies and the power vs status approach more suitable to explain 
formalised hierarchies (e.g., a leadership position in companies). 
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In summary, in order to categorise different kinds of hierarchies researchers have 
distinguished between two bases of influence in hierarchies. The first base is called 
power or dominance and describes a property of an actor to be able to influence 
others in a way they want either through reward and punishment (in case of power) 
or through coercion (in case of dominance). The second base is called status or 
prestige and describes a voluntary deference of others to an actor as a function of 
their admiration and respect for the actor (in case of status) and specifically for the 
actor’s skills and knowledge in a valued domain (in case of prestige). 
 
2.5 Synthesis of research into the power motive and hierarchies 
Research into the power motive and hierarchy differentiation have been largely 
independent, which may stem from the power motive’s definition - a desire for 
control and prestige - confounding different types of hierarchies. Nonetheless, we 
argue that synthesising these approaches would be beneficial in several ways. If 
behaviour and cognition related to increasing one’s rank in a hierarchy are fuelled by 
functionally autonomous motives (cf. Allport, 1937) and if there are different kinds 
of hierarchies, then it would seem reasonable to assume that different kinds of 
functionally autonomous motives underlie behaviour and cognition related to these 
different kinds of hierarchies. In line with this, Bischof (2008) has theorised that it 
would be evolutionarily beneficial if “Machtstreben” and “Geltungsstreben” 
(translates to power & prestige striving, respectively) had developed as distinct and 
functionally autonomous motives. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge this has 
never been empirically investigated, moreover, it has not been connected to research 
into the power motive. Embedding this research into the motivational psychology 
framework holds several advantages. First, based on the distinction between implicit 
and explicit motives, much clearer predictions could be made regarding the 
behaviour and cognition of hierarchy-relevant motives. Second, and most 
importantly for this research, it would answer the question of whether there are 
distinguishable components of the power motive related to different kinds of 
hierarchies and whether those predict meaningfully different behaviours and 
cognitions. If this were the case, then this would demonstrate that a unidimensional 
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conceptualisation of the power motive is insufficient and motivational psychologists 
would benefit from assessing its individual components. Finally, investigating 
whether there are distinct motives underlying different kinds of hierarchies might 
shed light on the validity of the power vs status and the dominance vs prestige 
approaches by determining whether power and dominance or status and prestige 
underlie the same or different motives.  
Although no research has directly addressed these questions, some researchers have 
used methods that tapped into these motives. For example, Cheng, Tracy, and 
Henrich (2010) developed a questionnaire to measure people’s dispositional 
dominance and prestige strategies. Whereas the dominance-strategy items showed a 
great resemblance with motive items (e.g., “I enjoy having control over others.”), the 
prestige-strategy items described a state of having prestige rather than a desire to 
gain prestige (e.g., “Members of my group respect and admire me.”). Maner and 
Mead (2010) utilised a subset of the Achievement Motive Scales (AMS; Cassidy & 
Lynn, 1989) to measure dominance and prestige desires. Here, at face-value, the 
prestige scale seemed to be accurate (e.g., “I want to be an important person in the 
community.”) although it matched more a definition of status than prestige as it was 
not focused on skills and knowledge. However, the dominance scale did not seem to 
measure dominance desires as defined by Henrich and Gil-White (2001) nor as 
measured by Cheng and colleagues (Cheng et al., 2010) but seemed to be more 
concerned with leadership desires (e.g., “I would make a good leader.”). Blader and 
Chen (2011) used a concern for status scale (e.g., “I wish to have high status”) which 
potentially matched with a status definition, however, as all items contained the word 
“status” it seemed to be highly dependent on what a layperson considers status to be. 
Thus, none of the existing questionnaire scales have fully captured the essence of 
motives in line with definitions of power/dominance and status/prestige hierarchies. 
In summary, we propose that distinct functionally autonomous motives underlie 
different kinds of hierarchies and that these motives relate to different kinds of 
behaviour and cognition, which would be functional to rise in the respective 
hierarchy. Moreover, we propose that these motives can be regarded as components 
of a general power motive, thus combining the research areas of hierarchy 
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differentiation and motivational psychology. This synthesis is beneficial in several 
ways as it shows whether a unidimensional power motive confounds important 
motivational differences or whether the conceptualisation of hierarchies based on 
power vs status or dominance vs prestige can be substantiated by distinct motives for 
each type of hierarchy. 
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3 Chapter 3: Preliminary exploratory factor analysis 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter we describe our first study to empirically bridge the gap between 
theories of different kinds of social hierarchies (power vs status; dominance vs. 
prestige; e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and research 
into the power motive (Winter, 1973). As a first step we created a large questionnaire 
item pool with items relating to the power motive and then selected items that fitted 
either to a broadly defined power/dominance (i.e., “Desiring asymmetrical access to 
resources or gaining influence through coercion”) or status/prestige (i.e., “Desiring 
respect and admiration from others, preferably for one’s skills and knowledge”) 
categories. For this initial item pool we selected the most frequently used scales to 
measure the power motive (Mayer, Faber, & Xu, 2007), scales that have shown to 
relate to different components of the power motive in a cluster analysis (Schönbrodt 
& Gerstenberg, 2012), and scales which were immediately relevant to the dominance 
vs prestige distinction (Cheng et al., 2010). Moreover, we added some newly created 
items to be able to measure the above stated categories in their full breadth. Note that 
this item pool was not an exhaustive collection of all questionnaire items which 
could have been used to measure the power motive (e.g., Achievement Motive Scales 
(AMS), Cassidy & Lynn, 1989). However, the items in the scales not included 
appeared at face-value very similar to the ones we selected, thus, we believe our 
initial item pool to provide a good cross section of questionnaire items measuring the 
power motive. The aim in this study was to investigate these items’ underlying factor 
structure by an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in order to see how many distinct 








Recommendations for minimum sample sizes in EFAs depend on how many 
questionnaire items determine a factor and the items’ communality (MacCallum, 
Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). As questionnaire items were related to the same 
concept, the power motive, we assumed moderate item communality and potentially 
few items determining a single factor. Thus, we opted for a minimum sample size of 
n = 500, which is at the higher end of what is recommended in this case (MacCallum 
et al., 1999). Hence, for this first EFA we collected 527 participants of which we 
excluded 20 participants for answering with “somewhat disagree”, “disagree” or 
“strongly disagree” to our attention checking question “It is better to do good than to 
do bad”. This attention checking question is adopted from Graham and colleagues’ 
(Graham et al., 2011) Moral Foundation Questionnaire (MFQ, 2017; 
www.moralfoundations.org). In the remaining sample gender was split evenly, 51% 
males (Mage = 34.26, SDage = 11.10). The sample was restricted to the United States 
and Great Britain with participants coming from a large variety of different 
professions (e.g., arts, management, university, IT, law, finance). Participants were 
paid 1 USD or the equivalent amount in GBP.  
 
Material  
We preselected 28 out of 59 questionnaire items from existing scales related to the 
explicit power motive, including the Personal Value Questionnaire (PVQ;  
McClelland, 1991), Personality Research Form (PRF dominance; Jackson, 1984), 
Unified Motive Scales (UMS power; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012), GOALS 
inventory (Pöhlmann & Brunstein, 1997), scales by Cheng and colleagues (2010) as 
well as some items created by ourselves. Questionnaire items (see Table 3.1) were 
selected on the basis of matching broad definitions of power/dominance (“Desiring 
asymmetrical access to resources or gaining influence through coercion”; 15 items) 
or status/prestige (“Desiring respect and admiration from others, preferably for one’s 
skills and knowledge”; 13 items). Some items were phrased as statements (e.g., “I 
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feel confident when directing the activities of others”) others as goals (e.g., “Be 
respected and admired”). Statement items were answered on a 6-point Likert scale 
with the scale anchors “Strongly disagree”, “Disagree”, “Slightly disagree”, “Slightly 
agree”, “Agree” and “Strongly agree”. Goal items were answered on a 6-point Likert 
scale with scale anchors “Not important to me”, “Of little importance to me”, “Of 
some importance to me”, “Important to me”, “Very important to me”, “Extremely 
important to me” (cf. Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). These anchors will be used 
throughout all reported studies. 
 
Procedure 
Participants filled in an online questionnaire through Amazon’s MTurk. To avoid 
response bias due to similar items, focal questionnaire items (n = 28) were randomly 
intermingled with the 10-item scales of UMS achievement, UMS affiliation, UMS 
intimacy, UMS Fear of losing control, and UMS Fear of losing reputation 
(Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). After completing the questionnaire, participants 
reported demographics and were fully debriefed. 
 
3.3 Results 
We first conducted a Maximum Average Partial test (MAP; Zwick & Velicer, 1986) 
as well as a Parallel Analysis (PA; Horn, 1965) on all of our focal items (n = 28) in 
order to assess the number, or a range, of factors that appropriately reflected the 
correlations between questionnaire items. MAP test and PA suggested a range of 
three to four factors, hence we first conducted a principal axis factor analysis with an 
oblique “promax” rotation (this was used for all EFAs throughout this thesis) on a 
four-factor solution. The resulting item-to-factor pattern showed three distinct factors 
comprised of high loadings of similar items within the same factor as well as one 
factor with high loadings of 8 out of the 9 goal items, mixed across power/dominance 
and status/prestige items (likely representing a method factor). One out of the three 
other factors matched our definition of prestige/status, the other two factors seemed 
to be related to distinct dominance and leadership desires, respectively (see 
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definitions in Chapter 4). This four-factor solution explained 44.8% of the variance 
in items.  
In light of the possible method factor we next modelled a three-factor solution (see 
Table 3.1). This factor analysis yielded the same three factors representing 
status/prestige, dominance, and leadership desires, however, most of the goal items 
now loaded on factors with similar item content. The amount of variance explained 
by this three-factor solution remained virtually unchanged at 44.6%.  
 
Table 3.1. Factor loadings of a three-factor solution including all 28 focal items with 
loadings < .25 omitted. Reverse scored items are marked with #. Items in italics were 
removed in the refined solution. Category denotes whether items were initially 
selected for matching a power/dominance (P) or status/prestige definition (S). 
 Prestige Leadership Dominance Category 
I like it when others look up to me. 0.56   S 
Be respected and admired by other people. 0.91   S 
To be well-known to a lot of people. 0.61   S 
A position with prestige. 0.55 0.26  S 
Be held in high-esteem by those I know. 0.85   S 
It is not important to me that others value my 
opinion.# 
0.38   S 
I feel sad if nobody recognises my unique 
talents and abilities. 
0.49 -0.34 0.31 S 
I am happy to do people favours as long as 
they respect me. 
0.26   S 
It is important to me to be considered an 
expert on some matters. 
0.37  0.31 S 
High social status. 0.44  0.32 S 
I would like to be an executive with power 
over others. 
 0.58 0.30 P 
I have little interest in leading others.#  0.80  P 
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I feel confident when directing the activities 
of others. 
 0.73  P 
I do not enjoy having authority over other 
people.# 
 0.80  P 
I enjoy having control over others.  0.54 0.39 P 
The opportunity to exercise control over an 
organization or group. 
 0.55  P 
To be in a leadership position in which others 
work for me or look to me for direction. 
0.27 0.65  P 
I try to control others rather than permit them 
to control me. 
 0.26 0.55 P 
I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get 
my way. 
  0.64 P 
Others know it is better to let me have my 
way. 
  0.75 P 
I often try to get my own way regardless of 
what others may want. 
  0.83 P 
I like to have the final say.   0.41 P 
Opportunities to influence others.  0.51 0.44  P 
I am more likely to help another person when 
other people are watching. 
  0.62 S 
I often want to impress other people with my 
actions. 
0.40  0.50 S 
I like buying things which impress other 
people. 
  0.50 S 
Be able to exert influence. 0.49 0.43  P 
I do not have a forceful or dominant 
personality.#  
 0.46 0.30 P 
 
To explore whether the factor structure could be further simplified, although not 
recommend by MAP test and PA, we conducted factor analyses with a two-factor 
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and a one-factor structure. The two-factor solution explained only 39.7% of the 
variance, however, almost all dominance and leadership related items loaded highly 
on one factor whereas almost all status/prestige related items loaded highly on 
another factor. Finally, a one-factor solution explained 36.6% of the variance with 
almost all items loading < .25 on this one factor. This suggests an underlying 
communality between all the items. Nonetheless, the three-factor solution seems to 
be most appropriate due to the match between the amount of factors suggested by 
MAP and PA, amount variance explained, and having factors onto which similar 
items load. 
As a final step we refined the three-factor solution by removing six items that 
showed higher cross-loadings with a second factor, one item which, at face-value, 
seemed to be too strongly related to the achievement motive (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012), one out of two items which were almost identical, and one 
double-barrelled item (see Table 3.1). The remaining items showed high loadings on 
their respective factor with mostly negligible cross-loadings on the other two factors 
(see Table A1.1 in Appendix 1). This three-factor structure and the respective 
questionnaire items thus became the basis for our next EFA (see Chapter 4). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In this EFA we investigated how many factors underlie a set of questionnaire items 
measuring the explicit power motive and selected on the basis of matching a broad 
power/dominance or status/prestige definition. Corroborating results from MAP test, 
PA, explained variance, and face-value fit of items to factors indicated that a three-
factor solution underlying these items was best. One of these factors seemed to 
describe a dominance motive close to the conceptualisation of Henrich and Gil-
White (2001) and others (e.g., Cheng et al., 2010; Maner & Case, 2016); it 
comprised items related to using coercive measures (e.g., aggression) to achieve 
one’s will. A second factor seemed to describe a status/prestige motive close to the 
conceptualisation of Henrich and Gil-White's (2001) prestige but also Magee and 
Galinsky's (2008) status. As described earlier, these two terms are almost identical. 
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The third factor seemed to be strongly related to leadership content. This seems to be 
a strong theme among scales measuring the explicit power motive (e.g., PRF 
dominance: Jackson, 1984; UMS: Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012), which does not 
neatly fit to a dominance vs prestige framework but could be the expression of a 
desire for power (asymmetrical access or a right to asymmetrical access to valued 
resources).  
In order to refine this three-factor solution we removed nine items from our analyses 
which yielded a clearer picture of the factors. Interestingly, two items we removed 
(“I often want to impress other people with my actions.” & “I like buying things 
which impress other people.”) were more strongly related to dominance than 
status/prestige motives. This suggests that boasting about one’s achievements or 
collecting status symbols may be more related to dominance than status/prestige 
motives, potentially as one is trying to force others to admire oneself as opposed to 
voluntary admiration. This is consistent with the conceptualisation of prestige/status 
as a source of voluntary deference and substantiates the idea of treating displays of 
higher socio-economic status to be different from status/prestige (Anderson, 
Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). 
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4 Chapter 4: Development and preliminary validation of 
DoPL motive scales 
4.1 General introduction 
The three factors pertaining to dominance, prestige, and leadership (DoPL) desires, 
found in Chapter 3 emerged from items measuring the explicit power motive and 
matched definitions of distinct kinds of hierarchies. Hence, we regard these factors as 
constituent motive components of the power motive as well as distinct motives to 
enhance one’s rank in a hierarchy and, as such, connecting these two strands of 
research. Whereas the dominance and prestige motives fit neatly into the dominance 
vs prestige approach of hierarchies (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001), the leadership motive somewhat relates to both the dominance vs prestige as 
well as the power vs status approach (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In the following we 
provide a brief overview of the dominance and prestige motives including their 
occurrence within the theoretical framework of hierarchies based on 
power/dominance and status/prestige. Moreover, we provide a more extensive 
overview of how a distinct leadership motive might have evolved and how it relates 
to the dominance vs prestige and the power vs status approaches. 
 
4.1.1 Dominance motive 
Our conception of dominance is taken from Henrich and Gil-White (2001; see also 
Bischof, 2008; Cheng et al., 2010; Maner & Case, 2016) as being based on agonistic 
mechanisms such as physical force or threat displays and can be readily observed in 
many animal species and humans. Nonetheless, threats can also be on a purely 
psychological level and would often replace the use of physical violence in humans. 
As dominance behaviour is suited to increase one’s rank in a hierarchy (Cheng & 
Tracy, 2014; Cheng et al., 2013), we assume a distinct motive for dominance to have 
developed and for this motive to have become functionally autonomous (cf. Allport, 
1937; Bischof, 2008). Hence, we define the dominance motive as a desire or concern 
to coerce others into adhering to one’s will, which can be achieved through 
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intimidation, aggression, physical force, or manipulating others. In line with Bischof 
(2008; see also Lersch, 1956) we propose that out of the three DoPL motives, the 
dominance motive is the most closely related to a desire for autonomy. More 
precisely, a highly dominance motivated individual would more strongly resist being 
influenced against their will by others (i.e., not dominated by others) compared to a 
low dominance motivated individual. This conceptualisation of the dominance 
motive is well in line with dominance in the dominance vs prestige approach of 
social hierarchies (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) but only partly matches with power 
in the power vs status approach (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The latter is because a 
desire for asymmetrical access (i.e., power) or a right to asymmetrical access to 
resources (see Chapter 2) could manifest itself in a desire to have the means to 
punish someone (a dominance incentive) but also to reward someone (not a 
dominance incentive). 
 
4.1.2 Prestige motive 
Compared to dominance, prestige is proposed to be a phylogenetically younger basis 
of hierarchies (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Similar to dominance, prestige is suited 
to increasing one’s rank in a hierarchy (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Cheng et al., 2013) 
and we propose that this also led to the development of a functionally autonomous 
prestige motive (Bischof, 2008; cf. Allport, 1937). We will thus define the prestige 
motive as a desire or concern to attain respect and admiration in the eyes of others, 
primarily for one’s skills and knowledge in a valued domain. We say “primarily” 
because, though holding that in most cases the prestige motive relates to admiration 
for specific skills and knowledge, we propose that sometimes the motive can 
manifest itself as a general/unspecified desire for admiration and respect. 
Nonetheless, this motive can be distinguished from simply wanting to attain a higher 
socio-economic status (Anderson et al., 2015), the affiliation motive (the desire to be 
among friends; e.g., Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012), the desire to boast about 
accomplishments, or collecting status symbols. It should be noted that it would have 
been equally permissible to call this the status motive (cf. Magee & Galinsky, 2008); 
however, we want to avoid it being conflated with socio-economic status and also 
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stress its primary focus on admiration for skills and knowledge. As such, the prestige 
motive is well in line with definitions of prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) as 
well as Magee and Galinsky’s (2012) definitions of status.  
 
4.1.3 Leadership motive 
Similar to dominance and prestige an evolutionary account for leadership has been 
proposed. Social group living presents considerable and varied coordination 
problems (e.g., when and where to gather food, defending the group, when and 
where to move), and natural selection may have favoured a mix of leadership and 
follower traits as a solution strategy (Van Vugt, 2006). According to evolutionary 
game theory (Maynard-Smith, 1982) a mix of leaders and followers can maximise 
the fitness of the group, as concerted actions are superior to uncoordinated ones (Van 
Vugt, 2006; this is a similar argument to the one we made for the existence of 
hierarchies in Chapter 2). The leadership traits Van Vugt (2006) proposed to have 
evolved to solve these coordination problems can be sorted into two categories: 
initiative taking and directing others.  
The first set of traits Van Vugt (2006) discussed were regarding initiative taking, 
based on the simple assumption that in most cases someone has to step up to be a 
leader. Thus, he presented several studies indicating that initiative taking is a 
skill/behaviour often observed in leaders and related to leadership emergence. For 
example, individuals in executive positions at AT&T differed significantly from their 
subordinates in terms of energy and activity levels as well as preparedness to make 
decisions (Bray & Howard, 1983). In a group decision making task, individuals who 
spoke more often were rated higher in leadership abilities regardless of the perceived 
quality of their contributions (Sorrentino & Boutillier, 1975). Van Vugt (2006) 
asserted that among the variables associated with this initiative taking are 
extraversion, risk-taking, and self-esteem. Although it stands to reason that someone 
has to assume responsibility and take initiative to become a leader, the causal 
evidence for this is lacking. Thus, to substantiate this argument further studies are 
needed to show the causal role of initiative taking for leadership emergence 
including moderating variables.  
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The second set of traits Van Vugt (2006) discussed related to directing others and 
were theorised to hinge on three qualities: (social) intelligence, generosity, and 
competence. Regarding intelligence, research showed that leadership and intelligence 
are strongly related (e.g., Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986), with verbal IQ 
potentially playing an important role as this would support the communication skills 
needed as a leader (Van Vugt, 2006). Social intelligence might aid directing others 
efficiently by virtue of empathetic recognition of when followers need which kind(s) 
of direction (e.g., Bass, 1990). Van Vugt (2006) argued that generosity induces 
follower motivation by leaders generously distributing attained goods (e.g., when 
distributing the meat after a hunt), which signals to followers that they can expect 
substantial portions in future coordinated actions. Finally, perceived competence is 
theorised as attracting followers by virtue of giving the appearance that a leader 
knows what they are doing; thus, presumably, increasing trust and decreasing 
uncertainty, both of which would work to increase group cohesion independently 
from dominance or prestige related behaviours. In line with this, Ho, Shih, and 
Walters (2012) found across several tasks that males were more likely than females, 
and vice versa, to emerge as leaders depending on whether a task was framed more 
masculine or more feminine (e.g., a paper folding task framed as building task vs art 
task). Perceived competence completely mediated these effects. In summary, Van 
Vugt (2006) argued that in order to solve coordination problems throughout human 
history, leadership traits evolved which can be categorised into initiative taking and 
directing others. Whereas initiative taking is supported by traits such as extraversion, 
self-esteem, and risk-taking, directing others is supported by (social) intelligence, 
generosity, and competence. 
Assuming the existence of dominance and prestige hierarchies, is the concept of 
leadership redundant? Are individuals at the top of these hierarchies naturally the 
leaders of their group? We believe the answer is no to both of these questions. 
Although a person at the top of a dominance or prestige hierarchy possesses 
influence and attention, this does not automatically make this person a leader. We 
propose that actively taking charge and directing others to achieve a common group 
goal is what separates individuals with mere high rank positions from leaders. 
Nonetheless, the concept of leadership cannot be as clearly distinguished from 
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dominance and prestige as dominance and prestige can be distinguished from each 
other (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). This is because the influence of a leader can 
arise from dominance and/or prestige but potentially also from other sources. For 
example, a group under imminent threat might prefer following a dominant leader 
(e.g., Winston Churchill in Britain during World War II) that can immediately 
enforce the necessary group cohesion (see also Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 
1984; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Moreover, a group might want to follow a 
person out of respect and admiration for their competence (e.g., Ho et al., 2012) or 
generosity (e.g., Boehm, 1999; Van Vugt, 2006). Notwithstanding this, it is also 
possible that there are other sources of influence. For example, a group might want to 
follow a person out of mere self-interest, as they believe she or he is the best person 
available to organise the group (Stogdill, 1975); this does not presuppose that the 
group admires or respects the person for their organisation skill. Moreover, another 
source of influence might be through the perceived legitimacy of a person to direct 
others (French & Raven, 1959). This source of influence would match our slightly 
modified understanding of power (cf. Magee & Galinsky, 2008; see Chapter 2) as a 
legitimate right to asymmetrical access to resources. For example, Raven and French 
(1958) showed that participants in a group task accepted directions from a leader 
even if this leader only appeared to be democratically elected but was not actually 
elected by the group (i.e., participants did not know the election was rigged). 
Nonetheless, although hypothetically these other sources of influence could be 
independent from dominance and prestige, whether they are independent in practice 
is a question that awaits further investigation.  
In summary, we propose that being a leader is not a mere by-product of being at the 
top of a dominance or prestige hierarchy but involves actively taking 
charge/initiative and the will/skill to direct others. Nonetheless, at least some of the 
sources of influence a leader can tap into are related to dominance and prestige 
processes, thus making the distinction between leadership and both prestige and 
dominance less clear-cut as the distinction between only the latter two.  
We acknowledge that this account of leadership is not yet as well worked out and 
substantiated by multiple sources of theoretical and empirical evidence as the 
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dominance vs prestige approach (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001). Thus, whether one can assume a distinct leadership hierarchy, akin to a 
dominance or prestige hierarchy is still an open question. Alternatively, leadership 
could also be regarded as a social dimension orthogonal to prestige and dominance, a 
desire to put one’s hierarchy position into use to achieve a common group goal. In 
either case, we hold that a group supplies a leader with additional influence and 
attention as this serves the group’s aim for coordinated activities (e.g., Van Vugt, 
2006). Moreover, leadership might serve as a consolidation of one’s rank position by 
legitimising it beyond dominance and prestige aspects (e.g., French & Raven, 1959). 
Thus, we propose that leadership is suitable for increasing a person’s fitness. 
Moreover, in line with the ideas of evolved leadership traits (Van Vugt, 2006), we 
propose the development of a functionally autonomous leadership motive (cf. 
Allport, 1937). We define this leadership motive as a desire or concern to guide and 
direct activities of others, which is not necessarily tied to acting either in favour or 
against other people’s will. The motive’s satisfaction arises from “being in charge” 
and taking responsibility.   
 
In this chapter we report three studies which aimed at developing a 30-item 
questionnaire to measure reliably three distinct dominance, prestige, and leadership 
motives (10 items per scale) as well as providing a preliminary validation of these 
scales. More precisely, in Study 1 we created a pool of questionnaire items in line 
with our definitions of the dominance, prestige, and leadership motives in order to 
capture these concepts in their full breadth. Based on an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) of these items showing the predicted three factor structure, we selected the 
best items in order to create a preliminary 10-item scale for each of the DoPL 
motives. In Study 2, we refined these three 10-item scales, provided short scales of 6 
and 4-items for each motive, and assessed the model fit of these final scales in a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Moreover, in a set of preregistered correlation 
analyses we showed the final DoPL scales’ validity within their nomological net. In 
Study 3, we demonstrated that two established scales to measure the explicit power 
motive, the Unified Motive Scales’ power (UMS power; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 
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2012) and the Personality Research Form’s dominance scale (PRF dominance; 
Jackson, 1984), could be decomposed into differently weighed combinations of 
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4.2 Study 1 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants 
As each of the three factors should be well determined (i.e., having many items 
loading highly on the factor) and having assumed higher communalities due to 
narrower concepts, we reduced our minimum sample size to n = 400 (MacCallum et 
al., 1999). Hence, for this EFA we collected data from 464 participants via Amazon’s 
MTurk of which we excluded 15 participants for incorrectly answering our attention 
checking question (see Chapter 3). In the remaining sample, gender was split evenly, 
50% males (Mage = 38.29, SDage = 12.60). The sample was restricted to the United 
States and Great Britain with participants coming from a large variety of different 
professions. Participants were paid 1 USD or the equivalent amount in GBP. 
 
Material & Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the study reported in Chapter 3, though in the current 
study we used an item pool consisting of the 19 items from Chapter 3’s refined 
solution and 36 self-developed items (57 items in total). These items were developed 
to measure the DoPL motives in their full breadth, thus we created several items fully 
covering the motives’ definitions and several possible manifestations. Specifically, 
Wilt and Revelle (2015) have suggested that traits, such as the BIG 5, consist of 
affective (A), behavioural (B), cognitive (C) and desire (D) components. We argue 
that motives not only consist of pure desires (e.g., “I want to dominate others.”) but 
also manifest themselves in affective (e.g., “I enjoy dominating others.”), 
behavioural (e.g., “I often dominate others.”) and cognitive (e.g., “Others should be 
dominated.”) ways.  
 
4.2.2 Results 
As in Chapter 3, we first conducted a MAP test and PA on all 57 focal items to 
assess a number, or range, of factors that should be extracted. Both analyses 
suggested five factors, however, from judging the levelling of the MAP statistic 
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(.0246, 0.144, .0091, .0085, .0073) a factor solution with as few as three factors 
seemed plausible. Thus, we first conducted a factor analysis on a five-factor structure 
(see Table A2.1.1 in Appendix 2). The resulting item-factor pattern showed that most 
items loaded highly on their respective DoPL factor. Seven of nine goal items loaded 
highly on the fourth factor, which similarly to Chapter 3, is likely to represent a 
method factor. The fifth factor showed no consistent pattern with only three primary 
loadings > .40 and the rest of the loadings being weak cross-loadings of leadership 
and prestige motive items. This factor structure explained 46.1% of the variance. 
Next we tried a four-factor solution which again yielded the three DoPL factors and 
the previously found factor consisting mostly of cross-loadings of prestige and 
leadership items with only four primary loadings > .4. The goal items now loaded on 
their respective motive factors. These four factors explained 44.2% of the variance. 
Next we conducted a factor analysis with our hypothesised three-factor solution, 
which still explained 43.4% of the variance. Most items loaded only (i.e., no cross-
loadings > .25) on their respective factors, seven items loaded more highly on a 
theoretically different factor, another seven items loaded mostly highly on their 
respective factors but showed heightened cross loadings of > .25. We removed these 
14 items and conducted another three-factor solution on the remaining 43 items. In 
this factor analysis all items (15 dominance, 18 prestige & 10 leadership items) 
loaded highly on their respective factor with no cross-loadings > .25 (see Table 
A2.1.2 in Appendix 2). As the DoPL motives are fairly narrow constructs, we 
decided that 10 items would be sufficient to capture these constructs fully. Hence we 
created a 10 item scale for each DoPL motive on the basis of items having high 
factor loadings, an even spread of affective, behavioural, cognitive, and desire 
aspects as well as a sufficient coverage of the underlying concept. A further factor 
analysis of these 10*3 core items showed that all items loaded highly and without 
cross-loadings > .25 on their respective factor. This was corroborated by MAP test as 
well as PA, which both suggested a three-factor structure. Additionally, we 
conducted several factor analyses in which we exchanged individual core items with 
additional “reserve” items (8 prestige items, 5 dominance items), which yielded 
essentially the same results. As in Chapter 3, we also conducted factor analyses 
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forcing a two and one-factor solution, which explained 39.2% and 33% of the 
variance, respectively (see Tables A2.1.3 and A2.1.4 in Appendix 2).  
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Based on an initial factor analysis (Chapter 3) of questionnaire items related to the 
explicit power motive from several existing inventories as well as theoretical 
considerations regarding different bases of hierarchies, we defined distinct 
dominance, prestige, and leadership (DoPL) motives. We created 57 questionnaire 
items to represent these motives in their full breadth with an about equal numbers of 
items representing affective, behaviour, cognitive, or desire aspects. Of all factor 
solutions the three-factor solution seemed the most sensible. We picked 10 core 
items based on high factor loadings, an even spread across ABCD categories, and 
sufficient coverage of the motives’ definition. These core items served as a 
preliminary version of the DoPL scales. However, this factor structure and the 
respective items needed to be confirmed in Study 2 with the potential of a core item 
being replaced by one of the reserve items (8 prestige, 5 dominance items). 
Moreover, we also wanted to examine whether the DoPL motives are not only 
statistically distinct but also relate differently to a range theoretically relevant 
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4.3 Study 2 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In Study 1 we created a preliminary version of the DoPL scales. In this study (Study 
2), we wanted to demonstrate the reliability and validity of these scales in four ways: 
First, we wanted to replicate the three-factor structure in Study 1’s refined item pool 
(n = 43) and, on the basis of this analysis, replace any core item of the preliminary 
DoPL scales which did not uniquely load on its respective factor in both Study 1 and 
Study 2. Note that this item selection was completely independent from the 
hypothesis tests described in Table 4.3.1. Second, we wanted to show that a three-
factor structure holds for the final 10 item DoPL scales as well as short scales of six 
and four items per motive in both samples of Study 1 and Study 2. Third, we wanted 
to assess the model fit of these final scales by using several CFAs. Fourth, in order to 
show convergent and divergent validity of the DoPL scales, we wanted to correlate 
them with personality traits and other characteristics which constitute the scales’ 
nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). For this we had preregistered our 
sample size, all our hypothesis regarding the correlations of the nomological network 
(see Table 4.3.1) as well as the strategy to determine which questionnaire items 
would constitute the final DoPL scales (see also Appendix 2). This preregistration 




To assess the scales’ convergent and divergent validity we intended to conduct 57 
correlation tests in which we aimed to detect even small effect sizes of r = .20 with β 
= .80. We determined that we would need approximately 400 participants when 
applying a Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple testing. This sample size would 
also be sufficient for the EFA (see Study 1). Thus we collected 440 participants via 
Amazon’s MTurk, restricted to Great Britain and the United States, 40 of whom were 
excluded due to answering incorrectly to either of our attention check questions “It is 
better to do good than to do bad” and “I have been on the moon”. The remaining 400 
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participants (Mage = 36.98, SDage = 11.69) consisted of 53% males and came from a 
large variety of different professions and received 1 USD or the equivalent amount in 
GBP for their participation. 
  
Material & Procedure 
We used the same 43 items (15 dominance, 18 prestige & 10 leadership items) as in 
the refined factor solution of Study 1. As previously done, all focal items where 
intermingled with items of the UMS (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). After 
participants filled in these items, we asked them to fill in the following validation 
scales in this fixed order: 1. Intermingled Big Five personality variables (John, 
Naumann, & Soto, 2008; Rammstedt & John, 2007), 2. Narcissism Admiration and 
Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et al., 2013), 3. Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), 4. Intermingled Anger and 
Verbal Aggression scales ( a H. Buss & Perry, 1992), 5. Self-reported altruism scale 
(SRA; Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995), 6. One question about 
pornography consumption, 7. One question about the number of leadership positions. 




















 scales  
Table 4.3.1. A list of validation scales along with their hypothesised relationship with dominance (D), prestige (P), and leadership (L) 
motives. Note that in the interest of better understanding, we changed some of the wordings in the rationale as compared to the 
preregistration. However, the underlying rationale and resulting hypothesis are identical. 
Variable Operationalisation Rationale Predicted effects 
D P L 
Aggression Scales for verbal aggression 
(5 items) and anger (7 
items) from Aggression 
Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & 
Perry, 1992). Predictions 
are the same for both scales. 
According to Bischof (2008) and Henrich & Gil-White (2001) dominance is attained by 
threatening & being aggressive towards others. Although being aggressive could foster 
other people’s disregard (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) some respect can also be gained by 
being aggressive especially when this aggression is directed to enemies of the group 
(Bischof, 2008). As these effects probably cancel each other out, a desire for prestige 
should not be related to aggression. A little aggression seems to be beneficial in a good 
leader. 
++ 0 + 
Altruism Self-reported altruism scale 
(SRA; 14 items) of Penner 
and colleagues’ (1995) 
Prosocial Personality 
Battery.  
According to Bischof (2008) and Henrich & Gil-White (2001) showing prosocial 
behaviour is beneficial for gaining prestige. A little prosocial behaviour might help a 
leader to inspire/reward collaboration. Whereas Bischof (2008) assumes a little prosocial 
behaviour in dominant individuals in order to consolidate a dominant position in what he 
calls a “Bindungsfalle”, Cheng et al. (2010) point out that being prosocial might be 
dysfunctional in eliciting the fear needed to dominate others.   
? ++ + 
Agreeableness Big Five Inventory (John et 
al., 2008), 9 items 
A friendly, trustworthy nature (i.e. being highly agreeable) should be beneficial for a 
person to be liked, admired, and respected. In a leader, this trait could be equally seen as 
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making one weak as well as a good leader. Therefore, these effects are likely to cancel 
each other out. Being friendly and trustworthy are opposite attributes of the ones needed to 
dominate other people.  
Extraversion Big Five Inventory 
(Rammstedt & John, 2007), 
2 items 
Satisfying one’s desire for dominance, prestige, and leadership requires being around other 
people; hence, a trait facilitating meeting other people would be beneficial. Nonetheless, 
whereas satisfying one’s desire for prestige and leadership seems to require a bigger 
group, the desire to dominate others might already be satisfied by dominating a few others. 
+ ++ ++ 
Conscientiousness Big Five Inventory 
(Rammstedt & John, 2007), 
2 items 
Achieving the skills and abilities needed to attain prestige probably involves working 
conscientiously towards them. We do not see any immediate connection to leadership or 
dominance. 
? + ? 
Openness Big Five Inventory 
(Rammstedt & John, 2007), 
2 items 
Similarly, openness should be beneficial to acquiring the skills and abilities needed to gain 
prestige. We do not see any immediate connection to leadership or dominance. 
? + ? 
Neuroticism Big Five Inventory 
(Rammstedt & John, 2007), 
2 items 
Individuals striving for the recognition of others might define themselves by this said 
recognition and would therefore be dependent on other people’s evaluation. Hence, their 
emotional stability would depend on others, which would predict low internal emotional 
stability. On the other hand low emotional stability might be dysfunctional to gain respect 
in the first place (Cheng et al., 2010). We assume the first effect to be stronger. However, 
they could also cancel each other out. Neuroticism is certainly not a good trait for a leader. 
There should be no immediate association to a need for dominance. 
0 0(+) - 
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positions you had in the last five 
years: (for example, captain 
of football team, organiser 
of study group, student 
representative etc.) 
leader. Nonetheless, being a leader often also comes with some prestige; hence there 
should also be a relationship with a need for prestige. One way of dominating other people 
might be by being a leader. Yet, having a high dominance motive might also be counter-
beneficial for achieving promotion into these positions. Hence, we predict a weak 
relationship with dominance. 
Social Dominance Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) Pratto et 
al. (1994), 8 items  
A person who wants to dominate other people would certainly support a society which 
allows people to dominate others. Leading other people also goes along with having a 
hierarchy; hence, we predict a small positive relationship between SDO and leadership 
motive. There should be no immediate relationship between SDO and the prestige motive.   
++ 0 + 
Porn consumption Measured by: On average, 
how many hours a week do 
you watch porn? (movies, 
magazines etc.) 
Desiring dominance might be satisfied by fantasising about dominating a sexual partner, 
which could be most easily attained by watching porn (Hernandez, 2011; Wright, Sun, 
Steffen, & Tokunaga, 2015). However, as more porn shows males dominating females, 
this relationship might only exist for males. We see no immediate relationship to prestige 
or leadership.  
+ 0 0 
Narcissism  NARQ_Admiration (9 
items), Back et al., (2013) 
As narcissistic admiration is defined as a “striving for uniqueness, grandiose fantasies and 
charmingness” and assumed to show in “self-assured, dominant, and expressive 
behaviors” (Back et al., 2013, p. 1016), this striving largely overlaps with the prestige 
motive but also somewhat with the dominance motive.  
+ ++ 0(+) 
NARQ_Rivalry (9 items), 
Back et al., (2013) 
Narcissistic rivalry is defined as a “striving for supremacy, devaluation of others and 
aggressiveness” (Back et al., 2013, p. 1016). This overlaps largely with the dominance 
motive. The supremacy aspect might also warrant a weak positive relationship with 
leadership. We hypothesise no relationship with prestige. 
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Power motive Unified Motive Scales 





As the DoPL motives are constituent parts of the explicit power motive, it should naturally 
correlate highly with all three of these motives. Nonetheless, at face-value, the 
conceptualisation of the power motive in the UMS is skewed towards the leadership 
motive hence this relationship should be the strongest.  
++ ++ +++ 
Affiliation motive UMS (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012),10 items 
The rationale for the affiliation motive is similar to the rationale for extraversion. 
However, affiliation desires are a little more tailored to making friends than just being 
surrounded by others. Hence, the relationship regarding leadership and dominance should 
be weaker as compared to extraversion. 
0(+) ++ + 
Achievement 
motive 
UMS (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012),10 items 
Both achievement and prestige motivation describe a desire to excel at various skills & 
abilities. The difference is that prestige motivated individuals are more motivated by the 
admiration which comes with having these skills whereas achievement motivated 
individuals are more involved with attaining excellency by itself. The relationship between 
these two motives should be strong nonetheless. A desire to do things better (and thus 
actually getting better) should also be somewhat beneficial for leading and dominating 
people.  
+ ++ + 
Intimacy motive UMS (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012),10 items 
A person with a strong desire for prestige arguably tries to get recognition from a lot of 
people, the admiration from one’s partner included. To attain this admiration, being with 
someone and being good to this someone seems beneficial. Leadership seems unrelated to 
- + 0 
                                                 
3
 There were two changes in computing this power motive score as compared to the power motive score in the UMS (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). The UMS 
item “I like to have the final say” was rephrased as “I like it when I have the final say.” and the UMS item “To be in a leadership position in which others work for me 
or look to me for direction” was split up into two items: “To be in a leadership position in which others work for me” and “I want to be in a position in which others 



















 scales  
having an intimate relationship with someone. A person desiring to dominate others would 
benefit from being in a romantic relationship (because one would have permanent access 
to another person). Nonetheless, the desire for dominance would strongly counteract with 
being good to one’s partner. As the latter part is more strongly represented in the intimacy 
motive, dominance and intimacy should actually be negatively correlated. 
Fear of losing 
control 
UMS (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012), 3 items 
Both desires for dominance and leadership involve controlling others thus the fear of 
losing control should be related to them. The prestige motive is not immediately related to 
controlling others. 
+ 0 + 
Fear of losing 
reputation 
UMS (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012), 2 items 
The fear of losing reputation is the fear-component of the prestige motive and they should 
therefore be highly correlated. Prospective leaders might be somewhat concerned about 
their reputation in order to maintain or attain leading positions. Dominating others should 
not be related to a fear of losing reputation.  
0 ++ 0(+) 
Notation: +++ (r = 1 to .6); ++ (r = .6 to .35); + (r = .35 to .15); 0 (r = .15 to -.15); - (r= -.15 to -.35); 0(+) denotes non-significant effect but descriptively positive; ? if 
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4.3.3 Results 
As in Study 1 we conducted a principal axis factor analysis with oblique “promax” 
rotation of 3 factors on all 43 items. Forty-two out of 43 items loaded most highly on 
their respective factor; one item (“I like it when I have the final say.”) loaded more 
highly on another factor (leadership) than the intended factor (dominance). Two 
prestige motive items (“I want to be well known to a lot of people.” and “I like it 
when others look up to me.”) showed cross-loadings > .25 on the dominance and 
leadership factor, respectively. As the latter prestige motive item was one of the core 
items, it was replaced by another prestige motive item (“I am happy when I can 
present my achievement to others”) of the same ABCD category for the final version 
of the DoPL scales. 
We conducted another factor analysis on our final core items (10 items for each 
DoPL motive) which showed that all core items loaded highly (all items > .46) on 
their respective factor with no cross-loadings > .25 (see Table 4.3.3). This three-
factor solution explained 54% of variance among items. Post-hoc MAP test as well 
as PA both confirmed that three factors underlie the pattern of correlations in this set 
of 30 questionnaire items. We cross-checked these 30 items with data from Study 1 
and found essentially the same loadings of the items on their respective factor with 
no cross-loadings > .25. Moreover, in Study 2 both post-hoc MAP test and PA 
suggested a three-factor structure to underlie these items. As a next step, we selected 
questionnaire items for 6-item and 4-item short scales on the basis of high factor 
loadings, sufficient content covering and, where possible, an even spread across 
ABCD categories (see Table 4.3.3). To confirm that a three-factor structure still 
underlies these short scales, we conducted MAP tests and PAs on all the short scales, 
which all indicated a three-factor structure. Subsequent factor analyses of the 6 and 
4-item scales for both Study 1 and Study 2, forcing a three-factor solution, showed 
that all items loaded highly on their respective factor with no cross-loadings > .25 
(see loadings for Study 2 in Table 4.3.3). Cronbach’s alpha was ≥ .80 in all scales 
across both Study 1 and Study 2 (see Table 4.3.2). Hence, we could replicate the 
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same three-factor structure in two independent samples for 10-item, 6-item and 4-
item scales measuring the DoPL motives.
4
  
Table 4.3.2. Cronbach’s alpha across Study 1 and Study 2 for 10-item, 6-item and 4-
item DoPL scales. 
Scale type Study 1 Study 2 
Dominance Prestige Leadership Dominance Prestige Leadership 
10-item .90 .86 .94 .90 .87 .96 
6-item .86 .82 .91 .86 .83 .94 














                                                 
4
 A translation of the 6 and 4-item scales into German showed the same three-factor structure as tested 

























Table 4.3.3. Showing the final version of the DoPL scales with primary factor loadings of the 10-item, 6-item and 4-item scales based on a 
principal axis factor analysis of data from Study 2. No cross-loadings were > .25. ABCD denotes the affective, behavioural, cognitive, and 
desire aspect (Wilt & Revelle, 2015), items with # are reverse scored.
5
  
Motive English German 10 – Item 
loadings 
6 – Item 
loadings 




Dominance I enjoy bending others to my will. Ich genieße es, andere meinem Willen zu 
unterwerfen. 
0.742 0.723 0.747 A 
 I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my 
way. 
Ich bin bereit aggressive Strategien anzuwenden, um 
meinen Willen durchzusetzen. 
0.743 0.748 0.744 B 
 When people challenge me I want to put them 
down hard. 
Wenn mich Leute herausfordern, will ich sie 
demütigen. 
0.737 0.718 0.685 D 
 I want to twist others around my little finger. Ich will andere um meinen Finger wickeln. 0.817 0.783 0.787 D 
 I often try to get my own way regardless of what 
others may want. 
Ich versuche oft meinen eigenen Willen 
durchzusetzen, unabhängig davon was andere 
wollen. 
0.697 0.712  B 
 I try to control others rather than permit them to 
control me. 
Ich versuche, andere unter meinen Einfluss zu 
bekommen, anstatt zuzulassen, dass sie mich 
0.492 0.544  B 
                                                 
5
 Note, that we added the word resume to the original prestige motive item “I like it when others compliment me on my curriculum vitae.” after finishing data 


























 It's not good to dominate others.# Es ist nicht gut andere zu dominieren.# 0.516   C 
 I enjoy manipulating others. Ich genieße es, andere zu manipulieren. 0.714   D 
 Putting people in their place is often necessary. Es ist oft notwendig andere Leute in ihre Schranken 
zu weisen. 
0.731   C 
 Getting others to do what I want. Andere Leute dazu bringen, das zu tun, was ich will. 0.515   D 
Prestige I feel sad if nobody recognises my unique talents 
and abilities. 
Es macht mich traurig, wenn niemand meinen 
besonderen Fähigkeiten und Talenten Beachtung 
schenkt. 
0.631 0.595 0.610 A 
 I am happy when I can present my achievements 
to others. 
Es macht mich glücklich, wenn ich anderen meine 
erfolgreichen Leistungen präsentieren kann. 
0.705 0.713 0.643 A 
 Recognition from others. Anerkennung von anderen Menschen. 0.856 0.854 0.915 D 
 Be respected and admired by other people. Von anderen Leuten respektiert und bewundert 
werden. 
0.759 0.804 0.792 D 
 Success means being respected. Erfolg bedeutet respektiert zu werden. 0.654 0.583  C 
 I often share with others when I achieved 
something great. 
Ich erzähle oft anderen davon, wenn ich etwas 
Tolles erreicht habe. 
0.493 0.494  B 
 I like it when others compliment me on my 
curriculum vitae/resume. 
Ich mag es, wenn mir jemand ein Kompliment zu 
meinem Lebenslauf macht. 

























 I am willing to work harder if this earns me more 
recognition from others. 
Ich bin bereit härter zu arbeiten, wenn mir das mehr 
Anerkennung von anderen einbringt. 
0.667   B 
 Being unnoticed by others is a terrible thing. Von anderen nicht beachtet zu werden ist eine 
schlimme Sache. 
0.667   C 
 I am happy to do people favours as long as they 
respect me. 
Ich tue anderen Leuten gerne einen Gefallen, 
solange sie mich respektieren. 
0.462   B 
Leadership I relish opportunities in which I can lead others. Ich genieße Situationen, in denen ich andere 
anführen kann. 
0.781 0.761 0.790 A 
 
I have little interest in leading others.# 
Ich habe nur wenig Interesse daran, andere zu 
führen.# 
0.900 0.850 0.824 D 
 I feel confident when directing the activities of 
others. 
Ich fühle mich in meinem Element, wenn es darum 
geht, die Tätigkeiten anderer zu leiten. 
0.871 0.858 0.883 A 
 I make a good leader. Ich bin ein guter Anführer. 0.873 0.867 0.894 C 
 I am often the leader. Ich bin oft der Anführer. 0.793 0.769  B 
 
I avoid positions with responsibility over others.# 
Ich vermeide Positionen, in denen ich 
Verantwortung über andere habe.# 
0.873 0.841  B 
 I like to be in charge of others. Ich mag es, für andere verantwortlich zu sein. 0.726   D 
 I do not enjoy having authority over other 
people.# 

























 When things need to be changed in the group, I 
step up and do it. 
Falls sich etwas in meiner Gruppe ändern muss, 
nehme ich das in die Hand. 
0.593   B 
 Strong leadership. Starke Führung. 0.793   C 
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Confirmatory factor analyses 
 
To assess the model fit and compare fits of the final 10, 6 and 4 items scales (see 
Table 4.3.3) we additionally conducted three confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). 
For each CFA we specified that each item should only load on its respective latent 
variable (dominance, prestige, or leadership), that the first item-loading for each 
latent variable was restricted to 1 and that latent variables were allowed to correlate 
with each other. The assessment of whether a model is a good fit is often done by 
using cut-off values for single or several model fit indices, such as the Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), standardised root mean squared residuals 
(SRMR), or the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA). Which values 
mark an acceptable model fit is still a matter of debate amongst scholars; several 
such values have been proposed. For example, some scholars proposed values of 
RMSEA < .08 as an indication of reasonable model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992; 
MacCallum, Browne, & Sugaware, 1996), or RMSEA < .08, CFI >.090 and TLI  > 
.090 (van de Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012). Others recommended slightly stricter 
values such as RMSEA < .07 (Steiger, 2007) or a combination of RMSEA < .06 and 
SRMR < .09 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
Whereas the model fit for the 10 and 4-item scale models were at the boundary of 
what most scholars suggested as cut off values for acceptable fit, the 6-item scale 
model seemed to fit better and in line with most of these cut off values (e.g., van de 
Schoot et al., 2012; see Table 4.3.4). Nonetheless, these fit indices have to be 
interpreted with caution for two reasons, and especially regarding the 10-item scales 
model. First, as the 10-item scales model contained 63 free parameters and we had 
only tested 400 participants, we were well below the recommended minimum sample 
size for reliable fit index estimates (i.e., 10 participants per free parameter; Schreiber, 
Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). Second, by showing that strict cut-off values 
can be misleading (e.g., both can lead to over-rejection of true models and under-
rejection of false models) as well as by discussing similar issues regarding reliability 
estimates, Marsh, Hau, and Wen (2004) advocated not solely relying on strict cut-off 
criteria when evaluating the validity of models. They argued that researchers should 
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also consider the model complexity (cut-off values become more conservative for 
more complex models) and interpretability of estimates. In our case all items were 
significantly positively related to their respective latent variable (z-values > 6.8) and 
the three factor solution provided a better fit than any two factor or one factor 
solution as well as matching the underlying theory. In summary, whereas the 10 and 
4-item scales CFA model performed, at best, at the boundary of acceptable model fit, 
the 6-item scale model showed acceptable model fit under moderately strict cut-off 
values (van de Schoot et al., 2012). Thus, whereas the 6-item DoPL scales seem to be 
sufficiently valid, the 10 and 4-item DoPL scales appear to be a somewhat noisy 
measurement tools (i.e., there is a substantial amount of variance that is not 
explained by the three factors). Nonetheless, these findings should not be over-
interpreted in light of potentially low reliability in estimates and there being a 
generally good match of model coefficients with the underlying three factor theory. 
The validity of the DoPL scales should further be assessed by their convergent and 
divergent validity when predicting relevant personality traits and other 
characteristics. 
       
Table 4.3.4. Fit indices for final 10, 6 and 4 item versions of the DoPL scales with a 
total of 30, 18, and 12 items respectively (see Table 4.3.3).   
Model: items per scale Free parameters CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
10-items 63 0.884 0.874 0.075 0.066 
6-items 39 0.931 0.92 0.075 0.056 
4-items 27 0.946 0.93 0.085 0.049 
 
Preregistered correlations 
To demonstrate convergent and divergent validity of the DoPL scales, we correlated 
them with a range of relevant personality traits and other characteristics (see Table 
4.3.1 for preregistered hypotheses and Table 4.3.5 for results). The dominance 
motive correlated most highly and significantly with NARQ rivalry, r = .65, verbal 
aggression, r = .53, social dominance orientation, r = .38, anger, r = .35, 
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agreeableness, r = -.34, and pornography consumption, r = .25. The leadership 
motive correlated most highly with the number of leading positions in the last five 
years, r = .44, neuroticism, r = -.41, conscientiousness, r = .37, and altruism, r = .34. 
The prestige motive correlated highest with the fear of losing reputation, r = .58, and 
the fear of losing control, r = .37, the remaining correlations of the prestige motive 
were in the middle ground between the dominance and leadership motive. These 
observed correlations mostly corresponded to our hypotheses (see Table 4.3.5); 
however, we had predicted conscientiousness and altruism to correlate more highly 
with the prestige motive than the leadership motive. Moreover, contrary to our 
hypothesis, NARQ Admiration correlated equally highly and positively with all 
DoPL motives, r = .57-.58. Excluding 5 cases in which no clear prediction (marked 
with ? in Table 4.3.1) was made, 26 out of 52 correlations fell precisely in the 
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Table 4.3.5. Correlations between validation and DoPL scales in columns 1 to 3. 
Differences in correlations (marked with *) based on overlapping or non-overlapping 
95% confidence intervals around r in columns 4 to 6. Checkmarks indicate correctly 
predicted sign and bold print the additional correctly predicted range of correlations. 
 Dominance Prestige Leadership D vs P P vs L D vs L 
Dominance 1 0.42 0.53 -  - 
Prestige 0.42 1 0.48 - -  
Leadership 0.53 0.48 1  - - 
UMS power 0.71 0.62 0.88  * * 
UMS affiliation 0.35 0.52 0.57 *  * 
UMS achievement 0.27 0.54 0.58 *  * 
UMS intimacy 0 0.45 0.34 *  * 
UMS fear of los. control 0.22 0.37 0.05  *  
UMS fear of los. reputation 0.19 0.58 0.24 * *  
BFI agreeableness -0.34 0.12 0.12 *  * 
BFI extraversion 0.25 0.28 0.53  * * 
BFI neuroticism -0.12 -0.03 -0.41  * * 
BFI openness 0.01 0.09 0.22   * 
BFI conscientiousness -0.02 0.20 0.37 *  * 
NARQ admiration 0.57 0.58 0.58    
NARQ rivalry 0.65 0.31 0.17 *  * 
Social dominance orient. 0.38 0.05 0.15 *  * 
Verbal aggression 0.53 0.18 0.22 *  * 
Anger 0.35 0.09 0.02 *  * 
Altruism 0.06 0.17 0.34   * 
Porn consumption 0.25 0.01 0.01 *  * 
Number of leading positions 0.16 0.26 0.44  * * 
Correlations of > .15 are significant at p <.05; correlations of > .18 are significant at p <.01 after 
applying Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple comparisons.  
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Furthermore, in additional exploratory analyses, we investigated whether we 
correctly predicted the sign of the correlation to account for slight distortions of 
correlation sizes due to the measurement tools’ imperfect reliability. This somewhat 
weaker prediction was correct in 41 of 52 cases (marked with checkmarks in Table 
4.3.5), which included 5 out 6 correlations for which we predicted a non-significant 
but descriptively positive relationship (marked as 0(+) in Table 4.3.1). When only 
considering the 35 correlations for which we had predicted significant relationships, 
29 such correlations attained significance and showed a relationship in the predicted 
direction. Finally, to account for the shared variance among the three DoPL motives, 
we also conducted multiple regression analyses predicting all of the variables in the 
nomological network by the DoPL motives (see Table 4.3.6). These latter results 
were similar to the results of the preregistered correlations but provide additional 
information about shared variances and more subtle effects that only showed after a 
portion of the variance had been explained by another variable. For example, 
whereas the prestige motive was not significantly correlated with neuroticism, r = -
.03, it was significantly positively related to neuroticism, b = .20, after controlling for 
influences of the dominance and leadership motives. In summary, exactly half of 
DoPL motives’ correlations with relevant personality traits and characteristics fell 
precisely in the predicted preregistered range. Moreover, an additional third of 
correlations showed relationships in the predicted direction but outside the 
preregistered ranges. As 41 out of 52 correlations either precisely matched our 
prediction or showed a relationship in the predicted direction, we believe this 
provides first preliminary evidence for the divergent and convergent validity of the 
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Table 4.3.6. Variables of the nomological network as simultaneously predicted by 
the DoPL motives in 17 independent linear regression analysis. For comparison 
reasons, all DVs and IVs were standardised. The model predicting number of leading 
positions (count data) is based on a quasi-Poisson distribution with log link function 
(intercept = -0.08; disperson parameter = 0.85). Only significant coefficients after 
Bonferroni correction (cut-off value: p = .0029) are displayed. 
 Dominance Prestige Leadership Adj.R
2
 
UMS power 0.29 0.20 0.64 .89 
UMS affiliation  0.31 0.42 .40 
UMS achievement -0.14 0.37 0.47 .44 
UMS intimacy -0.36 0.44 0.32 .30 
UMS fear of los. control  0.41 -0.24 .17 
UMS fear of los. reputation  0.62  .34 
BFI agreeableness -0.60 0.21 0.34 .26 
BFI extraversion   0.54 .28 
BFI neuroticism  0.20 -0.55 .20 
BFI openness   0.28 .05 
BFI conscientiousness -0.31  0.49 .20 
NARQ admiration 0.29 0.33 0.27 .51 
NARQ rivalry 0.74 0.14 -0.29 .47 
Social dominance orient. 0.45   .15 
Verbal aggression 0.58   .28 
Anger 0.47  -0.23 .15 
Altruism -0.18  0.41 .13 
Porn consumption 0.36   .08 
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4.3.4 Discussion 
In this study we replicated the three-factor structure in the final versions of the DoPL 
scales, which included either 10, 6 or 4 items per scale. Moreover, whereas as the 6-
item scales provided the best model fit in a CFA, the 10 and 4-item scales were at the 
boundary of what is regarded as acceptable model fit. Nonetheless, questionnaire 
items loaded highly with no substantial cross-loadings on their respective theoretical 
factors and all scales showed high internal consistency. Moreover, we could provide 
first evidence for the DoPL scales’ divergent and convergent validity by placing 
them in their nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). For this, we 
correlated the DoPL scales with a range of relevant personality traits and other 
characteristics for which we had preregistered hypotheses in line with our theory of 
these motives. Half these correlations fell precisely in our predicted preregistered 
range, for about four out of five we at least predicted the correct sign of the 
correlation. For example, out of the three DoPL motives, the dominance motive was 
the only motive negatively related to agreeableness and most strongly positively 
related to self-reported verbal anger, aggression, social dominance orientation, 
pornography consumption, and the rivalry component of narcissism. In line with our 
predictions, the leadership motive was most strongly positively related to the amount 
of leadership positions participants held in the last five years and negatively related 
to neuroticism. The prestige motive showed the predicted highest correlation with the 
fear of losing reputation and was, as predicted, significantly positively related to 
extraversion, conscientiousness, and self-reported prosocial behaviour. Moreover, it 
fell in the predicted middle position between dominance and leadership regarding 
social dominance orientation and the amount of leadership positions in the last five 
years. Interestingly, we predicted the highest relationship of the prestige motive with 
self-reported prosocial behaviour on the basis of a theoretically high association 
between the two (Bischof, 2008; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001); however, the 
descriptively highest relationship was between the leadership motive and prosocial 
behaviour. Post-hoc, this also makes sense as the leadership motive is concerned 
                                                                                                                                          
6
 Calculated with the rsq function in R’s (R Core Team, 2017) rsq package (Zhang, 2017, Version 
1.0). 
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with taking responsibility and taking action. All of the three DoPL motives correlated 
highly and to the same extent with the admiration component of narcissism (Back et 
al., 2013). As this personality trait is concerned with “showing off”, it is not 
surprising that it equally relates to prestige and dominance desires - showing off is a 
way of forcing others’ admiration. Nonetheless, we were surprised by the high 
association with the leadership motive.  
Finally, the relationships among DoPL motives and between the DoPL and other 
motives such as achievement, affiliation, and intimacy were mostly moderately high 
(except between dominance and intimacy) which might be explained by the same 
underlying approach element (i.e., the hope to gain something) in all of these motives 
(Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). All DoPL motives 
correlated highly with the UMS power motive (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) 
with the leadership motive showing the strongest correlation (r = .88), likely to be 
explained by the focus on leadership in the UMS power scale. In summary, the DoPL 
motives correlated differently and, for the most part, in line with the underlying 
theory with a range of personality traits and other relevant characteristics, which 
provides first evidence of the scales’ divergent and convergent validity. 
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4.4 Study 3 
4.4.1 Introduction 
As the DoPL scales were created in the framework of motivational psychology and 
especially in relation to the power motive (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; 
Winter, 1973), we wanted to investigate whether the final DoPL scales indeed 
constitute components of existing questionnaires for the power motive. We selected 
two established questionnaire scales measuring the explicit power motive: the power 
scale in the Unified Motive Scales (UMS power; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) 
and the dominance scale in the Personality Research Form (PRF dominance; 
Jackson, 1984). The UMS power is a relatively new scale which has been carefully 
crafted by selecting the best items out of a range of other explicit power motive 
scales. The PRF dominance is arguably the oldest, most widely used scale to measure 
the explicit power motive or dominance motive. Interestingly, the definition of PRF 
dominance does not include prestige aspects but this is captured by a related concept 
in a separate scale called “social recognition” (PRF social recognition). This scale is 
similarly defined as status/prestige (cf. Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008) as it describes “concerns about reputation” (Jackson, 1984, p. 7) but 
unlike status/prestige it is partly comprised of wanting to conform to societal norms, 
for example, by “behaving appropriately” (Jackson, 1984, p. 7). We were interested 
in both first order correlations between these three scales and the DoPL scales as 
well as in the unique and shared variance among the DoPL scales when predicting 
the two explicit power motive scales. As the item content of both the UMS power 
and the PRF dominance scale seemed to be mostly centred on leadership (despite 
their labels), we hypothesised most of the variance (shared and unique) to be 








We collected data from 264 participants via the online website www.profilic.ac who 
were reimbursed 1 GBP base-rate payment plus winnings from a set of dictator 
games (see Chapter 6). There were no restrictions regarding who could take part in 
this study. However, most participants on prolific.ac are either US or UK citizens. 
The sample size was determined by a power analysis for effects in these dictator 
games. We excluded data from 14 participants for incorrectly answering our 
attention checking question “It is better to do good than to do bad”, hence our 
analysis is based on 250 participants (139 males; Mage = 29.88, SDage = 10.62). 
 
Material & Procedure 
After providing demographic information, participants filled in a questionnaire 
consisting of intermingled 10 item version of the DoPL scales (see Table 4.3.3), 
UMS power, UMS affiliation, UMS intimacy, and UMS achievement (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012), PRF dominance and PRF social recognition
7
 (Jackson, 1984). 
After that participants played four rounds of a dictator game (these results are 
reported in Chapter 6) and were then fully debriefed. 
 
4.4.3 Results  
Table 4.4.1 shows correlations between DoPL dominance (DoPL-dom), DoPL 
prestige (DoPL-pres), DoPL leadership (DoPL-lead), UMS power, PRF dominance, 
and PRF social recognition. As previously found, all DoPL motives correlated 
moderately with each other, r = .39 to r = .47, and highly with UMS power, r = .58 
to r = .85. Whereas DoPL-lead correlated very highly with PRF dominance, r = .89, 
PRF dominance did not correlate as highly with DoPL-dom, r = .54, and DoPL-pres, 
r = .40. As expected PRF social recognition correlated highly with the related DoPL-
                                                 
7
 We did not collect data on the outdated item “I don’t try to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ ”. 
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pres scale, r = .67, but showed only small to moderate correlations with all the other 
scales, DoPL-dom, r = .25, and DoPL-lead, r = .38. 
 
Table 4.4.1. Correlation matrix of DoPL motives, two measures for explicit power 












PRF   
soc-reg 
DoPL-dom [.87] 0.39 0.47 0.69 0.54 0.25 
DoPL-pres  [.82] 0.44 0.58 0.40 0.67 
DoPL-lead   [.92] 0.85 0.89 0.25 
UMS power    [.90] 0.83 0.38 
PRF dominance     [.88] 0.25 
PRF soc-reg      [.82] 
All correlations are significant at p < .01 after correcting for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni-
Holm correction. Cronbach’s α in brackets on diagonal. 
 
To investigate how much variance the DoPL motives shared with the two established 
power motive scales UMS power and PRF dominance, we conducted two 
commonality analyses using R’s yhat package (Nimon, Lewis, Kane, & Haynes, 
2008; see Table 4.4.2 & Table 4.4.3). The DoPL motives explained 85% of the 
variance in UMS power and 82% in PRF dominance. Of this explained variance, 
DoPL-lead was the biggest contributor of both unique and shared variance (i.e., 
shared with other DoPL scales) for both UMS power and PRF dominance. However, 
whereas DoPL-dom and DoPL-pres had a sizeable unique contribution to explaining 
the variance in UMS power, their contribution to explaining the variance in PRF 
dominance was almost entirely shared with the respective other DoPL scales.  
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Table 4.4.2. Explained variance and commonality analysis of UMS power with the 
DoPL scales.  
UMS power    
 DoPL Overall R
2
 85.36  
  Unique Variance Total Variance 
 DoPL-dom 8% 39% 
 DoPL-pres 3% 34% 
 DoPL-lead 27% 72% 
 
Table 4.4.3. Explained variance and commonality analysis of PRF dominance with 
the DoPL scales.  
PRF dominance    
 DoPL Overall R
2
 81.92  
  Unique Variance Total Variance 
 DoPL-dom 2% 29% 
 DoPL-pres 0% 16% 
 DoPL-lead 49% 80% 
Note: “Unique Variance” shows the unique contribution of each DoPL scale, “Total Variance” shows 
the variance this scale explains including both unique and shared contributions. The shared 
contribution can be calculated by subtracting the unique variance from the total variance explained. 
For example, in the case of PRF dominance, DoPL-lead explains 80% of R
2
, of which 49% are unique 




To investigate whether the DoPL scales represent constituent parts of existing power 
motive scales, we tested their relationship with the UMS power (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012) and the PRF dominance (Jackson, 1984) scales. Correlations 
between the DoPL scales and both explicit power motive scales were moderate to 
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very high, r = .40-.89, with DoPL-lead showing the highest correlations. This was 
corroborated by a subsequent commonality analysis which showed that DoPL-lead 
provided the most shared and unique variance in both explicit power motive scales. 
Notably, whereas DoPL-pres and DoPL-dom had sizeable amounts of shared and 
some unique variance in UMS power, their amount of shared variance in PRF 
dominance was much smaller as well as DoPL-pres providing 0% unique variance 
and DoPL-dom only 2% unique variance. Importantly, the DoPL scales explained 
85% and 82% in the UMS power and PRF dominance scales, respectively. This 
shows that the DoPL scales indeed represent constituent components of the explicit 
power motive with DoPL-lead being by far the most influential component. 
The strong relationship with DoPL-lead and the two power motive scales is not 
surprising since, at face-value, many of the power motive scales’ items are concerned 
with leadership (e.g., “I feel confident when directing the activities of others” or “I 
have little interest in leading others” reverse scored). The small relationship between 
PRF dominance and DoPL-pres is also unsurprising as prestige or status aspects are 
not covered in PRF dominance’s definition, but in the definition of a separate scale, 
PRF social recognition. This latter scale correlated highly, r = .67, with DoPL-pres 
and little to moderately with DoPL-dom and DoPL-lead. Nonetheless, even though 
this correlation was high, it explains only 45% of the variance in both variables, 
which in turn indicates that DoPL-pres and PRF social recognition have some 
differences after all. One of these differences might be that the PRF social 
recognition scale includes items aimed at social acceptance (e.g., “I will not go out of 
my way to behave in an approved manner.” reverse scored), which seem to be more 
related to fitting in than with actively gaining others’ respect and admiration. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, the relationship between DoPL-dom and PRF 
dominance was only at r = .54, which is likely rooted in different definitions of 
dominance. Whereas PRF dominance focuses more on forceful leadership, DoPL-
dom, in line with Henrich and Gil-White (2001), focuses more on coerced 
submission mostly through threat and fear. 
Overall the UMS power scale seems to measure the explicit power motive more 
broadly than PRF dominance especially when it comes to the prestige or status 
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aspects. As most of the variance in the UMS power and the PRF dominance scales 
can be explained by the DoPL scales, we conclude that these scales indeed measure 
distinct components of the explicit power motive.  
 
4.5 General discussion 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 3), we found that three factors provided the clearest 
picture to a set of questionnaire items, which were mostly taken from various 
questionnaires measuring the power motive and selected as a result of matching a 
broad definition of the two kinds of hierarchies. In this chapter, we expanded on 
these three factors, which we defined as the desire to coerce others into adhering to 
one’s will (dominance motive), the desire to attain respect and admiration for one’s 
skills and knowledge (prestige motive), and the desire to direct others and take 
responsibility in and for one’s group (leadership motive). In two EFAs (Study 1 & 
2), we explored the factor structure in a large pool of questionnaire items based on 
our definitions of the dominance, prestige, and leadership (DoPL) motives. A three-
factor structure with most items loading on their theoretical factor provided the best 
solution. To create scales to measure the DoPL motives, we selected the best 10 
items for each motive on the basis of these EFAs, but also created short scales with 6 
and 4 items per motive. The model fit of these scales was mostly acceptable and we 
could provide first evidence for the scales’ divergent and convergent validity by 
showing the scales’ place in the relevant nomological network (Study 2). In Study 3, 
we could show that the DoPL scales represented constituent parts of two established 
scales that measure the explicit power motive, UMS power (Schönbrodt & 
Gerstenberg, 2012), and PRF dominance (Jackson, 1984). 
Given the multitude of theories underlying this research and several resulting scales, 
researchers might puzzle over which scales to use in which context. Generally, the 6-
item short scales for each DoPL motive should suffice for most applications as the 
DoPL motives are fairly narrowly defined and the 6-item scales still show a high 
internal consistency (see Table 4.3.2). In case researchers want to use the 10-item 
scales, we recommend intermingling the DoPL scales with UMS (Schönbrodt & 
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Gerstenberg, 2012) or related scales to prevent habituation to seemingly similar 
items. If researchers are strict proponents of the dominance vs prestige approach, or 
the power vs status approach, then just using the dominance and prestige scale, or the 
leadership and prestige scale, respectively, would be legitimate. Nonetheless, in both 
cases researchers would benefit from controlling for the respective missing 
component to arrive at a purer influence of dominance and leadership as well as 
prestige. Note though, as all DoPL motives are moderately correlated, this does come 
with the drawback of decreased statistical power. In other words, if all three DoPL 
motives are assessed researchers need bigger sample sizes. Finally, researchers 
interested in the explicit power motive would also benefit from using all three DoPL 
motives to distinguish between different aspects of the heterogeneously defined 
power motive (Winter, 1988).  
As conceptualising a functionally autonomous leadership motive (cf. Allport, 1937) 
on the basis of an evolutionary account of leadership (Van Vugt, 2006) is a novel 
approach, this set of studies is the first step towards theoretically and empirically 
validating this motive. Van Vugt (2006) proposed several evolved leadership traits 
which can be categorised into initiative taking and directing others. Regarding 
initiative taking we found that extraversion was strongly positively related to the 
leadership motive (r = .53). Moreover, self-reported altruism (Penner et al., 1995) 
showed a moderately strong relationship with the leadership motive (r = .34), which 
could be regarded as taking and signalling responsibility for and to one’s wider group 
(e.g., “I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.”). 
Regarding directing others, two findings might serve as a proxy for the competence 
variable assumed by Van Vugt (2006). Leadership correlated highly (r = .58) with 
the achievement motive (a desire to improve one’s skill; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg 
(2012) as well as moderately high (r = .37) with conscientiousness (a personality trait 
related to competence and dutifulness; Rammstedt & John, 2007). Originally, we had 
not made a hypothesis regarding this latter relationship; however, post-hoc it seems 
to match with our conceptualisation of leadership. Nonetheless, further empirical 
studies are necessary to confirm more of the assumptions we made regarding the 
leadership motive. For example, if directing others and taking responsibility is at the 
core of leadership, then a leadership motive representing this core should be 
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positively related to attaining leadership positions in a wide range of professions and 
among social groups (see Chapter 5). Moreover, to show that the dominance, 
prestige, and leadership desires are indeed distinct desires to attain influence, it is 
important to provide further studies showing their discriminant validity (Chapters 5 
to 7). Further limitations will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
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5 Chapter 5: Peculiarities of the leadership and prestige 
motives 
5.1 Introduction 
In this study we wanted to extend our initial validation efforts by showing that the 
leadership motive is positively related to employment ranks across a wide range of 
professions. Moreover, we were interested in two peculiarities of the leadership and 
the prestige motive. In particular, we wanted to investigate whether there are gender 
differences in how the leadership motives predicts individuals’ rank position in a 
company and whether the prestige motive would be positively related to higher 
levels of moral concerns. 
 
5.1.1 Leadership motive & employment rank 
Despite concerted efforts women are still underrepresented in higher leadership 
positions (Joy, 2008), even in egalitarian countries such as the United Kingdom 
(UK). For example, in 2016 in the UK women constituted about 46% of the 
workforce, however, men held about twice as many legislator, senior official, and 
manager positions than women (World Economic Forum, 2016). Two broad 
explanations have been proposed for this gender disparity, a) explanations based on 
discrimination against women, and b) explanations based on personality differences 
between genders. For example, stereotypes of how women ought to be (e.g., nice, 
caring) have been shown to contradict stereotypical attributes leaders ought to 
possess (e.g., decisive, dominant). In cases where women showed these stereotypical 
leader attributes, they earned disapproval due to the apparent role-incongruence 
(Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman & Eagly, 2008). Moreover, women seem to be held 
to stricter performance standards than men when it comes to promotions (Lyness & 
Heilman, 2006). However, alternative but complimentary explanations hold that 
differences in leadership positions might arise from mean personality differences 
such as that women have a lower power motivation (i.e., the desire to have influence 
on others; Winter, 1988) and generally regard achieving leadership roles as a less 
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important goal than men do (Gino, Wilmuth, & Brooks, 2015; Schuh, Hernandez, 
Frieg, & Dick, 2014). In summary, women in leadership positions are still under-
represented even in egalitarian countries such as the UK. Scholars offered two kinds 
of explanation for this pertaining to either discrimination (e.g., women are held to 
higher performance standards) or individual differences (e.g., women have less 
desire for influence). 
In Chapter 4 we argued that the desire to take responsibility and direct others evolved 
to become a functionally autonomous motive, the leadership motive. As individuals 
strive to satisfy their motives a higher leadership motive should be positively related 
to a higher leadership position/employment rank across a wide range of professions 
(hypothesis 1). However, if female leaders were indeed discriminated against, then 
these positions would be more difficult to attain for women, suggesting that women 
must compensate by being more highly motivated to actually achieve these positions. 
Thus, we predict a stronger relationship between the leadership motive and 
employment rank for women than for men (hypothesis 2). As higher leadership 
positions arguably provide more means of influencing others against their will (i.e., 
dominance incentive) and potentially elicits more respect from one’s subordinates 
(i.e., prestige incentive) both the dominance and the prestige motive, respectively, 
should also show a positive relationship with employment rank (hypothesis 3 & 4). 
Nonetheless, these relationships are less straight forward than the one between 
leadership motive and employment rank and might thus be too subtle to be detected 
in this analysis. Following the idea of mean personality differences we predict higher 
mean leadership scores in men than women (hypothesis 5).  
 
5.1.2 Prestige motive & moral concerns 
Prestige is defined as the respect and admiration a person receives for having, or 
perceived to have, advanced skills and knowledge in a valued domain (e.g., Henrich 
& Gil-White, 2001; Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Historically 
these domains would have included hunting, combat, or healing (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001), although arguably still present, more modern ways to accrue prestige 
might be, for example, showing excellent skills in sports (Cheng et al., 2010) or 
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through academic success. In this study we focus on morality as a prestige-promoting 
valued domain (Cheng & Tracy, 2014). Morals provide a code of conduct or 
heuristics likely mainly developed through cultural evolution (i.e., cultural changes 
of belief over time) but also to some extent through biological evolution (Alexander, 
2007; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013). When followed, sets of mutually agreed 
morals in a group/society are beneficial, as many morals relate to issues aiding to the 
maintenance and survival of this group (i.e., prohibitions to kill or steal; Alexander, 
2007). Moreover, similar to hierarchies, as argued in Chapter 2, morals provide 
stability by increasing the predictability of others behaviour (e.g., trusting that most 
other people would not try to kill another person). Given the benefits groups/societies 
attain from sets of morals it seems plausible to assume that these groups would value 
(i.e., by paying them respect/grant prestige) members, which promote higher morals 
either through their behaviour (e.g., prosocial behaviour; Cheng & Tracy, 2014; this 
assertion will be followed up in Chapter 7) or maybe even just by spreading these 
moral ideas (e.g., a priest).  
Of course, the extent to which something is morally right or wrong or what is a moral 
issue at all involves subjectivity and indeed different societies and groups assign 
different weight to different moral issues. In order to give structure to these different 
moral issues, researchers proposed the moral foundation theory (MFT; Graham et al., 
2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), which 
clusters moral concerns along five domains of harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-
group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. In order to test this theory, 
Graham and colleagues (2011) developed a questionnaire measuring these five moral 
domains (Moral Foundation Questionnaire; MFQ) and showed that the five moral 
domains could be found and statistically distinguished across populations in several 
countries or regions such as the US, Canada, UK, East Asia & the Middle East. As 
anticipated, research showed that groups as well as cultures differed in their 
endorsement of these five moral domains. For example, whereas conservative voters 
in the US were more concerned with moral issues regarding in-group/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity, democratic voters were more concerned with 
moral issues regarding harm/care and fairness/reciprocity (Graham et al., 2011). 
Eastern cultures seemed to be more concerned with moral issues regarding in-
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group/loyalty and purity/sanctity than Western cultures (Graham et al., 2011; 
Graham, Meindl, Beall, Johnson, & Zhang, 2016). Notably though, when 
investigating which kind of moral problems people in the US and Canada encounter 
on a daily basis, Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, and Skitka (2014) found that moral 
issues regarding harm/care were by far the most prominent (50% of reported moral 
events) independent of political ideology and religiosity.  
In summary, morality seems beneficial for societies and groups, hence, people acting 
in line with these morals and/or promoting them help their group and are likely to be 
rewarded with the group’s respect and admiration in return. As this reward represents 
strong incentives valued by prestige motivated people, we predicted the prestige 
motive to be positively related to higher endorsement of moral concerns. 
Nonetheless, moral concerns can be structured across five moral domains which are 
differently valued across different groups. Assuming a spread of participants from 
different social groups (e.g., conservative vs liberal voters, older vs. younger 
participants, men vs women) through random sampling, we predicted a positive 
relationship in all five moral domains (hypothesis 6). We made no a priori 




Participants for the analyses in this study came from three independent samples 
(sample A, B & C) totalling n = 935 participants (see Table 5.1 for individual sample 
sizes, age, and gender information). Sample A was collected through contacting 
individuals via email in the US, which were employed in professions such as 
Finance, Law, the Armed Forces, and Education.
8
 Sample B was collected through 
the online platform www.profilic.ac restricted to individuals living in Great Britain 
and being in any type of full-time employment (e.g., sales assistant, manager, 
lecturer, accountant). This was the same sample as described in Chapter 7. Sample C 
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consisted of students from various degrees (e.g., politics, linguistics, English 
literature) at the University of Edinburgh. Whereas sample A’s participation was not 
reimbursed, sample B’s participants were reimbursed with 1.20 GBP and sample C’s 
participants with 4 GBP for their participation. 
 
Table 5.1. Demographic information for the three independent samples in this study. 
Sample n Male/Female Mage SDage 
Sample A 274 190/84 36-45
9
 - 
Sample B 550 250/300 36.69 10.00 
Sample C 111 39/72 22.57 3.49 
 
Procedure & Material 
Employment rank, moral foundations and the DoPL motives were measured by 
questionnaires embedded in studies focussing on different research questions (sample 
A: the relationship between power and moral disengagement; sample B: the 
relationship between the DoPL motives and charitable giving; sample C: differences 
in implicit motives scores for dominance and prestige), which, with the exception of 
sample B (Chapter 7), will not be reported in this thesis. Any experimental 
manipulation in these studies was performed after questionnaire data had been 
obtained.  
Employment rank was assessed by the number of yes answers of 11 yes-or-no 
questions regarding a person’s influence in their company (Odey, 2016; see Table 
5.2). Concerns regarding the five moral foundations were collected by the 30-item 
MFQ (Graham et al., 2011) with 6 items per moral foundation (e.g., “Compassion for 
those who suffer is the most crucial virtue.” for the harm/care foundation). The DoPL 
motives were assessed by the 10-item DoPL scales in sample A and sample C and 
                                                                                                                                          
8
 This sample was collected by F. Odey in his Bachelor thesis supervised by A. Moore (Odey, 2016). 
The analysis reported here is based on original hypotheses not reported in Odey’s Bachelor thesis.  
9
 This represents the median age bracket, as age was only assessed in age brackets of ten years. SD 
could not be calculated. 
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the 6-item DoPL scales in sample B. MFQ items and DoPL items were standardised 
within their respective sample.  
Table 5.2. Eleven yes-or-no questions to measure individual’s employment rank in a 
company (Odey, 2016). 
# Question 
1 Are you an active member or employee of an organisation, corporation or society? 
2 Do you hold responsibility over others within the organisation? 
3 Do you have people reporting to you within the organisation? 
4 Do you have direct influence over decisions being made by the part of the organisation 
that you work in? 
5 Do you personally have responsibility for assessing the work of those reporting to you? 
6 Do you personally make decisions about the promotion or hiring of others within the 
organisation? 
7 Do you have direct influence over decisions being made by the organisation as a whole? 
8 Do those that report to you have people working for them? 
9 Do you have the final say on decisions being made? 
10 Do your decisions influence the broad direction the organisation takes? 




Employment rank data came from samples A & B, moral foundations data came 
from all three samples. As employment rank represented count data, we initially 
conducted a multilevel model on the basis of a poisson distribution with by-sample 
random intercepts and by-sample random slopes for the DoPL motives, effect coded 
gender and the interaction between gender and the leadership motive. However, due 
to overdispersion of the poisson distribution we tried to fit models with the same 
random effect structure based on a quasipoisson and a negative binomial distribution. 
Neither of these two models converged, even when restricting random effect 
correlations to 0, which is recommended in case of non-convergence (Barr, Levy, 
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Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Hence, we report separate generalised linear models based 
on a quasipoisson distribution for each sample A and sample B. Moral foundations 
were predicted by the DoPL motives in separate linear multilevel models with by-
sample random intercepts and by-sample random slopes for all DoPL motives. Due 
to initial non-convergence of these models we restricted random effect correlations to 
0 (Barr et al., 2013). All analyses were conducted with the statistical analysis 
programme R (R Core Team, 2017), utilising its base packages for the generalised 
linear models and the lme4 package for all multilevel models (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2016, version 1.1-12). 
  
5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Employment rank 
We first conducted three Welch t-tests on the pooled samples A & B to test whether 
there were significant gender differences in the DoPL motives (see Table 5.3). 
Whereas men were marginal significantly higher in the leadership than women, 
t(782.02) = -1.93, p = .05 , they were significantly higher in the dominance motive, 
t(808.44) = -2.95, p = < .01, and significantly lower in the prestige motive, t(819.73) 
= 2.74, p  < .01. Thus, given this result we can neither affirmatively confirm nor 
disconfirm that men have a higher leadership motive than women (hypothesis 5). 
Whether this difference can be reliably found and whether its small size affects any 
outcomes in a meaningful different way awaits further investigation. 
 
Table 5.3. Welch t-tests comparing mean DoPL motive scores across both male and 
female participants in pooled samples for sample A & B. 
Motive t p Cohen’s d 
Dominance -2.95 < .01 .21 
Prestige 2.74 < .01 .19 
Leadership -1.93 .05 .14 
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Across both samples A & B, the main effect of the leadership motive on employment 
rank was significant, bA/B = 0.33/0.39, SEA/B = 0.04/0.04, tA/B = 7.45/10.91, pA/B = 
<.01/<.01, indicating a positive relationship between a person’s desire to lead and 
their position in a company (hypothesis 1). However, this main effect was qualified 
by a significant interaction of the leadership motive with gender in sample A, b = 
0.41, SE = 0.09, t = 4.70, p = <.01, but not in sample B, b = 0.09, SE = 0.07, t = 1.44, 
p = .15 (see Figure 5.1). Hence, whereas the desire to lead seemed to be more 
strongly related to women’s employment rank than to men’s in sample A this was 
only descriptively the case in sample B (hypothesis 2). In both samples men reported 
to have higher employment ranks than women, bA/B = -0.41/-0.16, SEA/B = 0.09/0.07, 
tA/B = -4.68/-2.39, pA/B = <.01/.02. Moreover, in both samples the dominance motive, 
ps > .16, and the prestige motive, ps > .16, were unrelated to the employment rank 
(see Table 5.4; hypothesis 3 & 4). In summary, as predicted men held higher 
employment positions than women. Both men’s and women’s employment ranks 
were positively related to their leadership motives. Whereas in sample A this 
relationship was stronger for women than men, this could not be replicated in sample 
B. Hence, there is some evidence for this interaction but it awaits further replication. 
 
Table 5.4. Quasipoisson linear regression models for sample A & B with log link 
function predicting employment rank from standardised DoPL motives, effect coded 
gender variable (men = -.5; women = .5) and the interaction between the leadership 
motive and gender. Dispersion parameters were 1.54 and 2.12, respectively. 
  Sample A   Sample B  
 b SE t     p b SE t p 
Intercept 1.73 0.04 40.63 <.01 1.38 0.03 42.40 <.01 
Dominance -0.05 0.04 -1.40 .16 0.02 0.03 0.69 .49 
Prestige -0.05 0.04 -1.41 .16 -0.04 0.03 -1.17 .24 
Leadership 0.33 0.04 7.45 <.01 0.39 0.04 10.91 <.01 
Gender -0.41 0.09 -4.68 <.01 -0.16 0.07 -2.39 .02 
Leadership*gender 0.41 0.09 4.70 <.01 0.09 0.07 1.44 .15 
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Figure 5.1. Employment rank plotted in relationship with the leadership motive for 
women and men in sample A and sample B. Best fitting lines based on model 
coefficients in Table 5.4 given average scores for dominance and prestige motives. 
Data jittered for better visualisation. 
 
5.3.2 Moral foundations 
Across our three samples the prestige motive was significantly positively related to 
higher moral concerns regarding harm/care, b = 0.21, SE = 0.03, t = 6.03, 
authority/respect, b = 0.19, SE = 0.03, t = 5.44, and purity/sanctity, b = 0.14, SE = 
0.04, t = 3.84. Although descriptively positive, the relationships between the prestige 
motive and moral concerns regarding fairness/reciprocity and in-group/loyalty did 
not attain significance (ts < 1.15). The dominance motive was significantly 
negatively related to moral concerns regarding harm/care, b = -0.27, SE = 0.06, t = -
4.71, and fairness/reciprocity, b = -0.15, SE = 0.04, t = -4.28, as well as marginal 
significantly positively related to moral concerns regarding in-group/loyalty, b = 
0.11, SE = 0.06, t = 1.72. The leadership motive was significant negatively related to 
moral concerns for harm/care, b =- 0.08, SE = 0.03, t = -2.36, and significant 
positively related to moral concerns for in-group/loyalty, b = 0.12, SE = 0.03, t = 
3.47, authority/respect, b = .13, SE = 0.03, t = 3.71, and purity/sanctity, b = .10, SE = 
0.03, t = 2.97 (see Table 5.5). Adding gender in interaction with the leadership 
motives into the 5 models yielded no significant interactions. In summary, as 
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predicted (hypothesis 6) the prestige motive was positively significantly related to 3 
(harm/care; authority/respect; purity/sanctity) out of 5 moral foundations, however, 
only showed descriptive positive relationships with the other 2 (fairness/reciprocity; 
in-group/loyalty). In an additional analysis we found that whereas the dominance 
motive was negatively significantly related to 2 (harm/care; fairness/reciprocity) out 
5 moral foundations, the leadership motive was negatively related to 1 moral 
foundation (harm/care) and positively related to 3 moral foundations (in-
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Table 5.5. Moral foundations predicted by standardised DoPL motives across 
samples A, B, & C in linear multilevel models with by-sample random intercepts and 
by-sample random slopes for the DoPL motives. As moral foundations were 
standardised within each sample all intercepts were 0 with ps < .01 and thus omitted 
in this table.   
Moral foundation Predictor b SE t  
Harm/care      
 Dominance -0.27 0.06 -4.71 ** 
 Prestige 0.21 0.03 6.03 ** 
 Leadership -0.08 0.03 -2.36 * 
Fairness/Reciprocity      
 Dominance -0.15 0.04 -4.28 ** 
 Prestige 0.10 0.09 1.14  
 Leadership -0.05 0.03 -1.47  
In-group/Loyalty      
 Dominance 0.11 0.06 1.72 . 
 Prestige 0.08 0.07 1.15  
 Leadership 0.12 0.03 3.47 ** 
Authority/Respect      
 Dominance 0.05 0.03 1.59  
 Prestige 0.19 0.03 5.44 ** 
 Leadership 0.13 0.03 3.71 ** 
Purity/Sanctity      
 Dominance 0.00 0.06 0.06  
 Prestige 0.14 0.04 3.84 ** 
 Leadership 0.10 0.03 2.97 ** 
Note that the lmer function in R’s lme4 package does not provide p-values, however, based on the 
assumption that a t-distribution with df > 30 is approximately normally distributed t > |1.96| 
corresponds to p < .05 (*); t > |2.58| corresponds to p < .01 (**); t > |1.65| corresponds to p < .10 (.). 
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5.4 Discussion 
In this study we were interested in two separate research questions a) the relationship 
between the leadership motive and employment ranks in a company particularly 
when taking into account gender differences and b) the relationship between the 
prestige motive and endorsing moral concerns. In line with our predictions for the 
first research question we found that the leadership motive was strongly related to 
both women’s and men’s employment ranks across two independent samples. In 
other words, participants with higher leadership desires tended to have more people 
working under them and more influence on final decisions than participants with 
lower leadership desires. In line with the notion that female employees might be at a 
disadvantage for attaining higher leadership positions (e.g., Eagly & Karau, 2002; 
Heilman & Eagly, 2008; Lyness & Heilman, 2006), we assumed they needed to 
compensate for this with a higher motivation to attain these positions (i.e., a higher 
leadership motive); hence assuming a stronger relationship between the leadership 
motive and employment rank in women than in men. This hypothesis was confirmed 
in the first sample but could not be replicated in the second. Hence, although there 
seems to be some evidence for this gender difference, further research is necessary to 
answer this research question. It is possible that different results in the two samples 
are based on national idiosyncrasies as the first sample was collected in the US 
whereas the second was collected in the UK. For example, it may be that women 
aspiring to lead experience more discrimination in the US than in the UK. In line 
with this assertion we found that, although generally men ranked significantly higher 
in their employment position in both samples, this effect was larger in the US sample 
as compared to the UK sample. Nonetheless, based on a recent survey, at least in 
legislator, senior official, and manager positions the US have a more balanced gender 
ratio than the UK (World Economic Forum, 2016). Thus, it remains an open 
question.  
Schuh and colleagues (2014) found that differences in power motivation explained 
some of the differences in holding leadership positions across genders. As the DoPL 
motives represent subcomponents of the power motive a more fine grained analysis 
was possible here, however, whereas we found mean differences in dominance and 
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prestige motives, these motives did not predict employment rank. The difference 
between men and women in the leadership motive was only marginally significant 
and whereas Schuh and colleagues found effect sizes from d =.34 to .60, the 
difference in the leadership motive in this study was only d = .14. Thus, although not 
explicitly tested here, it seems unlikely that mean differences in the leadership 
motive for both genders explained mean differences in employment ranks. 
Regarding the second research question, we had predicted that the prestige motive 
would be positively related to endorsing moral concerns as this was proposed to be a 
highly valued domain and would thus provide a person with other’s respect and 
admiration (e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 2014). In line with this hypothesis we found that, 
on average across three independent samples, the prestige motive was positively 
related to 3 out of 5 moral foundations (i.e., moral concerns for harm/care, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) but not significantly to the remaining two 
foundations (fairness/reciprocity, in-group loyalty). As it is not possible to 
distinguish whether a non-significant finding is due to a true null effect or 
insufficient power, these findings do not necessarily contradict our hypothesis, 
especially taking into account that both non-significant effects pointed towards our 
predicted direction. Nonetheless, as the combined sample size of this study was n > 
900 the effect sizes of the non-significant moral foundations would have to be rather 
small, maybe negligible, if the effect indeed existed. Note though, at least in Western 
cultures, about 50% of moral events are concerned with issues of harm and care 
(Hofmann et al., 2014), thus, showing high moral concerns in this domain is arguably 
most important to gain prestige; the prestige motive was indeed highly positively 
related to the harm/care moral foundation. We had made no predictions regarding the 
relationship between moral concerns and the dominance and leadership motive, 
which showed negative (in case of the dominance motive) as well as positive and 
negative (in case of the leadership motive) relationships with some of the moral 
foundations. However, a discussion of these exploratory findings goes beyond the 
scope of this doctoral thesis. 
It is important to point out that, although our hypothesis might imply causal 
relationships, these cannot be assessed within this study. Thus, we cannot say 
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whether a higher leadership motive actually influences the attainment of a higher 
employment rank or is a result of it. Equally, purely based on this data, it is entirely 
possible that higher concerns for morality cause a higher desire for prestige, although 
we have struggled to find a parsimonious explanation for this. A difficult but 
interesting approach for further research could involve manipulating participants’ 
leadership and prestige motives and assessing the effect of this manipulation on 
leadership positions and moral concerns. Moreover, it would be interesting to see 
whether higher moral concerns in highly prestige motivated people also translate into 
moral behaviour such as prosocial behaviour (e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 2014), which we 
will investigate in Chapter 7. 
In conclusion, this study provides further evidence for the DoPL scales’ validity by 
showing a strong relationship between the leadership motive and employees’ rank in 
a company (which should, by definition, be a strong incentive for highly leadership 
motivated people). In an additional inquiry we found that this relationship might be 
stronger in women than in men, however, as results were not uniform further 
research is needed to confirm this effect. Moreover, we could show that the prestige 
motive was positively related to various moral concerns, a potentially highly valued 
domain in a society (e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 2014) whose attainment would represent 
an incentive for highly prestige motivated people. Nonetheless, this latter result is not 
as clear-cut since, although positively related to some moral concerns, the prestige 
motive showed no significant relationship with others. 
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6 Chapter 6: Dominance motive and dictator games 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5 we provided evidence for the discriminant validity of the leadership and 
prestige motives. In this study we wanted to extend this effort by showing the 
discriminant validity of the dominance motive. An experimental paradigm that 
seemed particularly suitable for this purpose is the dictator game (DG), hence we 
investigated the role of the dominance motive, controlling for prestige and leadership 
motives, in two DG studies: one conducted in the lab and one conducted online. 
The DG was first introduced by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) as an 
economic decision problem in which one person, a proposer, was endowed with a 
certain amount of money (e.g., 20$), which they needed to split with another person, 
the receiver, who had no other choice than accepting this split. The DG has since 
been widely used and in a meta-analysis of 328 DGs with many varying parameters, 
Engel (2011) found that only 36% of proposers gave nothing, about 17% of 
proposers split the money equally, and 34% proposers gave a proportion between 
nothing and an equal split. Initially, this distribution was somewhat surprising from 
an economical point of view, especially given that results generally held for one-shot 
DGs in which both splits and payouts were anonymous (e.g., Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Bernard Moore, 2001), as the 
rational economic choice should be to always keep all of the money (Camerer, 2003). 
This economically irrational behaviour has been attributed to underlying concerns of 
fairness/social norms of reciprocity (Diekmann, 2004; Kahneman et al., 1986), or 
simply altruism (Andreoni & Miller, 2002). Nonetheless, researchers also 
investigated a plethora of other moderating variables (see Camerer, 2003; Engel, 
2011; for reviews). For example, they found that the proportion given in a DG 
slightly increased with decreased anonymity, probably due to reputational concerns 
(e.g., Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007) and that this proportion was largely unaffected 
by the total amount of money participants played for (e.g., Engel, 2011; Forsythe et 
al., 1994), suggesting findings with small stakes can be generalised to bigger stakes. 
However, personality differences in participants have also shown to relate to DG 
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behaviour. Most importantly for our research were findings showing that the 
proportion given in DGs was negatively related to participants’ general power 
motive, which was proposed to be due to higher dominance in highly power 
motivated people (Baumert et al., 2014; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). As the 
DoPL scales’ dominance motive represents a desire to coerce others into adhering to 
one’s will, we hypothesised that it should be negatively related to the proportion 
given in a DG. This behaviour should satisfy the two related needs within the 
dominance motive, first, influencing receivers against their will (as we can assume 
the receiver wants to earn some money) and second, gaining autonomy from others’ 
influence by earning money. Moreover, we hypothesised that if participants played 
as receivers but received no money from proposers (thus were influenced against 
their will), this would arouse the dominance motive even more and thus would 
increase its effect in a subsequently played DG as proposer. 
We proposed that, as compared to the prestige and leadership motives, the 
dominance motive would be the most influential predictor, however, we also 
considered weaker influences of the prestige and leadership motives. Regarding the 
prestige motive, we hypothesised a positive relationship with the proportion given in 
the DGs. This was based on the assumption that this kind of altruistic behaviour 
would signal a higher level of morality, a highly valued domain, (e.g., Cheng & 
Tracy, 2014; see Chapter 5) and thus might be driven by reputational concerns. 
Nonetheless, note that we did not expect big effects sizes as the study conducted in 
the lab was partly anonymous. More precisely, participants only sometimes saw their 
potential game partners shortly before the study and also did not know with whom 
exactly they would play. Moreover, the study conducted online was completely 
anonymous. 
Regarding the leadership motive, we hypothesised differential effects for males and 
females. Gender differences regarding leadership have been investigated from many 
angles (e.g., Burke & Collins, 2001; Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & van Engen, 
2003), however, there seems to be some consensus that, although effect sizes are 
small, male leadership tends to be more self-centred and assertive as compared to 
female leadership. For example, Eagly and Johnson (1990) found in a meta-analysis 
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that male leadership styles were more autocratic than democratic (i.e., not involving 
vs involving subordinates in decision making processes) as compared to females’. In 
a 20 day event-sampling study of workers in a wide range of occupations researchers 
found that agentic behaviour (e.g., voicing an opinion, giving information, setting 
goals) was more influenced by being in a leadership role than by gender, however, 
communal behaviour (e.g., listening attentively to others, providing help) was more 
influenced by gender than by being in a leadership role, with females being more 
communal (Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994). Hence a female leader would be 
both communal and agentic, or if these strategies would cancel it each other out, 
neither, whereas a male leader would only be agentic. Behaviour in the DG is not 
directly related to any main component of the leadership motive, which is guiding 
others and taking responsibility for one’s group, however, in the absence of these 
components we hypothesised spill-over effects from a general leader personality. 
More precisely, we assumed that highly leadership motivated males would execute 
more selfish and assertive behaviour whereas females would not do this. Hence, we 
predicted a negative relationship between the amount of money given in a DG with 
the leadership motive in males but not in females. Note though that, as we controlled 
for the dominance motive, much of this effect would be shared and thus we only 
expected small effect sizes.  
In summary, across both a lab-based and an online-based DG we predicted a 
negative relationship between the proportion given in these DGs and the dominance 
motive. Moreover, and only investigated in the online DG, we predicted this effect to 
be bigger when participants received no money in previous DGs (dominance-arousal 
condition). We hypothesised a weaker positive relationship between the prestige 
motive and the proportion given as well as a weaker negative relationship between 
the leadership motive and the proportion given in males but not in females.     
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6.2 Method DG1 
Participants 
As we did not know which effect sizes to expect we decided somewhat arbitrarily to 
collect 50 participants (20 males; Mage = 23.76, SDage = 5.12) in this first lab-study 
and to use effect size estimates from this study in a further study. All participants 
were students doing various degrees at the University of Edinburgh and were 
reimbursed with 4 GBP as a base-rate plus their DG winnings.  
 
Material and Procedure 
Participants filled in the 10-item DoPL scales intermingled with the affiliation, 
achievement, intimacy, and power motive scales of the Unified Motive Scales (UMS; 
Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) online, prior to coming into the lab in order to 
make sure all participants could start at the same time. Once at the lab, the 
experimenter led all participants to individual cubicles. Note, that we invited four 
participants at a time, however, if we could not find four participants the 
experimenter pretended some participants were already in the other cubicles from a 
previous study. No participants raised any suspicions regarding this. After giving 
written consent the participants read instructions on a computer describing the DG as 
“an economic exchange game” which was played with one of the other three 
participants at the lab, however not disclosing which one. It was explained that an 
amount of 2 GBP had been allocated to one person, who thus became the proposer. 
This person could propose any proportion of these 2 GBP to the other participant, the 
receiver. Whether a participant played as proposer or receiver was ostensibly 
randomly selected, however, every participant played as proposer. After the 
experimenter had made sure everybody had understood the instructions, participants 
allocated any proportion (or nothing) of the 2 GBP to the ostensible receiver. After 
this they completed a set of other tasks for a different study interested in the implicit 
dominance and prestige motive. These findings will not be reported in this thesis. At 
the very end participants were fully debriefed and paid. 
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6.3 Method DG2 
Participants & sample size rationale 
In the lab-based study the smallest significant effects were the main effects for the 
leadership and prestige motives, which explained 3% unique variance each. To find 
this effect size with a statistical power of β = .80 and α = .05 (two-tailed) we would 
need n = 250 participants. Thus, we collected data from 264 participants through the 
online website www.prolific.ac of which we excluded 14 participants for incorrectly 
answering our catch question yielding the desired sample of 250 participants (139 
males; Mage = 29.88, SDage = 10.62). This is the same sample as described in Study 3, 
Chapter 4. Participants were paid a base-rate of 1 GBP as well as the amount of 
money won in the first DG they played as proposer. We preregistered this sample 
size rationale along with our hypothesis regarding main and gender effects and the 
respective models (https://osf.io/crsbq/). All models with an * mark preregistered 
models. 
 
Material and Procedure 
After providing standard demographic information participants filled in the 10-item 
version of the DoPL scales intermingled with the 10-item version of the UMS power, 
affiliation, achievement and intimacy motives (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) as 
well as the PRF dominance and PRF social recognition scales (Jackson, 1984). 
Results regarding the PRF scales are reported in Chapter 4, Study 3. After being 
introduced to the DG participants were shown 10 examples of possible splits in order 
to make sure they understood the rules of the game. Participants were told that they 
would play four rounds of the DG: two rounds as receiver (the money would, 
ostensibly, come from the two persons that have filled in the survey just before them) 
and two rounds as proposer (the money would, ostensibly, go to the two people who 
would fill in the survey immediately after the participant). Participants were told that 
they would get paid all rewards as receiver and one randomly selected reward in the 
role of proposer. The order in which they played these roles was ostensibly 
randomised, however, the order was fixed as proposer, receiver, receiver, proposer. 
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When participants played as receiver, they always received 0 GBP. This design was 
necessary to create two conditions: A neutral condition when playing the proposer 
for the first time and a dominance-arousal condition when playing the proposer for 
the second time. After this participants were fully debriefed. 
 
6.4 Results 
We report results for both lab-based and online DGs together in this section in order 
to facilitate comparisons between these two studies. In each study all predictors were 
standardised before the analysis. We first wanted to investigate whether the DoPL 
motives were related to behaviour in the DG in general, hence these first analyses 
focussed on data from the lab-based study and the online study’s neutral condition. 
We created a linear regression model for each of these datasets with the proportion 
given to the other participant as dependent variable and the DoPL motives as 
predictors (see Table 6.1). This analysis showed that the dominance motive was 
significantly negatively related to the proportion given to the other participant in both 
the lab-based, b = -14.57, t = -2.67, p = .01, as well as the online study, b = -8.98, t = 
-1.81, p(one-tailed) = .04. The main effects for the prestige and leadership motives 
were neither significant in the lab-based nor in the online study (ps > .18). In 
summary, these findings support our hypothesis regarding the unwillingness to give 
other participants money in a DG as a function of the dominance motive. However, 
although descriptively positive in both studies, a higher prestige motive was not 
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Table 6.1. Linear regression models predicting the proportion of money (in pennies) 
out of 2 GBP (lab-based study) and 3 GBP (online study: neutral condition) given to 
another participant by the dominance, prestige, and leadership motives. 
  Lab-based study  Online study  
 b SE t p b SE t p 
Intercept 89.82 4.66 19.28 < .01 105.76 4.27 24.80 < .01 
Dominance -14.57 5.47 -2.67 .01 -8.98 4.98 -1.81 .04
10
 
Prestige 6.67 5.04 1.32 .19 4.92 4.90 1.00 .32 
Leadership -7.37 5.37 -1.37 .18 -6.76 5.11 -1.32 .19 
 
To investigate our hypothesis regarding gender effects in the leadership motive, we 
added gender as an effect coded variable to these models as well as all the 
interactions between the DoPL motives and gender (see Table 6.1). In the lab-based 
study, the main effects for dominance and prestige motive remained virtually 
unchanged and neither of their interactions with gender reached significance (ps > 
.23). Nonetheless, the main effect for leadership was significant after controlling for 
gender, b = -11.74, t = -2.25, p = .03; however, this main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction of the leadership motive with gender, b = 33.20, t = 3.18, p < 
.01. This interaction showed that whereas the relationship between the leadership 
motive and the proportion given in the DG was highly negatively for males, b = -
28.34, it was slightly positive for females, b = 4.86. Recoding gender as a dummy 
variable (females = 0) showed this latter effect was only descriptively positive (p > 
.46) showing that there was no significant relationship between the leadership motive 
and the proportion given in females. Controlling for gender in the online studies’ 
neutral condition rendered all effects non-significant (ps > .14). In summary, in the 
lab-based study, when controlling for the influence of gender we still found the 
predicted negative relationship of the dominance motive with the amount of money 
given in a DG. Moreover, as predicted, we found the leadership motive to be 
                                                 
10
 Note, that as we had a directional hypothesis a one-tailed test was permissible here, the two-tailed 
p-value was p = .07. All other p-values reported here represent two-tailed p-values. 
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negatively related to the amount of money given for males but not for females. 
Although these effects pointed towards the predicted direction in the online study’s 
neutral condition, we could not replicate any of them.  
 
Table 6.2. Linear regression models predicting the proportion of money (in pennies) 
out of 2 GBP (lab-based study) and 3 GBP (online study: neutral condition) given to 
another participant by the dominance, prestige, and leadership motives, gender 
(effect coded; -.5 for males), and the interactions between the DoPL motives and 
gender. 
  Lab-based study  Online study*  
 b SE t p b SE t p 
Intercept 91.65 4.47 20.49 <.01 107.01 4.40 24.32 <.01 
Dominance -15.49 5.17 -3.00 <.01 -7.55 5.10 -1.48 0.14 
Prestige 7.11 4.80 1.48 .15 4.35 5.07 0.86 0.39 
Leadership -11.74 5.22 -2.25 .03 -7.21 5.14 -1.40 0.16 
Gender -2.13 8.95 -0.24 .81 12.42 8.80 1.41 0.16 
Gender*Dominance -1.68 10.35 -0.16 .87 4.81 10.20 0.47 0.64 
Gender*Prestige -11.71 9.61 -1.21 .23 -8.81 10.14 -0.87 0.39 
Gender*Leadership 33.20 10.44 3.18 <.01 9.25 10.28 0.90 0.37 
 
In order to investigate the effect of the arousal condition but also controlling for 
gender we analysed data from both conditions of the online study in a single 
multilevel model* using R’s (R Core Team, 2017) lme4 package (Bates et al., 2016; 
version 1.1-12). Note, that this package does not provide p-values, hence, all decision 
regarding significance are based on 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals (10000 
iterations).  
This multilevel-model included the proportion given in the DGs as dependent 
variable and the DoPL motives, gender, condition and all second order interactions 
between gender, condition and each of the DoPL motives as predictors (see Table 
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6.3). The random effect structure consisted of by-participant random intercepts and 
by-participant random slopes for experimental condition.
11
 The only two significant 
predictors in this model were first, experimental condition, b = -33.78, t = -7.40, 95% 
CI = [-42.88, -24.77], showing that participants gave on average 34 pennies less after 
having received nothing in two previous DGs (i.e., in the arousal condition). Second, 
there was a significant main effect of the dominance motive, showing a negative 
relationship between the dominance motive and the amount of money given across 
both conditions of the DG, b = -10.10, t = -2.05, 95% CI = [-19.62, -0.21]. The 
interaction between the dominance motive and experimental condition was not 
significant, b = -4.62, t = -0.86, 95% CI = [-15.16, 5.80], indicating no significant 
difference in the regression slopes for the dominance motive between the neutral and 
the arousal condition. In summary, the dominance motive was negatively related to 
the proportion given across both experimental conditions when controlling for 
gender and experimental condition. Although descriptively this dominance effect 
was stronger in the experimental condition this effect was not significant. 
Independent of the DoPL motives participants gave significantly less money to the 
other participants in the arousal condition, which means, after having received no 
money in two previous DGs. 
Note that we conducted ten further exploratory analyses (see Tables A6.1 to A6.6 in 
Appendix 3) based on the same five models as described above (Table 6.1 to 6.3). 
Retaining all other variables, the only change to the previous analysis of these 
models was that we only ever included either the dominance (plus interactions) or 
leadership motive (plus interactions). In all of these models both the effects for the 
dominance as well as the leadership motive were significantly negative (ps < .04) 
except for the leadership motive in the multilevel model (cf. Table 6.3). This 
suggests that these two motives share some of the predictive variance regarding the 
proportion given in DGs, however, it also shows that the dominance motive 
predicted the proportion given beyond this shared variance with the leadership 
motive. Thus the dominance motive was the stronger predictor. 
                                                 
11
 As the initial model did not converge we restricted all random effect correlations to 0 (Barr et al., 
2013). 
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Table 6.3. Multilevel model* with by-participant random intercepts and by-
participant random slopes for experimental condition predicting the amount of 
money (in pennies) out of 3 GBP given to another participant in an online DG. The 
independent variables included the DoPL motives, gender (effect coded: males = -
.5), experimental condition (effect coded: neutral = -.5; arousal = .5), and all second 
order interactions between gender, condition and each of the DoPL motives as 
predictors. Significant effects in bold. 
 b SE t Bootstrapped 95% CI 
Intercept 90.70 4.25 21.35 [82.22, 99.06] 
Dominance -10.10 4.92 -2.05 [-19.62, -0.21] 
Prestige 1.95 4.89 0.40 [-7.79, 11.65] 
Leadership -4.77 4.96 -0.96 [-14.49, 4.84] 
Gender 7.71 8.50 0.91 [-9.34, 24.06] 
Condition -33.78 4.57 -7.40 [-42.88, -24.77] 
Gender*Condition -9.65 9.35 -1.03 [-27.84, 8.64] 
Gender*Dominance 12.54 9.84 1.28 [-6.45, 31.54] 
Condition*Dominance -4.62 5.41 -0.86 [-15.16, 5.80] 
Gender*Prestige -4.91 9.78 -0.50 [-24.08, 13.92] 
Condition*Prestige -5.67 5.21 -1.09 [-15.90, 4.89] 
Gender*Leadership -2.05 9.91 -0.21 [-21.13, 17.23] 
Condition*Leadership 4.13 5.44 0.76 [-6.77, 14.66] 
 
6.5 Discussion 
In a lab-based and an online study we aimed at providing evidence for the 
discriminant validity of the dominance motive by employing a DG paradigm (e.g., 
Engel, 2011). We had hypothesised that denying receivers’ money to take it for 
oneself would satisfy a person’s desire to coerce others into adhering to one’s will 
(i.e., dominance motive) and in line with this we found that the dominance motive 
was negatively related to the amount of money given to the other participant in the 
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DG across both studies. In the online study only, we created a dominance arousal 
condition by having participants receive nothing in two DGs played as a receiver. 
We had hypothesised that this would increase the effect of the dominance motive in a 
subsequent DG played as proposer; however, the descriptively stronger effect of the 
dominance motive was not significant. Based on the assumption that males with a 
high leadership motive would have a more self-centred, assertive personality than 
females (e.g., Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Moskowitz et al., 1994) we predicted a 
negative relationship between the leadership motive and the amount of money given 
in the DGs for males but not females. This hypothesis was confirmed in the lab-
based but not the online study, hence, this finding awaits further replication. Based 
on the assumption that prosocial behaviour such as giving other people money would 
be a way to attain respect and admiration (i.e., prestige motive; Cheng & Tracy, 
2014) we predicted a positive relationship between the prestige motive and the 
proportion given in the DG. Although this was descriptively the case in both DGs, 
these effects were not significant.  
Generally effect sizes seemed to be bigger in the lab-based study as compared to the 
online study. This makes sense as the DoPL motives are social motives (i.e., desires 
related to other people; e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008). Thus these motives 
are more likely to be aroused in the labs’ social context, where participants saw each 
other before the study and conducted the study in close physical proximity from 
another as compared to the completely anonymous online study. Nonetheless, the 
labs’ social context was rather restricted as participants were placed in individual 
cubicles in separate rooms and did also not know with which of the other participants 
they ostensibly played. In a further study it would be interesting to decrease the 
anonymity in the DG and to investigate whether the prestige motive would be 
positively related to the proportion of money given by the proposer. 
A big caveat of this study, as in Chapter 5, is that all data collected here, except from 
the dominance arousal condition, are correlational. It is theoretically possible that a 
third variables explains the relationship between both the dominance motive and DG 
behaviour. Hence, although we believe dominance desires influencing DG behaviour 
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to be the most parsimonious and likely explanation, this cannot be confirmed with 
this data.    
In conclusion, these two studies provide further evidence for the discriminant 
validity of the DoPL scales by particularly showing that the dominance motive was, 
as predicted, negatively related to the proportion given in both a lab-based as well as 
an online dictator DG. The dominance motive predicted DG behaviour over and 
above the effects of the prestige and leadership motives. A potential negative 
relationship between the leadership motive and the proportion given in DGs in males, 
but not females, awaits further replication. 
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7 Chapter 7: DoPL motives and charitable giving 
7.1 Introduction 
After Microsoft founder Bill Gates gave away a substantial part of his wealth to 
charitable causes, TIME magazine displayed him on its cover for the person of the 
year 2005 representing the world’s good Samaritans (TIME, 2005). The businessman 
Warren Buffet followed him a year later giving more than two thirds of his wealth to 
charitable causes, which has arguably affected these two men to be among the most 
respected leaders and public personalities in the world (Prasad, 2011; 
www.nelsonmandela.org, 2011). Besides philanthropic reasons one can only 
speculate to what extent, in these specific cases, gains in reputation motivated Gates’ 
and Warren’s prosocial giving decision. In Chapter 5, we alluded to this link more 
generally by showing that desires for admiration and respect (i.e., the prestige 
motive) were positively related to many conceptualisations of morality and argued 
that prosocial giving behaviour provides a means to display these high levels of 
morality (e.g., Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Cheng & Tracy, 2014). Hence, to expand 
on Chapter 5’s findings and provide a further validation to the DoPL scales, in this 
study we wanted to test directly whether the prestige motive was positively related to 
prosocial charitable giving behaviour. 
Many researchers have investigated a link between reputation and prosocial 
behaviour. For example, university student alumni have been shown to donate more 
money to their old university when their donations were overt rather than covert 
(Harbaugh, 1998; Karlan & McConnell, 2014). In a sample of Italian blood donors, 
researchers found that giving people an award for their blood donation only 
increased their motivation to donate if this prize was announced publicly (Lacetera & 
Macis, 2010). Along the same lines, Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) found that 
when Princeton students could earn money for a charity depending on how often they 
would manage to press a pair of buttons, students increased their effort if they had to 
disclose their performance and winnings to other participants (overt condition) as 
compared to when they could not do that (covert condition). Interestingly, if some of 
these earnings went towards the participants themselves instead of the charity, 
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participants showed increased effort in the covert condition but decreased effort in 
the overt condition. Ariely and colleagues (2009) argued that this was due to 
participants expecting detrimental effects on their reputation if they seemed to put in 
more effort to earn money for themselves. In summary, this evidence suggests that 
once prosocial behaviour is made overt people are more willing to indulge in it, 
which is likely due to reputational concerns. Nonetheless, there is the caveat that this 
behaviour should not reflect badly on them (e.g., if the prosocial behaviour appears 
to serve the person themselves). 
In this study we asked participants whether they wanted to donate a proportion of the 
money they earned through this study (1.20 GBP) to a charity. To make this donation 
behaviour overt we showed a fake leader board with the current top 15 donors in this 
study and explained that, if they wanted and if they were among the top 15 donors, 
participants could have their name displayed on the board for the course of the study. 
In a neutral condition we wanted to omit this leader board, however, due to our 
sampling strategy participants were never tested in this condition (see below). We 
hypothesised that the prestige motive should be positively related to the proportion 
donated and that this relationship should be stronger in the condition with the leader 
board as compared to the neutral condition. Regarding the dominance motive we 
assumed that gaining money would strengthen a person’s ability to coerce others 
whereas giving it away for free would weaken it. Moreover, keeping money to 
oneself seems to be in line with the selfish desires to get one’s will/desire for 
autonomy inherent to the dominance motive (see DG studies in Chapter 6). Hence 
we predicted a negative relationship between the dominance motive and the 
proportion donated. Regarding the leadership motive we assumed that donating 
money would be a way to take responsibility for one’s group, although this latter 
term is rather broadly interpreted here (i.e., one’s group of British citizens). Thus we 
predicted a positive relationship between the leadership motive and the proportion 
donated. We preregistered all of these hypotheses, the confirmatory statistical models 
to test them as well as the sample size and rationale (https://osf.io/7c8sn/). 
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7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Analytical method: Bayesian statistics 
In this study we employed Bayesian statistics to make decisions regarding the 
significance of predictors and to determine the number of participants to be collected. 
Bayesian statistics are based on a “reallocation of credibility across possibilities” 
(Kruschke, 2015, p. 15). The credibility of each parameter in a model (e.g., the size 
of a coefficient or error variance) is determined by the product of two density 
distributions, a) a distribution of prior beliefs/probabilities of different possible sizes 
of a parameter and b) a distribution of likelihoods (from a likelihood function) of 
each parameter based on the collected data. For standardising purposes this product 
is often divided by the average likelihood across all parameters in the model 
weighted by their prior probability. The resulting weighted and standardised 
distributions for each parameter are termed posterior distributions. Note that, it is not 
always possible to find an analytical solution to the above described multiplication 
(i.e., if likelihood and prior distribution are not conjugate/do not have the same 
shape); however, a solution can be obtained through Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) random sampling of representative combinations of parameters (Kruschke, 
2015).  
There are three features to Bayesian statistics which are important for our analyses. 
First, contrary to classical frequentist statistics based on null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST), the sample size in a Bayesian analysis does not have to be 
determined a priori. As Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) have famously 
pointed out in regards to Bayesian statistics “(...) the rules governing when data 
collection stops are irrelevant to data interpretation. It is entirely appropriate to 
collect data until a point has been proven or disproven, or until the data collector runs 
out of time, money, or patience.” (p. 193). Second, posterior distributions of 
parameters allow testing for the significance of predictors by using 95% equal-tailed 
intervals (ETI). These intervals include 95% of the posterior distribution by cutting 
off the 2.5% most extreme values on both sides of the distribution. Given a normally 
distributed posterior, a 95% ETI includes the 95% most credible values for the true 
size of a coefficient; thus, if 0 is not included in this interval the coefficient can be 
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considered significantly different from 0 (Kruschke, 2015)
12
. Third, so-called Bayes 
Factors (BF) can be created to compare the relative evidence for one 
model/hypothesis over another model/hypothesis. This is done by dividing the 
integral across the likelihood of all parameters of model 1 (e.g., H0) weighted by 
their respective priors by the integral across the likelihood of all parameters of model 
2 (e.g., H1) weighted by their respective priors. Interestingly, this integration 
procedure automatically penalises models with more predictors (Broderson, 2012). 
The evidence for the model representing the H1 over the model representing the H0 
(i.e., BF10) can be interpreted as follows: 1 < BF10 < 3 represents anecdotal evidence, 
3 < BF10 < 10 represents moderate evidence for H1. Respectively, 1 < BF10 < 0.3 
represents anecdotal evidence, and 0.3 < BF10 < 0.1 represents moderate evidence for 
H0 (Jeffreys, 1961). Note, that simulation studies have shown that a BF10 = 6 marks 
a point where most models converge towards the alternative hypothesis if additional 
data is collected (Schönbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini, 2017).  
In this study we will calculated BFs and posterior distributions for our linear 
regression models using the BayesFactor package (version 0.9.12-2; Morey & 
Rouder, 2015) in R (version 3.3.3; R Core Team, 2017) with the default priors (non-
informative priors) on all parameters. Parameters of linear regression models include 
the coefficients for the predictors, the error variance (σ
2





Participants and sample size rationale 
We employed sequential BFs (Schönbrodt et al., 2017) to determine the number of 
participants in this study focussing on the hypothesised effect of the prestige motive. 
Thus we intended to sample participants in the experimental condition until the BF10 
> 6 for the model comparisons (H0: intercept only; H1: intercept + dominance + 
                                                 
12
 Some proponents of Bayesian statistics shy away from using the term “significant” to describe 
effects of a Bayesian analysis and rather describe these effects in terms of their credibility (e.g., 
Kruschke, 2015). However, in the interest of easier understanding and to mirror our frequentist 
analyses, we will use the term significant.  
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prestige + leadership) and (H0: intercept + dominance + leadership; H1: intercept + 
dominance + prestige + leadership). Only after this we intended to sample 
participants for the neutral condition, however, as the former requirements were 
never met we only sampled participants for the experimental condition. In addition to 
these decision rules, we determined a lower limit of n = 200 to detect a correlation of 
r = .2 with α = .05 (two tailed) and statistical power of β = .80 for additional data we 
collected within the same sample (see Chapter 5). Moreover, we determined an upper 
limit of n = 550 due to monetary constraints (see Appendix 4 for a detailed 
description of this preregistered sampling procedure). 
The sample was collected through the online webpage www.prolific.ac and 
participants were reimbursed with 1.20 GBP for their participation. The study was 
limited to participants living in Great Britain (as we only used British charities) and 
participants in a full-time employment position (for data we collected in regard to the 
leadership motive and employment rank; see Chapter 5). Following our sampling 
plan we collected 605 participants of which we excluded 55 participants for 
answering incorrectly to either one or both of our attention checking questions (e.g., 
Please answer this question with Strongly agree). The final sample consisted of n = 
550 participants (300 females; Mage = 36.69, SDage = 10.00), employed in various 
kinds of professions. 
 
Procedure 
We introduced this study as being interested in personality, employment positions 
and opinions regarding charities. In the experimental condition we also informed 
participants that at the end of the study we would give them the opportunity to donate 
a proportion of their earnings to a charity, that they would see a list of the current top 
donors and that they could chose to have their name displayed there for the duration 
of our data collection. After this any personal information would be destroyed. After 
giving consent and providing demographic information (i.e., gender, age, profession) 
                                                                                                                                          
13
 For linear regressions containing only continuous variables intercepts are integrated out analytically 
in the posterior distribution of the BayesFactor package and thus will not be reported here (Morey, 
2017). 
Chapter 7: Charitable giving 
100 
participants filled in the following questionnaires in this fixed order: the 6-item 
DoPL scales (see Chapter 4, Table 4.3.3) intermingled with 6-item version of the 
UMS affiliation and intimacy scales (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012), the 30-item 
moral foundation questionnaires (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011), 11 items to measure 
employment rank (see Chapter 5, Table 5.2). Participants then read a brief 
description of three actual charities (www.childrenwithcancer.org.uk; 
www.redcross.org.uk; www.safelives.org.uk). We then asked, if they were to donate 
any money to a charity, which one of these charities they would chose. Following 
this we asked them three decoy questions regarding the chosen charity (e.g., “Have 
you ever donated money to this charity”). In the experimental condition participants 
then saw a list of the ostensible current top 15 donors with 15 fake names (e.g., 
“James Maes”), locations (e.g., “Sussex”) and the charity these people ostensibly had 
donated to. These people were ranked by the proportions of their earnings they had 
donated but we did not display this ostensible amount. This list was displayed for 30 
seconds, participants were allowed to move on after 5 seconds. After 4, 15 and 25 
seconds this list was ostensibly updated to create the illusion that top positions were 
still contestable. Following this participants could chose to donate any proportion (in 
10% increments) of their 1.20 GBP earnings to their chosen charity. In the 
experimental condition participants additionally could provide their name and 
location to ostensibly be displayed in the list of top 15 donors. Although we did not 
save this personal information, we did save whether participants used the text boxes 
to give information about their name and location. Finally, participants were fully 
debriefed and we explained that at no point we had stored any personally identifying 
data, that the top 15 donors were not real, and that they will be paid in full as we had 
deceived them. Nonetheless, we provided web links to the charities in case they 
wanted to donate some money to the charities after all.  
 
7.3 Results 
As stated before, following our sampling strategy we collected the maximum of n = 
550 participants in the experimental condition only, as the relevant BFs were never 
greater than 6. In the full sample about 25% of participants were willing to donate a 
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proportion of their earnings (1.20 GBP) to a charity, with the mean donation being 
48% of these earnings. About 77% of the people who were willing to donate money 
also filled in the textbox ostensibly storing participants’ names in order to display 
them in the list of top 15 donors. 
 
Confirmatory analysis 
We created several models to predict the proportion of earnings donated to charities. 
For the first pair of models (H0: intercept only; H1: intercept + dominance + prestige 
+ leadership) the final BF10 was 0.30, indicating moderate evidence for the H0 (see 
decision rules above). For the second pair of models (H0: intercept + dominance + 
leadership; H1: intercept + dominance + prestige + leadership) the final BF10 was 
0.26 also indicating moderate evidence for the H0. This indicates that including the 
prestige motive as a predictor to a model with the dominance and leadership motive 
did not improve the model fit. 
 
Table 7.1. Posterior distributions for a linear regression model predicting the 
proportion of earnings donated by the standardised dominance, prestige, and 
leadership motives. The mean of these distributions can be interpreted as the mean 
size of the predictors’ slopes. 
 M SD 95% ETI 
Dominance -3.33 1.27 [-5.85, -0.83] 
Prestige 1.10 1.26 [-1.39, 3.54] 
Leadership 2.52 1.24 [0.10, 4.98] 
σ
2
 736.16 44.24 [654.33, 826.69] 
G 0.07 0.12 [0.01, 0.30] 
 
Based on MCMC sampling (10000 iterations) we created posterior distributions for a 
linear regression model predicting the proportion of earnings donated to charities by 
the standardised dominance, prestige, and leadership motives (see Table 7.1 & 
Chapter 7: Charitable giving 
102 
Figure 7.1). As hypothesised, whereas the dominance motive was significantly 
negatively related to the proportion donated, M = -3.33, SD = 1.27, 95% ETI [-5.85, -
0.83] the leadership motive was significantly positively related to the proportion 
donated, M = 2.52, SD = 1.24, 95% ETI [0.10, 4.98]. Nonetheless, our main 
hypothesis could not be confirmed as the prestige motive was not related to the 
proportion donated, M = 1.10, SD = 1.26, 95% ETI [-1.39, 3.54].   
 
 
Figure 7.1. Proportion of earnings donated as predicted by the standardised 
dominance, prestige and leadership motives. Data points jittered for better 
visualisation. 
 
Exploratory analysis   
To investigate possible alternative explanations for the non-significant effect of the 
prestige motive, we created two further models in an exploratory analysis. Note that 
we employed standard frequentist statistics as the results in these models were 
independent from our sampling procedure and using p-values is therefore 
permissible. However, any significant result would have to be interpreted with 
caution accounting for the exploratory nature of these analyses. 
The two models were designed to split the donation behaviour into two parts: a) 
whether participants gave anything at all and b) given participants were willing to 
donate, how much did they give. Thus, we first conducted a logistic linear regression 
model with a binary donation decision as DV (0 = no donation, 1 = donation) and the 
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standardised DoPL motives as predictors. This model revealed that the prestige 
motive was indeed positively related to the probability of donating, b = 0.24, SE = 
0.11, z = 2.15, p = .03. Whereas the dominance motive was negatively related, b= -
0.25, SE = 0.11, z = -2.21, p = .03, the leadership motive was unrelated to the 
probability of donating, b= 0.16, SE = 0.11, z = 1.47, p = .14. For the second analysis 
we restricted our sample to participants who had been willing to donate a proportion 
of their earnings (n = 138). Thus, we created a linear regression model with 
proportion donated as DV and the standardised DoPL motives as predictors. 
Although no predictors were significant in this analysis, the dominance motive was 
marginal significantly negatively related to the proportion donated, b = -5.50, SE = 
3.11, t = -1.77, p = .08, with the prestige motive being descriptively negatively 
related as well, b = -4.53, SE = 3.08, t = -1.47, p = .14. The leadership motive was 
descriptively positively related, b = 4.38, SE = 3.12, t = 1.40, p = .16. As the effects 
for the DoPL motives in the main confirmatory analysis are a combination of the 
effects in these individual exploratory models it is not surprising that we found 
significant effects for the dominance and leadership motive as these effects were 
both close to being significant and pointed in the same direction. Interestingly, the 
willingness to donate money as a function of the prestige motive is in the opposite 
direction as compared to the prestige motive’s negative, albeit non-significant, 
relationship to the actual proportion that was donated. Thus, these two prestige 
effects may have cancelled each other out, which could explain the null-result in the 
main confirmatory analysis.  
 
7.4 Discussion 
In an effort to further validate the DoPL scales we wanted to test whether the prestige 
motive (i.e., the desire for respect and admiration) is positively related to prosocial 
giving behaviour. This hypothesis was based on the assertion that prosocial giving 
behaviour is a way to display higher levels of morality, which in turn, should provide 
the displayer with the respect and admiration from others (e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 
2014; see also Chapter 5). To test the hypothesis we asked participants if they wanted 
to donate any proportions of their earnings in this study (1.20 GBP) to one of three 
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charities. Due to our sample size rationale we only tested one experimental condition 
in which participants could see a list of the ostensible current top 15 donors with the 
prospect of becoming part of this list if they donated enough money. Contrary to our 
hypothesis we found no significant relationship between the prestige motive and the 
proportion of money donated to a charity. Nonetheless, the effects of the dominance 
motive (i.e., the desire to coerce others into adhering to one’s will) and the leadership 
motive (i.e., the desire to direct others’ activities and take responsibility for one’s 
group) showed the predicted negative and positive relationship, respectively, with the 
proportion donated. We argued that the dominance motive should be negatively 
related as gaining money would provide a participant with more influence over 
others as well as being the more selfish option favoured by highly dominant people. 
Regarding the leadership motive we suggested that donating money to a national 
charity is a kind of responsibility taking which appeals to highly leadership 
motivated people. Note that, although we regard these as the most parsimonious 
explanations for these results, based on the data given they can neither be confirmed 
nor rejected as the data was only correlational and we did not investigate specific 
mechanism/varied specific parameters (e.g., the amount of responsibility that could 
be taken).  
A potential explanation for the null result regarding the prestige motive might be 
based on the experimental design itself. Anderson and Kilduff (2009) hold that 
individuals try to improve their status by promoting their value to the group. Status 
here refers to “an individual’s prominence, respect, and influence in the eyes of 
others” (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009, p. 295), thus a similar but slightly broader 
concept than prestige (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). The authors argue that one 
of the ways to promote one’s value is through “competitive altruism” (Hardy & Van 
Vugt, 2006), by which they mean individuals competing over who is the most 
generous. This idea maps onto our study design in which participants could compete 
for higher ranks on the leader board of current top 15 donors, nonetheless, a higher 
desire for prestige was not related to higher donations. As a matter of fact, in an 
exploratory analysis we found that among the people who were willing to donate 
anything at all the prestige motive was descriptively negatively related to the 
proportion donated. On the other hand, the prestige motive was significantly 
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positively related to the probability of donating something vs donating nothing. A 
speculative explanation for this could be that highly prestige motivated individuals 
actually refrain from overt “competitive altruism” as they would fear that others 
might interpret their prosocial behaviour as selfish (i.e., boasting about how great a 
person they are/trying to force others’ admiration). This would be in line with Ariely 
and colleagues’ (2009) argument that prosocial behaviour which seemingly serves 
oneself, to a degree, might be perceived as detrimental to one’s reputation. A future 
study could remove this competitive aspect, for example, by providing a list of all 
donors without ranks and regardless of the amount donated. Nonetheless, it is 
important to point out that this is only a post-hoc explanation of our findings, which 
would have to be confirmed in a new study. Moreover, based on these data, we have 
to conclude that so far there is only very little evidence (i.e., only the exploratory 
analysis of the binary donating decision) that the prestige motive is related to 
prosocial giving behaviour. 
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8 Chapter 8: DoPL motives and cognitive dissonance in the 
2016 US election 
8.1 Introduction 
 “Of course there is large scale voter fraud happening on and 
before election day. Why do Republican leaders deny what is 
going on? So naive!” (Trump, 2016a) 
 
In the wake of the 2016 US election the then presidential candidate Donald Trump 
tweeted several such statements suggesting large scale voter fraud, rigged pre-
election polls, or complaining about unfair media coverage (e.g., Trump, 2016b, 
2016c, 2016d), however, there has been no credible evidence for any of these 
accusations (e.g., Bump, 2016; Patterson, 2016). Nonetheless, these conspiracy 
theories seemed to resonate with Trump voters as a majority of them adopted similar 
beliefs (Tamman, 2016). In light of many pre-election polls predicting a victory of 
Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, this behaviour of Trump and his supporters can 
readily be explained by cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), which would 
describe these excuses for losing as an outlet to deal with an impeding defeat. In 
2016/17 the terms “fake news”, “alternative facts” or “post-truth” relating to exactly 
this kind of rhetoric have become prominent, moreover, given that Donald Trump 
actually won the election this rhetoric was arguably quite influential. Thus, we 
believe it is important to detect factors and moderators predicting people’s belief in 
such conspiracies. In this study we want to investigate exactly this, by combining 
research on cognitive dissonance with research on different kinds of power motives 
(i.e., the DoPL motives) and investigating whether the dominance motive is related 
to cognitive dissonance in voters of the 2016 US election regarding a predicted or 
actual defeat of their presidential candidate. 
Leon Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is one of the most widely 
validated theories in social psychology (e.g., Greenwald & Ronis, 1978; Harmon-
Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). It states that a person experiences psychological 
discomfort if they hold two dissonant cognitions at the same time and that this person 
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will thus strive to reduce this dissonance to a bearable/negligible amount. Dissonant 
cognitions refer to clusters of beliefs, desires, or broadly “knowledges” (Festinger, 
1957, p. 9) that stand in contradiction to each other. For example, the desire for one’s 
presidential candidate to win the election vs the prospect of a potential or an actual 
defeat of one’s presidential candidate. The theory further holds that if one cognition 
is stronger than the other, a person will try to reduce the dissonance in favour of the 
stronger cognition. For example, if a person’s acknowledgement of defeat is stronger 
than their desire of their candidate to win, one might reduce the cognitive dissonance 
by contemplating that one has not cared about the election in the first place. 
Moreover, with enough temporal distance to the election, the desire for one’s 
candidate to win becomes irrelevant as they are not a presidential candidate anymore 
and the dissonance is resolved as well. Nonetheless, if the desire to win is stronger 
than the acknowledgement of a potential or actual defeat of one’s candidate, one 
possible way of reducing this dissonance is by reducing the acknowledgement of this 
defeat. For example, by claiming one’s candidate is the “moral winner” or has 
actually won but was cheated out of their victory, which is reflected in many tweets 
of Donald Trump (e.g., Trump 2016a, Trump, 2016b; Trump, 2016c; Trump, 2016d). 
In summary, if a person holds two contrary cognitions at the same time such as 
wanting to win an election vs the prospect of losing an election, this person will 
experience the psychological discomfort of the dissonance state. One way of 
reducing this dissonance is by questioning the legitimacy of the defeat. 
In this study we measured cognitive dissonance as endorsement of potential excuses 
for losing the 2016 US election which diverted the responsibility away from the 
candidate’s personality/policy towards factors outside of their control (e.g., voter 
fraud; see Table 8.2). Importantly, the strength or resistance of a cognition is 
theorised to be a function of importance or value a person attributes to said cognition 
(Festinger, 1957). Winning a presidency always comes with the victory of beating 
one’s opponent(s) and the president’s power to make others do what one wants them 
to do (e.g., by executive orders), which represent dominance desires regardless of 
who assumes the presidency. Moreover, particularly in this election there was an 
unusually strong “us-against-them” mentality between Democrats and Republicans 
(MacWilliams, 2016) fuelled by the fear of being dominated by the other group. 
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Hence, if higher dominance desires represent higher desires to win then dominance 
desires should be positively related to cognitive dissonance in voters facing (i.e., 
Donald Trump voters; hypothesis 1) or experiencing defeat (i.e., Hillary Clinton 
voters; hypothesis 3). Nonetheless, once the presidency is won cognitive dissonance 
should be resolved in the winning candidate’s voters. One could even propose a 
negative relationship between the dominance motive and the endorsement of excuses 
due to a reversed cognitive dissonance. For example, if the winner’s voters before the 
election questioned the election’s legitimacy, they might now be keen to confirm the 
legitimacy depending how much they wanted to be the winner (i.e., the extent of 
their dominance motive). Hence, we predicted a negative relationship between the 
dominance motive and the endorsement of potential excuses in the winning 
candidate’s voters (i.e., Donald Trump voters; hypothesis 2). In addition to these 
hypothesis we also wanted to explore mean differences in the dominance, prestige, 
and leadership (DoPL) motives between Trump and Clinton voters. The three main 





The sample size of the pre-election part of the study was based on a statistical power 
analysis showing that we would need about n = 250 participants to detect a small to 
medium mean difference of d = .3 in dominance, prestige, or leadership motives. The 
sample size of the post-election part of the study was determined by the maximum 
number of people we could test given our budget. We resampled any data for 
participants who failed to correctly answer our attention checking question “Please 
answer this attention checking question with ‘Strongly agree’.”, which led to the 
exclusion of n = 5 and n = 18 participants in the pre-election and post-election 
sample, respectively. The final sample sizes were thus n = 250 (102 females, Mage = 
32.51, SDage = 11.46) in the pre-election part and n = 500 (230 females, Mage = 32.77, 
SDage = 12.18) in the post-election part (see Table 8.1). Both samples were collected 
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through the online webpage www.prolific.ac restricted to US American participants. 
Note that some participants who took part in the first part of the study also took part 
in the second part; these participants (n = 160) were identified by unique identifier 
codes. All participants indicated that they were registered voters for the 2016 US 
election and that they had the intention to vote or have voted for either Donald 
Trump or Hillary Clinton. Participants were reimbursed with 0.40 US dollar for their 
participation in any one study.  
Table 8.1. Depicting the distribution of males and females either intending to vote or 
have voted through early voting for either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump (pre-
election) and the distribution of males and females who have voted for Hillary 
Clinton or Donald Trump (post-election). 
  Pre-election Post-election 
  Clinton Trump Clinton Trump 
Gender Male 93 55 177 93 
 Female 82 20 186 44 
Total  175 75 363 137 
 
Material 
The DoPL motives were measured with the 4-item short scales version of the DoPL 
scales (see Chapter 4). Sum scores of the DoPL scales were mean-centred and 
standardised for the analysis. Cognitive dissonance was measured as an endorsement 
rating on 6-point Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree” for six 
potential-excuse items at each pre and post-election time points. The first three items 
were based on accusations made by Donald Trump (e.g., Trump, 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c, 2016d) before the election regarding rigged pre-election polls (1), voter fraud 
(2), and unfair media coverage (3). The latter three items referred to other tentative 
causes of losing this election such as preference to vote for women (4), unequal 
campaign funds (5) and positive impact of the candidates' children (6). The wording 
for these items was slightly different in the pre and post-election part and depending 
on whether participants had indicated to vote/or to have voted for Donald Trump or 
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Hillary Clinton (see Table 8.2). The rationale behind items #1, #2, #3, & #6 was that 
higher agreement with these statements indicate a higher belief in excuses for why 
one’s presidential candidate would lose (before election) or had lost (after election) 
the election. Items #4 and #5 were tailored to the specific event of Donald Trump 
losing the election. A higher belief a woman (Item 4) or the candidate with more 
campaign funds (Item 5) has an unfair advantage does not represent an excuse for a 
defeat for Hillary Clinton voters as their candidate was female and she also was the 
candidate with more campaign funds (Narayanswamy, Cameron, & Gold, 2016).  
 
Procedure 
The pre-election sample was collected one and two days before the US election on 
the 8
th
 of November 2016, whereas the post-election sample was collected one and 
two days after the election. Both parts of the study were introduced as a study on 
personality, voting preferences and opinions regarding the 2016 US election. The 
requirements of the study clearly stated that participants had to be registered voters 
for the 2016 US election. Moreover, they either needed to have the intention to vote 
(pre-election only) or have already voted (pre- and post-election) for either Donald 
Trump or Hillary Clinton. Participants who did not meet these requirements could 
not continue further with this study. After checking these requirements, we asked for 
voter intention/early voting choice between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton (pre-
election) or who participants had voted for (post-election). Following this, 
participants filled in the 12 items of the 4-item DoPL short scales and the six items 
regarding cognitive dissonance (see Table 8.2) followed by standard demographic 
questions (i.e., age, gender, occupation). At the end of the pre-election part, 
participants were made aware that there will be a post-election survey and we 
provided them with a unique identifier code to be used to match their data in both 
studies (n = 160 participated in both parts). Note that participants were not fully 
debriefed after the pre-election but only after the post-election part. Nonetheless, we 
provided participants with an email address to which they could direct any questions 
in both parts of the study.  
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Table 8.2. Depicting the 6 cognitive dissonance items used for the pre-election part 
in case participants had indicated to vote for Donald Trump. Curly brackets {} 
indicate changes in wording for the post-election part. Squared brackets [] indicate 
changes in wording if participants stated they will or have voted for Hillary Clinton.  
# Category Cognitive dissonance items 
1 Rigged pre-
election polls 
The pre-election polls are {were} rigged against Donald Trump [Hillary 
Clinton] in a way that they are {were} showing more voters in favour of 
Hillary Clinton [Donald Trump] than there actually are {were}. 
 
2 Voter fraud At this year’s election, more than 2% of votes in favour of Hillary Clinton 
[Donald Trump] will actually be {have actually been} invalid due to voter 
fraud but will be {have been} counted towards the valid votes for Hillary 
Clinton [Donald Trump]. 
 
3 Unfair media 
coverage 
The portrayal of Donald Trump [Hillary Clinton] in the media has been very 
unfair as compared to Hillary Clinton’s [Donald Trump’s] portrayal. 
 
4 Preference to vote 
for women 
As a woman Hillary Clinton has {had} an advantage as most US voters 




It doesn’t matter what kind of personalities presidential candidates have, the 
candidate with more campaign funds always wins. 
 
6 Positive impact of 
candidates’ 
children 
Hillary Clinton’s child [Donald Trump’s children] had a lot more positive 
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8.3 Results 
Differences in DoPL motives between Trump and Clinton voters 
To assess whether there were baseline differences in the DoPL motives between 
Trump and Clinton voters when controlling for gender, we conducted three 
preregistered 2(gender: male vs female)*2(voting preference: Trump vs Clinton) 
ANOVAs with the DoPL motives as DVs. We report results from the combined 
sample here; however, note that results remained virtually unchanged when 
analysing each part of the study on its own or when excluding participants in the 
second part who had already participated in the first part. For the dominance motive, 
both main effects of gender, F(1,746) = 24.76, p < .01, η
2
G = .03, and voting 
preference, F(1,746) = 22.90, p < .01, η
2
G = .03, were significant, indicating a higher 
dominance motive for males and Trump voters. The interaction was not significant (p 
= .72). For the prestige motive, neither main effects nor the interaction were 
significant, indicating no differences in prestige motives among Trump or Clinton 
voters, or between males and females (ps > .62). For the leadership motive, both 
main effects of gender, F(1,746) = 14.13, p < .01 η
2
G = .02, and voting preference, 
F(1,746) = 6.08, p = .01, η
2
G = .01, were significant, indicating a higher leadership 
motive for males and Trump voters. The interaction was not significant (p = .10).
14
 
In an exploratory analysis we wanted to investigate whether any of the DoPL 
motives in combination with gender would predict the voting preference when the 
respective influence of the other DoPL motives were controlled. Hence, we 
conducted a logistic regression on the full sample with voting preference as DV 
(Trump = 0) and the DoPL motives, gender (male = 0), and interactions between the 
DoPL motives and gender as predictors (Figure 8.1). The significant intercept of this 
model indicated that, given average DoPL motive scores, among males there was a 
preference to vote for Clinton over Trump, b = 0.80, z = 6.94, p < .01. This effect 
was even more pronounced in females, b = 0.56, z = 3.07, p < .01, however note that 
                                                 
14
 As the homogeneity of variances assumption was violated in case of the ANOVAs for dominance 
and leadership motive, we additionally conducted robust ANOVAs using the t2way function in R’s 
WRS2 package (Mair & Wilcox, 2017; version 0.9-2). There was no change regarding the statistical 
significance in any of the main effects or interactions. 
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these effects are likely to be artefacts by us oversampling Clinton voters as well as 
undersampling female Trump voters (see Table 8.1). Independent from this sampling 
bias we found that higher dominance scores were related to a higher chance of voting 
for Trump, b = -0.46, z = -3.93, p < .01, but higher prestige motive scores were 
related to a higher chance of voting for Clinton, b = 0.40, z = 3.07, p < .01. These 
two effects did not vary between gender, ps > .23 (interaction terms). Higher 
leadership scores in males were related to a higher probability of voting for Trump, b 
= -0.44, z = 3.36, p < .01, however, this effect disappeared for females, b = 0.40, z = 
1.99, p < .05 (interaction term). Note, when excluding participants in the second part 
who had already participated in the first part the difference between males and 
females in regard to the leadership motive became only marginally significant (p = 
.06). All other effects remained virtually unchanged except of an additional marginal 
significant interaction between the prestige motive and gender (p = .07).  
 
Figure 8.1. Depicting the probability of voting for Clinton over Trump predicted by 
the DoPL motives [in SD] for males (dotted lines) and females (straight line). Note, 
that the interaction between gender and motive was only significant for the 
leadership motive. 
 
Cognitive dissonance  
In line with our preregistered analysis plan we first assessed whether we could 
combine the first three cognitive dissonance items and the latter three dissonance 
items. The first three items pertaining to specific accusations of Donald Trump 
showed sufficient consistency to be combined into a sum score (Cronbach’s α = .70). 
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The latter three items representing additional excuses for a potential/actual loss of the 
election did not show sufficient consistency (Cronbach’s α = .31). However, note 
that items #4 and #5 (see Table 8.2) did not represent cognitive dissonance in the 
event of a Trump victory (see Material & Discussion) and we therefore excluded 
them from our analysis. Note that Item 6 (see Table 8.3) did not correlate with the 
sum score of items #1-3. The DoPL scales correlated moderately with each other (see 
Table 8.3). 
 
Table 8.3. Pearson’s product-moment correlations of DoPL motives and cognitive 
dissonance (CD) items with p-values adjusted for multiple testing (Bonferroni-Holm 
correction). Cronbach’s alpha on diagonal in square brackets. 
 Dominance Prestige Leadership CD sum score #1-3 
Dominance [.84]    
Prestige 0.30** [.78]   
Leadership 0.29** 0.40** [.87]  
CD sum score #1-3 0.23** 0.10* 0.07 [.70] 
CD Item 6 0.06 0.12* -0.06 -0.09 
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
Our main hypothesis was that cognitive dissonance was positively related to the 
dominance motive for voters of the anticipated loser of the election (i.e., Donald 
Trump voters; hypothesis 1) before the election. Moreover, we hypothesised that 
after the election cognitive dissonance was positively related to the dominance 
motive for voters of the actual loser of the election (in this case Hillary Clinton; 
hypothesis 2) and negatively related to the actual winner of the election (in this case 
Donald Trump; hypothesis 3). To test hypothesis 1 & 3 we conducted a preregistered 
linear regression model with the DoPL motives as predictors, voting preference 
(Trump = 0), study part (pre-election = 0), and all possible interactions between the 
dominance motive, voting preference and study part (see Table 8.4 & Figure 8.2). 
Results revealed that cognitive dissonance was indeed positively related to the 
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dominance motive for Trump voters before the election, b = 0.87, t = 2.93, p < .01 
(hypothesis 1). Moreover, although cognitive dissonance was not negatively related 
to the dominance motive after the election for Trump voters, the relationship between 
cognitive dissonance and the dominance motive was significantly weakened after 
Donald Trump had won, b = -0.76, t = -2.04, p = .04 (hypothesis 3). Other significant 
effects showed that independent of study part and voting preference the prestige 
motive was positively, b = 0.38, t = 3.18, p < .01, and the leadership motive 
negatively related to cognitive dissonance, b = -0.28, t = -2.32, p = .02. 
Unsurprisingly, as the cognitive dissonance items were based on Trumps 
accusations, Trump voters had generally higher cognitive dissonance scores than 
Clinton voters before the election, b = -5.02, t = -11.90, p < .01. This difference 
significantly decreased after the election, b = 1.15, t = 2.22, p = .03, however Trump 
supporters’ cognitive dissonance scores still remained higher.   
  
Table 8.4. Cognitive dissonance predicted by dominance motive, voting preference 
(Trump = 0), study part (pre-election = 0) and any interaction between these 
variables as well as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 13.07 0.36 36.67 <.01 
Dominance 0.87 0.30 2.93 <.01 
Voting preference -5.02 0.42 -11.90 <.01 
Study part -0.73 0.44 -1.66 .10 
Voting preference*study part 1.15 0.52 2.22 .03 
Dominance*voting preference -0.64 0.37 -1.71 .09 
Dominance*study part -0.76 0.37 -2.04 .04 
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.91 0.47 1.92 .05 
Prestige 0.38 0.12 3.18 <.01 
Leadership -0.28 0.12 -2.32 .02 
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To test hypothesis 2, we re-coded voting preference (Clinton = 0) and study part 
(post-election = 0) and conducted another linear regression model with the same 
predictors (see Table 8.5). This analysis revealed that the dominance motive was 
indeed positively related to cognitive dissonance in Clinton voters after the election, 
b = 0.38, t = 2.15, p = .03. However, even though the relationship between cognitive 
dissonance and the dominance motive was descriptively smaller before than after the 
election there was no significant difference in the regression slopes before and after 
the election, b = -0.15, t = -0.51, p = .61. Note, that the effects reported in Table 8.4 
and Table 8.5 remained virtually unchanged when excluding participants’ post-
election data if they had already participated in the pre-election part, with the 
exception that the three-way interaction became significant (p < .05) as opposed to 
be marginally significant (p = .05). In summary, as predicted the dominance motive 
was positively related to cognitive dissonance (i.e., believing in an unfair election) in 
Donald Trump voters before the election when it seemed as if Donald Trump was 
losing (hypothesis 1). After the election, which Donald Trump won, the relationship 
between the dominance motive and cognitive dissonance did not become negative, 
however, it was significantly decreased (hypothesis 3). The dominance motive was 
positively related to cognitive dissonance in Clinton voters after the election 
(hypothesis 2), however, although this relationship was descriptively stronger after 
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Table 8.5. Cognitive dissonance predicted by dominance motive, voting preference 
(Clinton = 0), study part (post-election = 0) and any interaction between these 
variables as well as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 8.47 0.16 54.43 <.01 
Dominance 0.38 0.18 2.15 .03 
Voting preference 3.87 0.31 12.65 <.01 
Study part -0.42 0.27 -1.54 .13 
Voting preference*study part 1.15 0.52 2.22 .03 
Dominance*voting preference -0.27 0.29 -0.94 .35 
Dominance*study part -0.15 0.29 -0.51 .61 
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.91 0.47 1.92 .05 
Prestige 0.38 0.12 3.18 <.01 
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Figure 8.2 Cognitive dissonance [theoretical range 3 – 18] predicted by dominance 
motive, voting preference and study part (see Table 8.4). Note that both the slope for 
“Trump pre-election” and “Clinton post-election” are significantly positively related 
to the dominance motive (hypothesis 1 & 3, respectively). Moreover, the slope for 
“Trump pre-election” is significantly steeper than for “Trump post-election” 
(hypothesis 2). 
 
Additional cognitive dissonance items 
We are not reporting results for items #4 and #5 (see Table 8.2) here as they were 
only applicable in the case of a Clinton victory, however, Trump won the election 
(see Discussion). Nonetheless, the interested reader can find a summary of these 
results in Tables A5.1 to A5.4 and Figure A5.1 in Appendix 5. Results for item #6 
(see Table 8.6) did not follow the pattern of the other cognitive dissonance items (see 
Figure 8.3). Cognitive dissonance did not differ between Trump and Clinton voters 
before the election, p = .81, however, was significantly higher for Clinton than for 
Trump voters after the election, b = 0.54, t = 2.33, p = .02. The dominance motive, 
opposed to our prediction, was marginal significantly negatively related to cognitive 
dissonance in Trump voters before the election, b = -0.24, t = -1.80, p = .07 
(hypothesis 1). This relationship was marginal significantly more positive after the 
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election, b = 0.29, t = 1.75, p = .08 (see Table 8.6).  In line with our predictions 
(hypothesis 2), the dominance motive was significantly positively related to 
cognitive dissonance in Clinton voters after the election, b = 0.19, t = 2.44, p = .01 
(see Table 8.7). This relationship did not differ between before and after the election, 
p = .92.  
 
Table 8.6. Cognitive dissonance as measured by Item #6 (positive impact of 
candidates’ children, see Table 8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting 
preference (Trump = 0), study part (pre-election = 0) and any interaction between 
these variables as well as controlling for prestige and leadership motives.  
 b SE t p 
Intercept 2.55 0.16 16.01 < .01 
Dominance -0.24 0.13 -1.80 .07 
Voting preference -0.04 0.19 -0.23 .81 
Study part -0.21 0.20 -1.05 .29 
Voting preference*study part 0.54 0.23 2.33 .02 
Dominance*voting preference 0.42 0.17 2.49 .01 
Dominance*Study part 0.29 0.17 1.75 .08 
Dominance*voting preference*study part -0.28 0.21 -1.32 .19 
Prestige 0.20 0.05 3.78 < .01 
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Table 8.7. Cognitive dissonance as measured by Item #6 (positive impact of 
candidates’ children, see Table 8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting 
preference (Clinton = 0), study part (post-election = 0) and any interaction between 
these variables as well as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 2.84 0.07 40.86 < .01 
Dominance 0.19 0.08 2.44 .01 
Voting preference -0.50 0.14 -3.63 < .01 
Study part -0.33 0.12 -2.74 .01 
Voting preference*study part 0.54 0.23 2.33 .02 
Dominance*voting preference -0.14 0.13 -1.10 .27 
Dominance*Study part -0.01 0.13 -0.10 .92 
Dominance*voting preference*study part -0.28 0.21 -1.32 .19 
Prestige 0.20 0.05 3.78 < .01 
Leadership -0.16 0.05 -3.03 < .01 
 
Figure 8.3 Cognitive dissonance as represented by Item #6 (positive impact of 
candidates’ children, see Table 8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting 
preference and study part (see Table 8.6).  
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Analysing subset of participants who took part in both studies 
As we had collected unique identifier codes for participants, we could analyse 
whether participants’ opinions had changed between before and after the election for 
a subset of our sample (n = 160). Hence, we conducted a multi-level model using the 
lmer function in R’s (version 3.3.3; R Core Development Team, 2017) lme4 package 
(version 1.1-12; Bates et al., 2016). The random effect structure consisted of by-
subject random intercepts, the fixed effects structure was identical to the two models 
described above (see Table 8.4 & Table 8.5). Note that, although b and t values were 
somewhat smaller due to the decreased statistical power, results essentially mirrored 
the results reported in Table 8.4 & Table 8.5. The only effect that had completely 
disappeared was the relationship between cognitive dissonance and leadership. See 
Table A5.5 and Table A5.6 in Appendix 5 for a full description of the multi-level 
model results. Due to the similarity of the results for this subset as compared to the 
full sample we will not further discuss these findings. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
In a study of voters in the 2016 US election we investigated three hypothesis 
regarding whether the dominance motive predicted the endorsement of potential 
excuses for why one’s presidential candidate appeared to lose (just before the 
election) and actually had lost (just after the election). These hypotheses were based 
on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) explaining the endorsement of 
excuses as a dissonance reduction arising from two contrary cognitions: the desire 
for one’s candidate to win vs the apparent or actual defeat of one’s candidate. As we 
assumed that one’s desire for victory and thus one’s cognitive dissonance was a 
function of the dominance motive we predicted a positive relationship between the 
dominance motive and the endorsement of excuses just before the election in voters 
of the anticipated loser (hypothesis 1). As most polls predicted a Clinton victory, this 
hypothesis was centred on Trump voters and indeed we found a significantly positive 
relationship between the dominance motive and the endorsement of excuses (e.g., 
voter fraud/rigged pre-election polls) in Trump voters before the election.  
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Further we hypothesised that cognitive dissonance should be resolved in the winner’s 
voters (i.e., Trump voters) after the election and potentially even reverse previous 
effects, thus predicted a negative relationship between the dominance motive and the 
endorsement of excuses after the election (hypothesis 3). Although this relationship 
significantly decreased to a point where it essentially disappeared, the relationship 
was not, as predicted, negative. A potential explanation for this might be that either 
the cognitive dissonance resolved after the election in Trump voters as Trump had 
won and there simply was no reverse cognitive dissonance effect. Or, since Trump 
did not win the popular vote, this reverse effect was diminished as there was still 
some dissonance left. Indeed, Donald Trump himself did not give up on his 
conspiracy theories even after the election, claiming he would have won the popular 
vote if it had not been for voter fraud (Trump, 2016e).  
Finally, we also hypothesised a positive relationship between the dominance motive 
and endorsements of excuses for a defeat in the losing candidate’s voters, in this case 
Hillary Clinton voters (hypothesis 2). We did find this predicted positive 
relationship, however it is interesting that this effect was only descriptively larger 
than the relationship between the dominance motive and endorsement ratings before 
the election. As most pre-election polls predicted a close victory it is possible that 
Clinton voters could not completely ignore that Clinton might lose the election, 
which introduced some cognitive dissonance after all. In summary, these results are 
in line with our general assertion that the dominance motive is related to endorsing 
even very unlikely excuses (e.g., large scale voter fraud) in voters for the anticipated 
(i.e., Donald Trump) and the actual loser (i.e., Hillary Clinton) of the 2016 US 
election. Moreover, the relationship between the dominance motive and the 
endorsement of these excuses disappeared in voters of the actual winner, but did not 
become negative as predicted. 
The results discussed above pertained to a sum score of cognitive dissonance based 
on three correlated potential excuses offered by Donald Trump (item #1 to #3 in 
Table 8.2). Nonetheless, we also measured the endorsement of three additional 
excuses not offered by Donald Trump. We did not report results for item #4 and item 
#5 (see Table 8.2) as these were created in case of a Clinton victory and thus were 
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only suitable to describe cognitive dissonance in Trump voters. For example, if 
Trump had lost, the excuse that the candidate with more campaign funds always win 
(item #5) would have seemed reasonable for Trump voters to reduce cognitive 
dissonance by claiming unfair standings and regarding Trump as the moral winner; 
as Clinton had more campaign funds. However, since Trump won, neither a high nor 
a low endorsement of the statement that the candidate with more funds always wins 
represents an excuse for Clinton voters as to why Clinton might have lost. 
Endorsements of the excuse in item #6 (see Table 8.2) did not correlate with the 
cognitive dissonance sum score (r = -.09). Moreover, these endorsement related 
somewhat differently to dominance in Trump voters than did endorsements for items 
#1 to #3 (see Table 8.2). This difference might have been due to Trump not 
promoting this excuse himself, however, we will not further interpret these results as 
single-item measures for broader concepts such as cognitive dissonance are likely 
little reliable (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013). In summary, we excluded items #4 
and #5 (see Table 8.2) from our analysis as they were one-directional and would 
have only predicted cognitive dissonance in case of a Clinton victory. Results 
regarding Trump voters in item #6 were somewhat different from the other results, 
which might have been due to the excuse in this item having not been endorsed by 
Trump himself. Nonetheless, given the caveat of little reliable results of single-item 
measures we will refrain from a further interpretation of these latter results. 
In a further analysis we also investigated whether the probability of voting for 
Clinton over Trump was predicted by the three DoPL motives (when controlling for 
each other) and gender. First, we found that the dominance motive was negatively 
related to the probability to vote Clinton for both males and females. This 
relationship might have been due to many of Trump’s ideas being centred on a 
strong/independent state (“Make America Great Again”), brokering unequal deals in 
favour of the US (“America First”), and a superiority of some groups over others 
(e.g., “Caucasian” & “Males” over “Mexicans”; Degani, 2016; Filipovic, 2016). 
These ideas are consistent with the dominance motive and dominance being based on 
forced deference (see Chapter 2 & 4, Cheng, 2010; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; see 
also Choma & Hanoch, 2017).  
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Second, contrary to the dominance effect, higher prestige motive scores were 
positively related to the probability to vote for Clinton regardless of gender. An 
analysis of website and Twitter content of both Trump and Clinton showed that while 
Clinton listed 24 issues on her website, Trump listed 4. In line with this Clinton’s 
tweets focused more than twice as many times on actual issues than Trump’s, 
nonetheless, Trump was four times more likely to tweet an attack on critics as 
compared to Clinton (Lee & Lim, 2016). Moreover, an analysis of speeches by 
Trump and Clinton showed that whereas Clinton’s strategy seemed more to argue for 
her points/issues in order to convince old and new followers to vote for her, Trump’s 
strategy seemed more to forcefully repeat points his followers already agreed on 
(Quam & Ryshina-Pankova, 2016). Thus, Clinton’s behaviour/strategy seemed to be 
more about convincing others with her knowledge and by argument (a prestige 
strategy; e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 2014) than Trump’s, which arguably would make 
Clinton’s strategy more appealing to voters with a higher prestige motive due to this 
similarity (e.g., Ben-Ner, McCall, Stephane, & Wang, 2006).  
Third, we found that the leadership motive was negatively related to the probability 
to vote for Clinton in males but unrelated in females. This result could be explained 
by male leaders understanding leadership more in an autocratic, assertive, and 
agentic way than female leaders (see Chapter 6; Eagly & Johnson, 1990) and thus 
agreeing more with Trump’s leadership style than Clinton’s. Since being in a 
leadership position and the leadership motive are strongly linked (see Chapter 5) this 
effect might transcend to males with high leadership motives. In another analysis in 
which we did not control for the respective other DoPL motives we found that the 
dominance and leadership motive were higher for males than females and higher in 
Trump voters than Clinton voters with no gender-interaction effects. Prestige motive 
scores did not differ between Trump and Clinton voters or males and females. This 
shows that more nuanced effects can be obtained when controlling for the respective 
other DoPL motives in the same analysis. In summary, whereas the dominance 
motive was negatively, the prestige motive was positively related to voting for 
Clinton over Trump, regardless of gender. The leadership motive was negatively 
related to voting for Clinton over Trump for male but not female voters. 
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Limitations and future research 
In our view, there were two main limitations to this research. First, the hypotheses in 
this study hinged on a chain of assumptions, which seemed very plausible to us but 
have not been confirmed yet. Further research should investigate whether there is a 
direct link between the dominance motive and the desire to beat one’s (political) 
opponent(s) and whether the prospect or an actual defeat causes immediate 
psychological discomfort as a function of the dominance motive. Second, although 
our hypotheses seem to imply a causal link between, for example, the dominance 
motive influencing voting for Trump or the dominance influencing cognitive 
dissonance, these results are correlational. As the DoPL motives are assumed to be 
stable personality traits it would be difficult to manipulate these motives to establish 
a causal relationship in a future experiment, however, in the future researchers could 
manipulate the importance of a potential victory or the humiliation of a defeat and 
measure whether a person’s psychological discomfort can be predicted by the 
dominance motive after the actual defeat. 
 
Conclusion 
In times of “fake news” and “post truth” it is important to determine which factors 
relate to endorsing populist opinions not based on objective facts. In this study we 
used statements offered by the presidential candidate Donald Trump as proxy for 
such populist opinions (e.g., the accusation of large scale voter fraud) and found that 
the dominance motive predicted their endorsement in Trump voters in lieu of a 
potential defeat in the 2016 US election. We argued that the endorsement of such 
opinions is a way of reducing cognitive dissonance. Understanding the interplay 
between cognitive dissonance in situations of impeding defeat and the dominance 
motive is important to ensure people can make decisions based on actual facts and 
not “alternative facts”. 
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9 Chapter 9: DoPL motives and effort mobilisation 
9.1 Introduction 
The function of motives is to energise, direct, and maintain behaviour (Heckhausen 
& Heckhausen, 2008). The previously reported studies in this dissertation mainly 
focussed on the directing part of motives, however, to provide further evidence for 
the DoPL motives’ validity we wanted to show their relationship to effort 
mobilisation (i.e., the energising part) in motive-relevant tasks.  
A theoretical account of how much energy people invest in order to complete a task 
has been provided by Brehm and Self's (1989) motivational intensity theory. This 
account is an extension of classic expectancy*value models of motivation, which 
hold that motivation is the product of the incentive value a task itself and/or its 
outcome provide multiplied with one’s subjective assessment of whether one will be 
successful in this task (i.e. expectancy; Beckmann & Heckhausen, 2008). 
Furthermore, the incentive value is determined by one’s need state and motivational 
disposition. For example, in terms of hunger motivation, the incentive value 
prescribed to making a sandwich depends on how long one has gone without food 
(need state) and how much one likes food in general (motivational disposition). 
Brehm and Self (1989) coined the result of this expectancy*value calculation 
“potential motivation” (p. 110). 
Importantly, Brehm and Self (1989) argued that another determinant, task difficulty, 
has to be taken into account in order to arrive at the actual effort a person mobilises 
in a task. Their argument is based on the assumption that humans want to conserve 
energy, and that, given that they believe a task can be completed, they only invest as 
much energy as necessary. For example, if it is easy for a person to make a sandwich, 
having a low potential motivation will make a person work as hard as having a very 
big potential motivation. Nonetheless, the potential motivation determines the upper 
limit of effort a person will mobilise. For example, if a task is very difficult a person 
with low potential motivation will disengage from the task, whereas a person with 
high potential motivation will mobilise a lot more energy to solve the task up to the 
point where the needed effort goes beyond the potential motivation or a person is not 
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physically able to do the task. Importantly, in cases where a person cannot assess the 
task difficulty or is instructed to perform as well as they can, the effort is solely 
determined by this person’s potential motivation (see Figure 9.1, Gendolla & 
Richter, 2006, p. 1190). In summary, according to motivational intensity theory the 
energy a person invests into solving a task depends on the value this person 
prescribes to this task/outcome of the task, the expectancy to succeed in this task as 
well as the difficulty of the task. As people are assumed to try to conserve energy 
they are argued to invest only as much energy into a task as necessary up to the point 
where the outcome does not justify the invested energy anymore. If a task’s difficulty 
cannot be assessed a person is theorised to invest as much energy as is maximally 
justified by the outcome (e.g., Gendolla & Richter, 2006, 2010).   
   
 
 
Figure 9.1 Depicting the relationship between effort and task difficulty (here called 
performance standard) according to Brehm and Self’s (1989) motivational intensity 
theory in cases of low potential motivation (A) and high potential motivation (B). 
Note. Reprinted from “Ego-Involvement and the Difficulty Law of Motivation: Effects on 
Performance-Related Cardiovascular Response”, by Gendolla & Richter, 2006, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 32, p. 1190. Copyright 2006 by the Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology, Inc. 
 
Chapter 9: Effort mobilisation 
128 
In order to apply motivational intensity theory, it is important to determine how 
effort mobilisation can be measured. Researchers have argued that neither self-report 
measures (due to self-presentational concerns) nor direct performance measures (due 
to differences in abilities) provide satisfactory means to measure effort (e.g., 
Gendolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012). Instead, researchers (e.g., Capa, Audiffren, & 
Ragot, 2008; Gendolla & Richter, 2006) have utilised measures of cardiovascular 
reactivity as indicators of sympathetic nervous system activation, which in turn plays 
a dominant role in actively coping with stressors and activation in general (Obrist, 
1976; Wright, Tunstall, Williams, Goodwin, & Harmon-Jones, 1995). Two measures 
of cardiovascular reactivity seem to be particularly suitable to capture increased 
effort mobilisation: a) increased systolic blood pressure and b) decreased heart rate 
variability in the low frequency band. 
 
Systolic blood pressure 
Systolic blood pressure (SBP) is the blood pressure measured as the heart contracts; 
that means the maximum blood pressure. The strength of a heart contraction is 
determined by “beta-adrenergic sympathetic discharge to the heart” (p. 1190; 
Gendolla & Richter, 2006) and has been shown to relate to effort mobilisation in 
several studies (see Gendolla & Richter, 2010, for a review). For example, Gendolla 
& Richter (2006) asked students to memorise different amounts of random letter 
strings (e.g., “Q P T Z”) within 5 minutes in four difficulty conditions (easy: 3 letter 
strings; moderate: 6 letter strings; difficult: 15 letter strings; unfixed: instead of being 
asked to remember all of the letter strings displayed, participants were asked to 
remember as many as they can out of 15 displayed letter strings). These four 
difficulty conditions were crossed in a 2*4 between subjects design with two 
conditions of ego-involvement. In the high-ego-involvement condition, the task was 
framed as a concentration task that was especially indicative for academic success, 
which should be in the interest of the study’s student sample. In the low-ego-
involvement condition, the task was not framed as having a relationship to any 
measure of academic success. SBP was measured several times before the task was 
introduced (as a baseline) and several times during the memorisation task. In line 
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with Brehm and Self’s (1989) theory, participants’ SBP did not differ between low 
and high ego-involvement in the low and moderately difficult condition (as 
participants arguably mustered enough potential motivation for these conditions). 
However, in the difficult and unfixed conditions participants showed significantly 
higher SBP in the high as compared to the low ego-involvement condition. This 
finding is also in line with motivational intensity theory as potential motivation 
represents the upper limit of effort participants invest in a task and the potential 
motivation should be higher in the high than the low-ego involvement condition. 
Importantly, to control for individual differences in baseline SBP and random 
fluctuation in SBP measurements all SBP measurements were averaged and baseline-
corrected. 
 
Heart rate variability (HRV) in the low frequency band 
The human heart is innervated by both the sympathetic and the parasympathetic 
nervous system. Whereas the sympathetic innervation speeds up the heart rate, the 
parasympathetic, guided by information from baroreceptors, slows the heart rate 
down (Berntson et al., 1997). Researchers have proposed that changes in heart rate 
can be utilised to disentangle the sympathetic and parasympathetic influence on the 
heart. This is done by splitting the frequency of heartbeat intervals (called RR 
intervals or interbeat intervals) into low, .07 – .14 Hz, (sometimes also referred to as 
midfrequencies; Mulder, Van Roon, Veldman, Elgersma, & Mulder, 1995) and high, 
.14 - .4 Hz, frequencies via spectral analysis (e.g., Capa et al., 2008a; Capa, 
Audiffren, & Ragot, 2008b; Mulder et al., 1995). Both the variability of heart rates 
(HRV) in the low and high frequency bands have been shown to decrease with 
increased mental effort (e.g., Mulder et al., 1995). However, the variability in the 
high frequency band seems to be distorted through the vagal (i.e., parasympathetic) 
innervation of the heart, which becomes more pronounced as respiratory patterns 
change. Variability in low frequency band seems not to be influenced by this, thus 
this frequency band was proposed to mainly represent sympathetic activation 
(Mulder et al., 1995). Note though, that this claim has recently been refuted by 
showing that the low frequency HRV is indeed still a mix of sympathetic and 
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parasympathetic influence (e.g., Billman, 2013; TaskForce, 1996). Nonetheless, in 
the past low frequency HRV has been shown to relate to effort mobilisation across 
several studies (e.g., Capa et al., 2008a, 2008b; Mulder et al., 1995). For example, 
Capa and Audiffren (2009) found significantly lower heart rate variability in the low 
frequency range for people with a high achievement motive (in this case people with 
simultaneously a very high approach achievement score and very low avoidance 
achievement score) as compared to people with a low achievement motive (in this 
case people with simultaneously a very low approach achievement score and very 
high avoidance achievement score) in a reaction time task when asked to consistently 
beat their previous performance. 
In this study we wanted to investigate whether cardiovascular indices of effort 
mobilisation vary as a function of DoPL motives in tasks related to DoPL incentives. 
To do so, we employed the random letter memorisation task as described above 
(Gendolla & Richter, 2006) with an unfixed difficulty level. However, instead of 
framing the task in terms of academic success, we made an ostensible connection 
between memory skills and better abilities to dominate, gain prestige, or leading 
others. To control for simple desires to perform well in this task, we also controlled 
for individuals’ achievement motive (defined as “a recurrent concern with a standard 
of excellence and the disposition to derive satisfaction from the mastery of 
challenging task”, Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012, p. 726). We used four indices of 
effort mobilisation (i.e., DVs): systolic blood pressure during memorisation (SBP 
memorisation), systolic blood pressure during recall (SBP recall), heart rate 
variability in the low frequency band of .07 – .14 Hz during memorisation (HRV 
memorisation) and the number of correctly recalled items. We hypothesised that SBP 
memorisation, SBP recall and the number of correctly recalled items would be 
positively and HRV memorisation would be negatively, related to the respective 
DoPL motive in a task providing incentives for the respective DoPL motive. 
 
 




We collected data from 140 students studying various degrees of which 11 
participants were excluded for responding incorrectly to our attention checking 
question (see procedure). This left a total of 129 participants (Mage = 22.34, SDage = 
3.52; 94 females)
15
. Participants received 4 GBP for their participation. 
 
Questionnaire 
Dominance, prestige and leadership motivation was measured by the 10-item version 
of the DoPL scales intermingled with the 10-item versions of the Unified Motive 
Scales (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) for achievement, affiliation, and intimacy. 




Systolic blood pressure (SBP) was measured in millimetres of mercury (mmHG) 
with two Omron M10-IT blood pressure monitors. One monitor was used for 
baseline and memorisation measurements, the other for recall measurements. The 
blood pressure cuff was placed over the brachial artery about 1-2 cm above 
participants’ elbow and always on their left arm. Three blood pressure measurements 
were taken automatically in intervals of 2 minutes for baseline and memorisation 
measurements and in intervals of 15 seconds for recall measurements. Heart rate 
variability (HRV) was measured in ms
2
 with a movisens ekgMove sensor placed 
over participants’ hearts and kept in place by a chest belt. Here we were only 
interested the low frequency band (0.04 – 0.15 Hz; TaskForce, 1996) as this is 
hypothesised to mainly reflect sympathetic nervous system activity (Malliani, 
                                                 
15
 Note that due to equipment failure the number of participants varied for the four dependent 
variables. SBP memorisation & correctly recalled items: n = 129; SBP recall: n = 124; HRV 
memorisation: n = 112 (see Table 9.1). 
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Pagani, Lombardi, & Cerutti, 1991; Mulder et al., 1995). Note that we did not assess 
HRV during recall as recall durations were too short to attain a reliable estimate for 
this time frame. The DataAnalyzer in the movisens software package was used to 
read out the HRV from the sensor. All measurements were baseline-corrected. 
  
Procedure 
Students who responded to our online advertising were informed that the study 
consisted of two parts: Filling in a questionnaire at home and then coming to the lab 
for the main task. Participants created unique identifier codes for both parts so we 
could match their data. The study had been advertised as a study interested in how 
blood pressure and heart rate were affected in a demanding situation, which was 
reiterated when participants came to the lab. In the lab the experimenter attached 
blood pressure cuff and heart rate sensor to participants after which they relaxed for 
10 minutes while reading about some historical events. Five minutes into this 
baseline the experimenter started the blood pressure monitor to take 3 measurements 
for the baseline measurement. These 5 minutes were also used to take baseline 
measures for the HRV. After this participants were informed that they would do a 
memory test in which they needed to memorise and recall 14 random letter strings 
(e.g., “y m x d”) as well as in which location (i.e., in which of the 14 numbered 
boxes) they appeared in. The instruction was to remember as many letter strings as 
they could. After a practice trial participants were given a cover story explaining the 
motivation of the study. More precisely, we gave them fake information about two 
studies having found a relationship between memory performance and stress-levels 
(first study) or between memory performance and, counterbalanced across 
participants, either being able to a) dominate, b) lead or c) acquiring prestige from 
others (second study). The description of the second study served as the between-
subjects experimental manipulation. In each condition this text consisted of an 
introducing sentence which stated that “Davis and Franklin (2015) could show that 
having good memory is key to: a) to being able to influence others and getting them 
to do what you want, b) to being a good leader and directing the activities of others, 
c) to acquiring skills and knowledge which are respected and admired by other 
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people.” This was followed by some additional information. “The skill to remember 
details, which is measured in this task, seems to be especially important. Davis and 
Franklin found that the better a) you remember another person’s knowledge, habits, 
and beliefs the better you could convince them of something even when they have a 
strong opposing opinion about it. As a matter of fact, in Davis and Franklin’s study 
the ability to influence others was directly related to performance in this memory 
task. b) someone remembered the particular strengths and weaknesses of other 
people the better they could assign them to suitable tasks if need be. In fact, in Davis 
and Franklin's study a person’s likelihood of becoming and their success as a leader 
was directly related to performance in this memory task. c) individuals can 
remember details about the world and other people the more often will other people 
ask for their advice. As a matter of fact in Davis and Franklin's study the degree to 
how much individuals were respected was directly related to performance in this 
memory task.”  
After participants had read this we briefly quizzed them with two questions about 
both studies to assess whether they had actually read the information. Only 
participants who identified the key findings of the made-up second study correctly 
were included in our analysis (e.g., “Memory is key to being a good leader and 
directing the activities of others.” in the leadership condition). Eleven participants 
were excluded for answering this question incorrectly. After the quiz, the 
experimenter started the blood pressure measurements (SBP memorisation) and left 
the room to give participants 5 minutes time to memorise the 14 letter strings 
displayed on the screen. Immediately after this the experimenter came back in, 
switched the blood pressure monitors over (SBP recall) and left the participants to 
recall however many letter strings they remembered by typing them into empty 
numbered boxes on the screen. Subsequently to this participants were asked what 
they thought this study was about, received some feedback regarding their 
performance as compared to participants in Gendolla and Richter's study (2006) and 
were then fully debriefed.  
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Table 9.1. Depicting the number of participants in each experimental condition and 
for each dependent variable. 
Dependent variable Experimental Condition 
 Dominance Condition Prestige Condition Leadership Condition 
SBP memorisation 41 45 43 
SBP recall 39 44 41 
HRV memorisation 32 39 41 
Correctly recalled items 41 45 43 
 
9.3 Results 
Analysis and sampling strategy 
As we did not know what effect sizes to expect, we could not conduct an a priori 
power analysis to estimate a sufficient sample size. Thus, we determined the size of 
our sample by using Sequential Bayes Factors (SBF; Schönbrodt et al., 2017) and 
judged the significance of predictors on the basis of 95% ETI intervals. See Chapter 
7 for a detailed description of this approach and the interpretation of Bayes Factors 
and 95% ETI intervals. In this study we had three between-subjects experimental 
conditions and four DVs, yielding 3*4=12 experimental levels (see Table 9.1). We 
calculated BFs by comparing models with dominance, prestige, leadership, and 
achievement motives and any combination of these predictors to an intercept-only 
model for each of these 12 experimental levels. Any model including more than just 
the intercept represented an H1 whereas the intercept-only model represented the H0. 
Sampling was stopped after n = 129 participants as each of these BFs indicated 
anecdotal or moderate evidence for the H0 with one exception where we found 
anecdotal evidence for the H1, with the predictor (prestige motive) showing a 
relationship with the DV (HRV) in the opposite direction than we hypothesised (see 
HRV during memorisation). For each of the four DVs we also estimated a posterior 
probability distribution of a model including all focal predictors and their interactions 
with the experimental conditions while controlling for the achievement motive. All 
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analysis were conducted with the BayesFactor package (version 0.9.12-2; Morey & 
Rouder, 2015) in R (version 3.3.3; R Core Team, 2017) with the default priors (non-
informative priors) on all parameters. All predictor variables were standardised. 
 
Table 9.2. Pearson product-moment correlations for all four predictor variables with 
p values adjusted by Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple tests. Standard 
deviations and [range] on diagonal. 
 Dominance Prestige Leadership Achievement Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Dominance 7.44 [11, 49]    .82 
Prestige 0.35** 7.54 [21, 58]   .83 
Leadership 0.36** 0.35** 8.63 [18, 59]  .91 
Achievement 0.16 0.29** 0.38** 7.48 [18, 60] .88 
** p < .01, * p < .05. 
 
Preliminary analysis 
As participants needed different amounts of time to recall the letter strings, the 
number of blood pressure measurements differed between participants (M = 2.33; SD 
= 0.78), however, the number of measurements did not predict SBP for recall or the 
number of correctly recalled items (ps > .34). As often found for younger adults (e.g., 
Gendolla & Richter, 2006; Wolf et al., 1997) the baseline measurements of SBP 
were higher for men (M = 104.73) than for women (M = 95.62), t(50.17) = 5.00, p < 
.01.  
The predictor variables dominance, prestige, leadership, and achievement motive 
were generally moderately correlated with each other with the exception of an only 
marginally significant correlation of dominance and achievement motive scores (see 
Table 9.2). The dependent variables correlated less than expected. Only the two SBP 
measurements correlated moderately and only SBP Recall correlated significantly 
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with the number of items recalled
16
. Contrary to what would be expected, the HRV 
measurements did not correlate negatively with the SBP measurements or the 
number of items correctly recalled (see Table 9.3). 
 
Table 9.3. Pearson product-moment correlations for all four dependent variables with 
p values adjusted by Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple tests. Standard 
deviations and [range] on diagonal. 
 SBP Memorisation SBP Recall HRV 
Memorisation 
Items correct 
SBP Memorisation 4.30 [-5, 18]    
SBP Recall 0.44** 8.44 [-10, 51]   
HRV 
Memorisation 
-0.02 0.22 689.59 [-1807, 
4208] 
 
Items correct 0.18 0.25* -0.01 3.40 [0, 14] 
** p < .01, * p < .05. 
 
SBP during memorisation 
None of the models with average SBP during memorisation as DV and dominance, 
prestige, leadership, and achievement motives - or any combination of those – as 
predictors provided a more probable representation of the data than the intercept-only 
model in the dominance (BFs < 0.4), prestige (BFs < 0.32) or leadership (BFs < 
0.53) condition. A full model including all experimental conditions, DoPL motives, 
and DoPL motives’ interactions with experimental conditions while controlling for 
achievement yielded non-significant effects as judged from the 95% ETI (see Table 
9.4).  
 
                                                 
16
 Only complete letter strings placed in the appropriate box were scored as correct. However, scoring 
complete letter strings which were in the wrong boxes as correct did not markedly change 
correlations. 
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Table 9.4. Posterior probability of a linear model predicting SBP during 
memorisation by dominance, prestige, leadership, and achievement motive scores as 
well as by the interaction of prestige, dominance, and leadership with the three 
experimental conditions. Coefficients represent deviations from the grand mean. 
Coefficients for which we had hypothesis are marked in bold. 
 b SD 95% ETI Interval 
Intercept (grand mean) 3.86 0.39 [3.10, 4.62] 
Dominance -0.01 0.39 [-0.78, 0.76] 
Prestige  0.12 0.37 [-0.60, 0.85] 
Leadership  -0.06 0.40 [-0.86, 0.73] 
Achievement  -0.20 0.36 [-0.91, 0.51] 
Dominance condition  0.17 0.50 [-0.80, 1.15] 
Prestige condition  -0.21 0.49 [-1.19, 0.76] 
Leadership condition  0.04 0.49 [-0.93, 1.02] 
Dominance condition: Dominance 0.29 0.51 [-0.70, 1.30] 
Dominance condition: Prestige -0.41 0.63 [-1.65, 0.82] 
Dominance condition: Leadership 0.11 0.53 [-0.93, 1.16] 
Prestige condition: Dominance 0.09 0.52 [-0.93, 1.11] 
Prestige condition: Prestige -0.33 0.55 [-1.42, 0.75] 
Prestige condition: Leadership 0.24 0.48 [-0.70, 1.20] 
Leadership condition: Dominance 0.12 0.50 [-0.86, 1.11] 
Leadership condition: Prestige 0.38 0.56 [-0.73, 1.50] 
Leadership condition: Leadership -0.50 0.56 [-1.62, 0.58] 
 
SBP during recall 
None of the models with average SBP during recall as DV and dominance, prestige, 
leadership, and achievement motives - or any combination of those – as predictors 
provided a more probable representation of the data than the intercept-only model in 
the dominance (BFs < 0.97), prestige (BFs < 0.80), or leadership (BFs < 0.56) 
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condition. A full model including all experimental conditions, DoPL motives, and 
DoPL motives’ interactions with experimental conditions while controlling for 
achievement yielded non-significant effects as judged from the 95% ETI (see Table 
9.5).  
 
Table 9.5. Posterior probability of a linear model predicting SBP during recall by 
dominance, prestige, leadership and achievement motive scores as well as by the 
interaction of prestige, dominance and leadership with the three experimental 
conditions. Coefficients represent deviations from the grand mean. Coefficients for 
which we had hypothesis are marked in bold. 
 B SD 95% ETI Interval 
Intercept (grand mean) 5.02 0.76 [3.53, 6.51] 
Dominance -0.39 0.78 [-1.94, 1.13] 
Prestige  0.68 0.74 [-0.76, 2.16] 
Leadership  -0.32 0.79 [-1.88, 1.25] 
Achievement  0.27 0.73 [-1.17, 1.72] 
Dominance condition  0.53 0.99 [-1.40, 2.47] 
Prestige condition  -1.01 0.98 [-2.96, 0.87] 
Leadership condition  0.48 0.98 [-1.42, 2.42] 
Dominance condition: Dominance 0.79 1.01 [-1.19, 2.81] 
Dominance condition: Prestige -0.35 1.24 [-2.81, 2.10] 
Dominance condition: Leadership -0.43 1.06 [-2.53, 1.63] 
Prestige condition: Dominance 1.17 1.05 [-0.86, 3.25] 
Prestige condition: Prestige -1.11 1.11 [-3.31, 1.05] 
Prestige condition: Leadership -0.06 0.99 [-1.99, 1.89] 
Leadership condition: Dominance -0.88 1.00 [-2.87, 1.06] 
Leadership condition: Prestige 0.55 1.11 [-1.64, 2.75] 
Leadership condition: Leadership 0.33 1.09 [-1.81, 2.50] 
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HRV during memorisation 
None of the models with average HRV during memorisation as DV and dominance, 
prestige, leadership, and achievement motives - or any combination of those – as 
predictors provided a more probable representation of the data than the intercept-only 
model in the dominance (BFs < 0.75) or leadership condition (BFs < 0.42). However, 
in the prestige condition, models including prestige were at least as probable a 
representation of the data as the intercept-only model (BF = 1) with a model only 
including prestige and leadership being almost 5 times more probable than the 
intercept-only model (BF = 4.96). Nonetheless, a further inspection of these models 
revealed that these prestige effects were in the opposite direction as predicted, 
indicating a negative relationship between the prestige motive and effort mobilisation 
(i.e., lower HRV) in the prestige condition. A full model including all experimental 
conditions, DoPL motives and their interactions with experimental conditions, as 
well as the achievement motive showed a significant main effect of prestige, b = 
164.99, 95% ETI [41.48, 294.37], with no other significant effects as judged from the 
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Table 9.6. Posterior probability of a linear model predicting HRV during 
memorisation by dominance, prestige, leadership and achievement motive scores as 
well as by the interaction of prestige, dominance and leadership with the three 
experimental conditions. Coefficients represent deviations from the grand mean. 
Coefficients for which we had hypothesis are marked in bold. 
 B SD 95% ETI Interval 
Intercept (grand mean) 223.8 63.67 [97.86, 348.51] 
Dominance -31.01 64.94 [-159.33, 96.92] 
Prestige  164.99 64.71 [41.48, 294.37] 
Leadership  -106.81 68.44 [-243.79, 25.54] 
Achievement  46.48 60.21 [-70.95, 166.38] 
Dominance condition  94.76 85.75 [-70.7, 266.17] 
Prestige condition  50.48 81.85 [-108.14, 213.64] 
Leadership condition  -145.23 83.10 [-311.11, 15.27] 
Dominance condition: Dominance 3.15 83.49 [-160.87, 167.68] 
Dominance condition: Prestige 31.19 104.97 [-174.72, 237.96] 
Dominance condition: Leadership -34.34 85.84 [-203.28, 133.34] 
Prestige condition: Dominance 7.14 84.43 [-158.56, 173.70] 
Prestige condition: Prestige 111.69 93.69 [-69.85, 297.99] 
Prestige condition: Leadership -118.83 79.34 [-276.91, 34.63] 
Leadership condition: Dominance -13.25 86.65 [-183.77, 157.75] 
Leadership condition: Prestige -60.47 96.31 [-251.42, 128.31] 
Leadership condition: Leadership 73.72 93.20 [-107.53, 258.78] 
 
Correctly recalled letter strings (items) 
None of the models with the number of correctly recalled letter strings as DV and 
dominance, prestige, leadership and achievement motives - or any combination of 
those – as predictors provided a more probable representation of the data than the 
intercept-only model in the dominance (BFs < 0.52), prestige (BFs < 0.64) or 
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leadership (BFs < 0.43) condition. A full model including all experimental 
conditions, DoPL motives, and DoPL motives’ interactions with experimental 
conditions while controlling for the achievement motive yielded no significant 
effects as judged from the 95% ETI (see Table 9.7).  
 
Table 9.7. Posterior probability of a linear model predicting number of correctly 
recalled letter strings by dominance, prestige, leadership, and achievement motive 
scores as well as by the interaction of prestige, dominance, and leadership with the 
three experimental conditions. Coefficients represent deviations from the grand 
mean. Coefficients for which we had hypothesis are marked in bold. 
 B SD 95% ETI Interval 
Intercept (grand mean) 6.49 0.30 [5.90, 7.08] 
Dominance 0.06 0.31 [-0.55, 0.67] 
Prestige  -0.14 0.29 [-0.72, 0.43] 
Leadership  -0.12 0.32 [-0.75, 0.51] 
Achievement  -0.27 0.28 [-0.83, 0.28] 
Dominance condition  -0.57 0.40 [-1.37, 0.20] 
Prestige condition  0.06 0.39 [-0.70, 0.82] 
Leadership condition  0.51 0.39 [-0.26, 1.30] 
Dominance condition: Dominance 0.32 0.40 [-0.47, 1.12] 
Dominance condition: Prestige -0.22 0.49 [-1.20, 0.74] 
Dominance condition: Leadership -0.10 0.42 [-0.92, 0.72] 
Prestige condition: Dominance -0.28 0.41 [-1.08, 0.53] 
Prestige condition: Prestige 0.21 0.44 [-0.64, 1.07] 
Prestige condition: Leadership 0.06 0.38 [-0.68, 0.81] 
Leadership condition: Dominance 0.35 0.4 [-0.42, 1.15] 
Leadership condition: Prestige -0.33 0.44 [-1.21, 0.54] 
Leadership condition: Leadership -0.02 0.44 [-0.89, 0.83] 
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9.4 Discussion 
In this study we wanted to investigate whether people invest more effort into a 
random letter memorisation task (cf. Gendolla & Richter, 2006) as a function of their 
individual dominance, prestige, and leadership motive if the task was framed as 
being relevant to dominating others, gaining prestige or leading others. None of our 
four measures of effort mobilisation (SBP during memorisation & recall, HRV 
during memorisation, and the number of correctly recalled items) showed any effect 
in line with this hypothesis. Using a Bayesian Analysis method, we found that for 
almost all DVs, the observed data were more probable under an intercept-only model 
than any model including the predictors dominance, prestige, leadership motives, or 
any combination of these. The only exception to this were models including the 
prestige motive as a predictor and HRV during memorisation as DV. We found that 
these models were an anecdotally to moderately more probable representation of the 
data than an intercept-only model. Nonetheless, in these models the prestige motive 
predicted effort in the opposite direction to what we had hypothesised. In other 
words, a higher prestige motive was related to an increase in HRV in the low 
frequency band 0.04 Hz – 0.14 Hz, which indicates less effort mobilisation. Note 
though that measuring effort mobilisation by means of HRV in the low frequency 
band has been criticised as this HRV is both influenced by sympathetic and 
parasympathetic activation with only the former being related to effort mobilisation 
(Billman, 2013). In fact, the cleaner measure of sympathetic activation, SBP during 
memorisation, did not show any relationship with the prestige motive, which makes 
us doubt whether we actually measured effort mobilisation in this case. As such we 
will not further interpret this result. 
To take individuals’ general desire to perform well in challenging tasks into account, 
we controlled for the achievement motive (e.g., Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) in 
all our analysis. Although this motive has shown to predict task performance in other 
studies (e.g., the number of cells completed in a Sudoku; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 
2012) in our study it was neither related to any physiological measure of effort 
mobilisation nor to the actual task performance (i.e., number of correctly recalled 
items). This null-result was surprising to us, however, the achievement motive has 
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often been related to performance in tasks that allowed participants to constantly 
monitor their performance as to see whether they have improved (e.g., Brunstein & 
Heckhausen, 2008). In our study, participants performed the same task only once. An 
effect of the achievement motive might have occurred if participants had done the 
same task twice so they could see whether they could beat their own performance the 
second time round.   
There are several tentative explanations as to why we found null-results in this study. 
First, as this was a further validation study of the DoPL scales we need to address the 
possibility that the DoPL scales do not measure motives after all. However, this 
seems unlikely given the plethora of successful validation studies previously reported 
in this thesis, which show the DoPL scales’ predicted relationship with relevant 
behaviour and personality characteristics. Second, it could be that the relationship 
between motives and effort mobilisation is not as strong as theorised. Although 
researchers (Capa & Audiffren, 2009; Capa et al., 2008a, 2008b) have shown a 
relationship of the achievement motive with objective cardiovascular indices of 
effort mobilisation in achievement related tasks we are not aware of any other 
research investigating this relationship with any other motives. As such this 
possibility awaits further empirical investigation. Third, it is entirely possible that the 
experimental manipulation in this study was too weak to produce any effects. Our 
contention was that if participants read, for example, that a better memory ability 
makes them better at leading others and if they also possess a higher leadership 
motive, they then want to prove to themselves that they have excellent memory skills 
and see this as an indicator for good leadership performance. We accept that this is 
not a straight forward experimental manipulation, which hinges on several 
assumptions. a) Participants would have to believe that this link between, for 
example, memory and leadership skills actually exists. b) It seems reasonable to 
assume that a person wants to improve their leadership qualities if they are highly 
leadership motivated, however, in our study they could actually not improve their 
leadership qualities but only prove to themselves that they have the abilities (in this 
case memory) to be a good leader. Although it also seems plausible that highly 
motivated people want to prove to themselves that they have the skills to achieve 
their motive goal we cannot back up this assumption. c) Even if assumptions a) and 
Chapter 9: Effort mobilisation 
144 
b) were met it is still possible that memory abilities are too far removed from the 
actual motive goal (i.e., dominating others, gaining prestige, or leading others) such 
that they would not stimulate participants enough to increase their effort in the task. 
If a single assumption or any combination of these assumptions were not met, this 
could thus explain the null-results in our study. In summary, there are at least three 
explanations for the null-results in this study. However, whereas we believe it is 
unlikely that the results were due to the DoPL motives not actually measuring 
motives, or motives in general not being related to effort mobilisation, we believe the 
strongest explanation is that the experimental manipulation was too weak to arouse 
the respective DoPL motive. 
In conclusion, we did not find any relationship between the DoPL motives and effort 
mobilisation in a random letter memorisation task which was construed to be 
relevant for these motives. A likely explanation for these null-results is that we did 
not succeed in making the task performance relevant enough for the respective DoPL 
motive. However, we believe that investigating the link between motives and 
cardiovascular indices of effort mobilisation is an important area for future research. 
This is because the energising role of motives is a key theoretical assumption (e.g., 
Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008), which has received little scientific attention in 
terms of objectively measured effort mobilisation (i.e., not being based on 
performance or self-reports; e.g., Gendolla & Richter, 2006). We chose a letter 
memorisation task as it was well-established paradigm to examine effort mobilisation 
and offered the possibility to investigate all three DoPL motives at once. Future 
studies would benefit from using different tasks that are immediately relevant to the 
respective motives, even if each motive has to be investigated within a unique study. 
For example, in case of the prestige motive, researchers could measure participants’ 
systolic blood pressure (i.e., effort mobilisation) while they are actively trying to 
impress other participants (e.g., when creating a profile on an internet platform).  
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10 Chapter 10: General discussion 
In this thesis we wanted to investigate whether the general power motive (e.g., 
Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012; Winter, 1973) can be decomposed into distinct 
motives related to desires to rise in social hierarchies (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In Chapter 3 & 4 we showed that three motives can 
be distinguished within questionnaire items related to the general power motive: a 
dominance motive (i.e., a desire to coerce other’s into adhering to one’s will), a 
prestige motive (i.e., a desire to attain respect and admiration for one’s skills and 
knowledge), and a leadership motive (i.e., a desire to direct others and take 
responsibility in and for one’s group). The dominance and prestige motive fit very 
well into the dominance vs prestige approach of social hierarchies (Cheng & Tracy, 
2014; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). The leadership motive could be conceptualised 
as either a distinct social hierarchy based on legitimate power (e.g., French & Raven, 
1959) or as an orthogonal hierarchy to dominance and prestige depending on the 
degree individuals use their dominance or prestige influence to lead others to a 
common group goal (e.g., Van Vugt, 2006). In Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 we showed 
that these dominance, prestige, and leadership (DoPL) motives could not only be 
distinguished on statistical grounds but also predicted personality (e.g., 
agreeableness, extraversion), behaviour (e.g., giving behaviour towards charities or 
in dictator games), and other characteristics (e.g., leadership positions, endorsing of 
morality). Chapters 8 and 9 expanded on these findings and investigated the DoPL 
motives’ role in cognitive dissonance in the 2016 US election as well as regarding 
objectively measured effort mobilisation in motive relevant tasks. In sum, we believe 
that this set of empirical studies provides sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
general power motive can and should be decomposed into distinct DoPL motives 
which underlie desires to rise in social hierarchies.  
In the following discussion we will first highlight four ways in which this research 
contributes to investigations into social hierarchies and the power motive. Second, 
we will consider other possible distinctions within the power motive and social 
hierarchy literature. Third, we will examine how research into the DoPL motives 
relates to research into individual differences (i.e., BIG 5 model), in which way these 
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approaches overlap, differ, and which way they can complement each other. Finally, 
we will discuss the limitations of our approach and give an outlook regarding 
directions of future research. 
10.1 Contributions of this research 
This research makes four major contributions to investigations into social hierarchies 
and the power motive. First, it extends existing theories regarding social hierarchies 
by showing how two such theoretical frameworks can be combined. Second, it 
informs power motive theory by providing a theoretical framework to distinguish 
between distinct components within the power motive. Third, it provides scholars 
with a tool to simultaneously measure distinct DoPL motives. Fourth, it demonstrates 
empirically that these different DoPL motives relate to distinct behaviour, personality 
traits and other characteristics. 
There are two major theories regarding the bases of social hierarchies, the dominance 
vs prestige (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) and the power vs status approach (e.g., 
Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Conceptions of prestige and status are almost 
synonymous, however, whereas dominance describes influence through threat and 
fear power describes influence through reward and punishment based on 
asymmetrical access to resources. As Cheng and colleagues (2013) have correctly 
pointed out, this conception of power confounds the basis of hierarchy with the rank 
in a hierarchy (which is also defined by asymmetrical access to resources). 
Nonetheless, we argued that if power is conceptualised as a right to asymmetrical 
access to resources, the two theories can meaningfully complement each other. Thus 
we proposed that groups which want to achieve a common group goal accept, 
legitimise, and increase a person’s (i.e., a leader) influence (thus increasing their 
hierarchy rank) so this person can successfully direct the group towards achieving 
their goal (cf. Raven & French, 1958; Van Vugt, 2006). Hence, our research expands 
on the dominance and prestige approach by implementing elements of a modified 
power vs status approach. More precisely, this research helps explain leader 
emergence beyond the assumption that people with a high dominance or high 
prestige rank automatically become group leaders.  
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Based on the observation that individuals have a desire to influence other people, 
researchers proposed a distinct power motive (distinct from affiliation or 
achievement motive) representing a desire to influence others (Murray, 1938; 
Uleman, 1972; Veroff, 1957; Winter, 1973). However, conceptualisations of this 
motive vary among scholars. To take these different conceptions into account and 
therefore acknowledging that there are many ways to attain influence, Winter (1988) 
defined the power motive deliberately broadly as “a concern for having impact on 
others, arousing strong emotions in others, or maintaining reputation and prestige” 
(p. 510). We argued that this power motive reflects a desire to rise in a social 
hierarchy, however, as we proposed three kinds of hierarchies, based on dominance, 
prestige, and leadership, we argued that the power motive should be conceptualised 
by three interrelated but distinct motives. This assumption was substantiated by 
evolutionary accounts of dominance, prestige, and leadership (Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; Van Vugt, 2006) and the assumption that functionally autonomous motives 
(Allport, 1937; Bischof, 2008) evolved in relation to each of these hierarchies. 
Hence, this research provides a theoretical framework for distinguishing between 
different components within the heterogeneously defined power motive on the basis 
of different social hierarchies. 
Several methods have previously been used to measure desires relating to social 
hierarchies, however, they suffered from two shortcomings: confounding dominance 
with leadership desires and confounding desires for prestige with attainment of a 
high prestige rank. Maner and Mead (2010) employed scales to tap into dominance 
and prestige desires, however, their dominance scale confounded dominance with 
leadership desires (e.g., dominance item: “I would make a good leader.”; cf. Cassidy 
& Lynn, 1989). Critically, we showed in several studies dominance and leadership 
desires relate to distinctly different kinds of behaviour. Cheng and colleagues (2010) 
developed scales to measure dominance and prestige strategies, however, whereas 
the dominance scale seemed suitable to either measure a dominance desire or one’s 
actual dominance position (e.g., “I enjoy having control over others.”; “Some people 
are afraid of me.”), the prestige motive only related to one’s prestige position (e.g., 
“Members of my group respect and admire me.”). Crucially, we hold that having a 
high prestige rank is not synonymous to a high desire for prestige. For example, a 
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person who has prestige due to a valued skill (e.g., hunting) could have achieved this 
skill through a desire for respect and admiration (i.e., prestige motive) but also 
through a desire to achieve excellence in challenging tasks (i.e., achievement motive; 
Brunstein & Heckhausen, 2008). On the other hand, although motives are strong 
predictors for attaining goals (e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008), a higher 
explicit motive does not guarantee successful goal attainment. For example, in a 
longitudinal study Sheldon and Schüler (2011) showed that participants were more 
likely to achieve affiliation or achievement goals when they had a high affiliation or 
achievement motive paired with feeling that they were more autonomous (internally 
driven) than controlled (externally driven) in their goal pursuit. Moreover, some 
research indicates that a congruence between explicit and implicit motive increases 
the chance to achieve respective motive goals (e.g., Schüler, Job, Fröhlich, & 
Brandstätter, 2008; Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). In sum, our 
research provides scholars with a unique tool which distinguishes between 
dominance, prestige, and leadership aspects as well as measuring distinct motives 
rather than confounding having and wanting dominance or prestige.  
This research also highlights the practical use for distinguishing between the DoPL 
motives. Across several studies we showed that the DoPL motives predict relevant 
variables to different degrees, beyond the shared influence of the other DoPL 
motives and in some cases even in opposite directions. For example, whereas the 
dominance motive was significantly negatively related to agreeableness, both the 
prestige and leadership motive had a positive relationship with agreeableness. 
Whereas the dominance motive was unrelated to neuroticism, the prestige motive 
was positively and the leadership motive negatively related (see Table 4.3.6 in 
Chapter 4). Whereas the prestige motive was only positively, the dominance motive 
was only negatively related to various moral concerns; the leadership motive showed 
both negative and positive relationships (Chapter 7). This shows that when not 
controlling for these different influences of the DoPL motives, using a general power 
motive might mask important effects.  
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10.2 Other distinctions within the power motive and social 
hierarchies 
Besides our distinction between dominance, prestige, and leadership, scholars have 
distinguished other concepts within either the power motive or social hierarchies. In 
the following we will briefly introduce these three distinctions of autonomy, 
morality, and socialised vs personalised power, and discuss how they fit into the 
DoPL framework.  
First, Lammers, Stoker, Rink, and Galinsky (2016) highlighted the importance of 
autonomy rather than influence when predicting desires for greater power. Across 
nine studies they showed that feeling to be or actually being in a position of power 
both positively predicted perceived autonomy and perceived influence on others. 
However, whereas perceived autonomy decreased a desire for greater power, 
perceived influence did not. Thus, Lammers and colleagues (2016) concluded that a 
desire to attain more power reflects a desire to increase one’s autonomy and not a 
desire to increase one’s influence on others. As the definition of the power motive 
does not include autonomy desires (cf. Winter, 1988; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 
2012) we had largely ignored this concept, with the exception of the dominance 
motive including elements of not wanting to be controlled against one’s will. Even 
though the desire to attain autonomy is not regarded as a component of the power 
motive, it could plausibly relate to a general desire to rise in all of the three DoPL 
hierarchies. This is because any higher rank position provides more access to all 
kinds of resources, thus means to fulfil one’s own goals.  
Nonetheless, out of the three hierarchies, a high position in a dominance hierarchy 
should be most appealing to a person with high autonomy desires as a person. Such 
an agent, given that they possess relevant characteristics such as physical strength, 
could enforce a higher ranking themselves (e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 2014). A high 
position in a prestige hierarchy should be least appealing to a person with high 
autonomy desires as even if a person has superior skills, a higher ranking still arises 
from others’ voluntary deference (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). The prediction 
for the leadership hierarchy is not completely clear and would depend on whether 
one proposes a distinct or orthogonal leadership hierarchy. However, if a leader’s 
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influence arises from legitimised power granted by others to achieve a common 
group goal, then autonomy desires would probably moderately predict attaining a 
higher rank in a leadership hierarchy. This is because, on the one side, legitimised 
power is not easily challenged, thus providing autonomy. On the other side, it comes 
with responsibility over others which should hinder autonomy. An interesting path 
for future research would be to assess how much of the variance a general autonomy 
desire shares with specific DoPL motives when predicting the desire to rise in, versus 
actual rank attainment, in a specific DoPL hierarchy. In summary, Lammers and 
colleagues (2016) found that perceived autonomy decreased desires for greater 
power whereas perceived influence over others did not. This indicates that desires for 
autonomy could play an important role for attaining a higher rank in DoPL 
hierarchies, which is an interesting avenue for future research. 
Second, in a recent paper Bai (2017) argued that morality represents another pathway 
to attaining a higher ranking in a hierarchy; effectively proposing a distinct morality 
hierarchy. This morality theory is based on virtues (i.e., morally praiseworthy 
characteristics), which are culturally dependent (e.g., Western cultures valuing issues 
of fairness as more moral than Eastern cultures, cf. Graham et al., 2016) and which 
necessarily involve some sort of self-sacrifice (i.e., giving more of a resource than 
receiving). Although Bai argued that these virtues are not necessarily helpful, 
sometimes even detrimental, for solving immediate group-tasks (e.g., Bendersky & 
Shah, 2012), ultimately a group would experience this self-sacrificing behaviour as 
beneficial. Thus, in order to encourage a virtuous person in continuing their moral 
behaviour a group would voluntarily defer to this person and provide this person with 
a higher rank in a hierarchy akin to dominance or prestige. Bai identified admiration 
as the functional emotion which connects perceiving a person as virtuous with 
voluntarily deferring to her. Importantly, Bai distinguished this kind of admiration 
from admiration in the prestige hierarchy. Whereas admiration for virtues is 
associated with feelings of warmth (i.e., a more internally positive feeling; cf. Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), admiration for skills is more associated with a desire to 
emulate the skilful person (she also calls this affective respect). She thus argued for 
disentangling moral virtues and competence within the prestige hierarchy in which 
virtues are only regarded as modifiers that increase the perceived value of a person’s 
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skills. Hence, in the prestige approach copying moral behaviour would be beneficial 
for other individuals as this aids the display of their skills. However, Bai (2017) held 
that virtues increase people’s hierarchy ranking even if they are not immediately 
beneficial and even if they go beyond prosocial behaviour and specifically generosity 
(as discussed in the dominance vs prestige approach; see Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 
Cheng & Tracy, 2014) but could involve, for example, religious purity. 
Morality, similar to autonomy, is not a component of the power motive, and we did 
not include any desires for being a moral person in our analysis. Nonetheless, if 
morality is indeed a path towards increasing one’s ranking in a hierarchy, it begs the 
question whether a distinct morality motive can be postulated and whether this would 
be functionally autonomous. To assume a functionally autonomous motive would 
require further exploration into the evolutionary underpinnings of morality. Indeed, 
direct empirical support for a morality hierarchy would be necessary as the existence 
of such a hierarchy has yet to be established. Notwithstanding this, if a distinct 
morality motive could be assumed, then the current conception of the prestige motive 
would have to be refined, as although it is mostly concerned with admiration and 
respect for skills and knowledge, it also contains a general desire for “being 
respected and admired” (see Chapter 4, Table 4.3.3), which potentially confounds 
desires for respect (for competence) and admiration (for virtuousness). The 
dominance hierarchy seems to have no overlap with the morality hierarchy (Bai, 
2017). The leadership hierarchy might share a mutual desire to take responsibility for 
one’s group. Nonetheless, whereas in the leadership hierarchy this is clearly linked to 
directing a group towards a common group goal, virtues in the morality hierarchy do 
not include any leadership components and might even be detrimental to directing a 
group towards a common goal. Moreover, authority/legitimised power is both a part 
of leadership as well as a part of morality (see the moral domain of authority/respect; 
Graham et al., 2011). However, whereas authority in the leadership motive is 
something people desire for themselves in order to obtain influence, authority in 
regard to morality describes a cognition that people in general should/ought to listen 
to authority figures and adhere to the traditions of society. In summary, Bai (2017) 
proposed another pathway to rise in a social hierarchy based on morality and 
proposed to distinguish prosocial from competence aspects within the prestige 
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hierarchy. Whereas a potential morality motive underlying this hierarchy would seem 
to be mostly distinct from the dominance or leadership motives, the prestige motive 
would have to be further refined to differentiate between admiration for skills and 
admiration for being virtuous. Nonetheless, further research is necessary to confirm 
this morality hierarchy on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. 
Third, researchers have proposed that the power motive can be divided into 
personalised and socialised aspects (Magee & Langner, 2008; McClelland, 1970; 
Winter & Stewart, 1978). In this conceptualisation, individuals high in a personalised 
power motive (p power) desire power for self-serving purposes in a zero-sum manner 
(McClelland, 1970). By contrast, those high in a socialised power motive (s power) 
aim to use power to benefit others, thus demonstrating more prosocial behaviour, but 
also have ambivalent feelings towards having power. As such p and s power seem to 
have substantial overlap with the dominance and leadership motives and indeed all 
aspects of the dominance and leadership motive can be found among different 
conceptualisations of p and s power, respectively. Nonetheless, as different scholars 
appeared to have slightly different understandings of these concepts, many aspects 
included under the p and s power terms do not match with dominance and leadership 
desires. For example, besides desires to dominate others measures of p power 
included desires to impress others, desires for reputation, unsolicited helping 
behaviour (Magee & Langner, 2008), desires for autonomy unrelated to coercing 
others (Wang & Sun, 2016), or general beliefs that there should be social hierarchies 
(Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). Similarly, besides desires to take responsibility and lead 
others, measures of s power included doubts about one’s ability to influence others, 
antipathy towards power as it is perceived to be flawed or deceptive (Magee & 
Langner, 2008), making the world a better place at large but not strictly by leading 
others (Wang & Sun, 2016), or positive feelings from showing general prosocial 
behaviour (Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). The prestige motive shows some overlap with p 
power under some conceptualisations (e.g., Magee & Langner, 2008), however, it 
remains mostly unrepresented by either p or s power. In summary, conceptualisations 
of distinct p and s power have included all aspects of the dominance and leadership 
motives, however, as p and s power were not clearly defined they also included many 
aspects that did not match these motives. In the interest of maintaining these 
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concepts of p and s power, scholars could use the more narrowly defined dominance 
and leadership scales. 
 
10.3 Explicit DoPL motives in relation to five factor models of 
personality 
Apart from other distinctions within social hierarchies and the power motive, the 
DoPL motives also show overlap with some facets of five factor models of 
personality (e.g., Big-Five; Goldberg, 1990)
17
. In this section we will briefly describe 
the different theoretical underpinnings of five factor models and motive research in 
general and highlight the commonalities and differences between the DoPL motives 
and five factor model facets. We will then discuss how motive research could benefit 
from findings of five factor models. 
Both five factor models of personality as well as research into motives serve the 
classification of individual differences in people. The five factor model of 
personality was originally based on factor analytical and lexical approaches to find 
commonalities among words referring to personality attributes (e.g., Asendorpf & 
Neyer, 2012; John, Angleitner, & Ostendorf, 1988). Researchers consistently found 
five factors/domains (termed traits; e.g., extraversion or agreeableness) underlying 
questionnaire responses based on these attributes which described individual 
differences in “stylistic and habitual patterns of cognition [C], affect [A], and 
behaviour [B]” (Emmons, 1989, p. 32). Although researchers agreed that 
desire/motivational (D) aspects should also be included in the representation of 
personality traits (e.g., Borkenau, 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1988; Read, Jones, & 
Miller, 1990; Wilt & Revelle, 2015), Wilt and Revelle (2015) found that 
questionnaire items measuring these are scarce among the most popular personality 
trait scales (i.e., NEO-PI-R, Costa & McCrae, 1992; IPIP version of NEO-PI-R & 
IPIP version of AB5C, Goldberg et al., 2006).  
                                                 
17
 We will use the terms five-factor model and Big-Five interchangeably as for the purpose of this 
section they are the same. However, we are aware that there are subtle differences between these 
models (Wilt & Revelle, 2015) such as the labelling of certain facets.  
Chapter 10: General discussion 
154 
Investigations into motives started out with an effort to classify human needs through 
observation and experimentation (see Chapter 2.3.1; Murray, 1938; Jackson 1967). 
Among these, researchers were mostly interested in the psychogenic (rather than 
physiogenic) needs and tested whether these could be aroused experimentally (i.e., 
by increasing the need state; e.g., McClelland et al., 1949), whether this would show 
in projective tests like the TAT and whether these TAT test scores would predict 
motive-relevant behaviour (e.g., Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1987). Three basic needs 
were considered to cover most fundamental human motives: power, affiliation, and 
achievement (e.g., Langan-Fox & Grant, 2006; McClelland, 1987; Veroff, Depner, 
Kulka, & Douvan, 1980). Unlike traits these motives were not only measured with 
questionnaire scales (i.e., explicit motives) but also through projective methods such 
as the TAT (i.e., implicit motives; e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008). As 
motives represent preferred goal states, at least for explicit motives, questionnaire 
items measuring these motives have mostly referred to D aspects. However, recently 
researchers have included questionnaire items which acknowledge that desiring these 
goals states can also show in distinct ABC ways (e.g., Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 
2012; see Chapter 4.2.1). In summary, both trait as well as motivational 
psychologists created frameworks to classify individual differences in people. 
Whereas trait psychologists employed a lexical approach to create an all-
encompassing framework of personality, motivational psychologists employed 
experimental arousal studies to investigate a few basic human motives. Although 
both fields of research have included ABCD aspects in their personality models, 
traits researchers have focussed more strongly on ABC aspects, whereas motivational 
psychologists focussed more strongly on D aspects.  
Although based on different methodological approaches, trait model domains as well 
as their narrower facets have shown substantial correlations with explicit motives 
(e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1988; Engeser & Langens, 2010; Paunonen, Jackson, 
Trzebinski, & Forsterling, 1992; Stumpf, 1993). Whereas the affiliation and 
achievement motives seemed to reliably map onto certain Big-Five domains/facets, 
the power motive correlated differently with Big-Five facets depending on which 
kind of power motive scale was used (Engeser & Langens, 2010). This might be 
explained by the heterogeneity of the power motive and different power motive 
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scales focussing more strongly on different aspects. The DoPL motives were 
designed to reduce this heterogeneity and provide meaningful subcomponents of the 
power motive, thus might place the power motive more reliably within the five factor 
model. By inspecting items of facets of the most common Big-Five questionnaires, 
DoPL dominance seemed most closely related to affiliation’s straightwordness facet 
in the NEO-PI-R or morality in the IPIP version of the NEO-PI-R and AB5C (e.g., 
“Use others for my own ends”). Nonetheless, these scales seemed to only represent 
the manipulative part of the dominance motive but not the more overt forceful part. 
Furthermore many items seem to be involved with just sticking to the rules (e.g., 
“Would never cheat on my taxes”). DoPL prestige seemed to be best reflected by 
affiliation’s modesty facet in the NEO-PI-R and IPIP version of NEO-PI-R (e.g., 
“Making myself the centre of attention”). However, all of these items seemed to be 
concerned with boasting about oneself or having a high opinion of oneself, which at 
best reflects a mix of dominance and prestige aspects (see Chapter 3.4). DoPL 
leadership seemed to be most closely related to extraversion’s assertiveness facet in 
the NEO-PI-R and IPIP version of NEO-PI-R as well as the leadership facet in the 
IPIP version of the AB5C (e.g., “Try to lead others.”). Although the overlap here is 
very big this facet also contained items relating to dominance content (e.g., “I am 
dominant..”).  
In summary, Big-Five domains/facets and explicit motives have shown substantial 
correlations in the past. At face-value the DoPL leadership motive seemed to be 
closely resembled by the assertiveness/leadership facet, the dominance and prestige 
motives seemed to be only partly represented by respective Big-Five facets. As there 
is an enormously rich pool of questionnaire items measuring traits we have no doubt 
that one could handpick items from different questionnaires and facets which would 
closely resemble the DoPL scales. This is reassuring as the DoPL scales intend to 
measure individual differences in people and these should have surfaced at some 
point in a thorough investigation of personality. Nonetheless, this does not render 
research into the DoPL motives redundant for three reasons. First, whereas the basis 
of five factor models is exploratory, the DoPL motives are based on theoretical 
accounts of different social hierarchies. Thus without this theory it would be purely 
coincidental to create scales from the pool of trait items that resemble different 
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desires to rise in DoPL hierarchies. Second, as most trait items only focus on ABC 
aspects of personality, we believe the DoPL scales with a more balanced ABCD 
distribution cover the DoPL aspects of personality more broadly than trait items 
could (c.f., Wilt & Revelle, 2015). Third, by using some of the exact same items used 
in previous power motive scales we managed to link the DoPL scales more closely to 
the power motive as this would have been possible by selecting existing trait scale 
items.  
Finally, given this overlap of traits and motives we believe motivational psychology 
could benefit from trait psychological findings in at least two ways. First, in multiple 
twin studies trait researchers investigated the genetic, shared environmental, and 
non-shared environmental correlates of personality traits at a domain (e.g., Riemann, 
Angleitner, & Strelau, 1997), facet (e.g., Jang, Livesley, Angleitner, Riemann, & 
Vernon, 2002), and even item-level (e.g., Mõttus, Kandler, Bleidorn, Riemann, & 
McCrae, 2016) in five factor model questionnaires. Results showed a strong genetic 
component and very little (albeit non-zero) shared environmental influences. As 
stated in Chapter 2.3.1, motives are theorised to form during childhood as a function 
of positive or negative learning experiences (e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008). 
Given the theoretical and operational overlap of explicit motive items and trait items 
and assuming that most childhood experiences are shared among twins (e.g., 
Borkenau, Riemann, Angleitner, & Spinath, 2002), this casts doubt on this 
developmental claim at least for explicit motives. Hence, explicit motive research 
would benefit from incorporating genetic influences in the genesis of explicit 
motives akin to trait theory. Second, both motives and traits are assumed to be 
relatively stable over time, however, whereas this has been shown for implicit 
motives (e.g., Schultheiss & Pang, 2007) as well as traits (e.g., Ardelt, 2000) the 
longest test-retest interval for explicit motives we found was two weeks (Jackson, 
1984). Again, given the theoretical and operational overlap of explicit motive items 
and trait items it seems reasonable to assume that explicit motives are also relatively 
stable over time. Assuming this stability would substantiate the claim regarding 
explicit motives’ lasting effects on behaviour. Moreover, in respect of the DoPL 
motives it could solve some problems regarding the purely correlational 
interpretations of findings. Assuming temporal stability in the DoPL motives’ would 
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render some reversed causal relationships unlikely (e.g., a leadership position 
causing a higher leadership motive). In summary, as there seems to be substantial 
overlap between traits and explicit motives it seems reasonable to assume that, akin 
to traits, differences in explicit motives are strongly influenced by genes and that 
they are relatively stable over time. 
10.4 Limitations of this research 
There are three important limitations to our research. First, when constructing the 
DoPL scales we did not conduct an exhaustive review of all power motive items; 
thus our items are not randomly drawn from the population of all possible power 
motive items (e.g., Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). Rather than investigating all 
power motive scales we chose the most widely used power motive scale (Jackson, 
1984) as well as scales that have shown to distinguish between different aspects 
potentially related to different social hierarchies (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). 
Moreover, rather than selecting all possible items we pre-selected items based on 
matching definitions of different social hierarchies. Thus, it is entirely possible to 
find different components of the power motive or more fine grained distinctions 
based on a different item pool. However, our aim was not to find all possible 
distinctions within the power motive and, as Bischof (2008) pointed out, this would 
be an almost impossible endeavour as any concept can be distinguished into finer and 
finer graded distinctions. The method we employed only served the purpose of 
distinguishing distinct (i.e., not strongly correlated) power motive components which 
relate to theoretical considerations of social hierarchies. 
Second, all relationships between the DoPL motives and the various dependent 
variables (DVs) in this thesis are correlational. Thus, although our hypotheses often 
implied a causal relationship (e.g., a higher leadership motive leads to a higher 
leadership position) we were careful to point out that, given our data, the significant 
relationships we found could also reflect a reversed causal link (e.g., someone who is 
in a higher leadership position developing desires for leadership) or that both 
variables could be driven by a third variable (e.g., having a higher leadership position 
and desiring leadership are both driven by a common desire for money). Admittedly, 
as we regard the DoPL motives as relatively stable personality dispositions (e.g., 
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Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008) experimentally manipulating these motives to 
establish a causal relationship would prove to be difficult. Nonetheless, in a 
longitudinal study consistently positively promoting prestige aspects (in case of the 
explicit motive) or consistently establishing prestige stimuli-reward contingencies (in 
case of the implicit motive) might be a method to manipulate individuals’ motives 
(Schultheiss, 2001). An informative and less intrusive alternative way would be 
arousing participants’ motives, similarly to our manipulation in the online dictator 
game study (Chapter 6). However, this would only get us part of the way towards 
causality. This because a significant interaction between experimental factor and 
DoPL motive in predicting a DV could show that the experimental factor causes a 
relationship between DoPL motive and DV to become bigger or smaller, however, 
the relationship itself would still be correlational. In sum, given our data, we can 
conclude that the DoPL motives relate distinctly different to a range of relevant 
variables, however, we cannot conclude that the DoPL motives cause differences in 
these relevant variables. As motives are theorised to direct, energise, and maintain 
behaviour (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008), thus implying a causal relationship, 
future research is necessary to bridge this gap from correlational to causal evidence. 
Third, assuming a distinct leadership motive based on a desire to take responsibility 
and direct others is a novel approach and our findings provided initial evidence for 
this leadership motive theory. For example, a variable related to initiative-
taking/responsibility-taking, extraversion, was strongly positively related to the 
leadership motive (e.g., Van Vugt, 2006). Moreover, the leadership motive was 
positively related to variables related to competence such as the achievement motive 
or conscientiousness, which would also be beneficial to attract followers (Van Vugt, 
2006). Finally, the leadership motive was a strong predictor for employment 
rank/leadership position across a wide range of professions, thus illustrating the 
universality of the leadership motive (see Chapter 5). Nonetheless, there are still 
many open questions regarding the underlying theoretical evolutionary framework 
(e.g., Allport, 1937; Van Vugt, 2006; see Chapter 4). For example, is it sensible to 
assume a distinct leadership hierarchy akin to dominance and prestige based on 
legitimate power (e.g., French & Raven, 1959)? Can initiative taking and/or directing 
others provide a person with legitimate power (e.g., Raven & French, 1958) and thus 
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influence over other people? Or is leadership a hierarchy orthogonal to dominance 
and prestige hierarchies, based on whether people put their dominance or prestige 
influence into practice to achieve a common group goal? In sum, although our 
findings provide preliminary support of our leadership motive theory this theory 
needs to be further refined theoretically and awaits further empirical support.  
10.5 Future directions 
The theoretical framework proposed in this thesis and in particular the DoPL scales 
as a measurement tool provide many interesting avenues for future research. As we 
stated before, we hold that wanting dominance, prestige or leadership is not 
synonymous to having them. Nonetheless, for a comprehensive theory of social 
hierarchies it would be important to investigate under which circumstances higher 
DoPL motives lead to higher DoPL hierarchy rankings. Previous research in 
motivational psychology indicated that increasing internally driven motivation 
(Sheldon & Schüler, 2011) or a congruency between implicit and explicit motive 
(e.g., Schüler et al., 2008; Winter et al., 1998) predict an enhanced relationship 
between motive and goal attainment. Moreover, situational variables could provide 
further moderating influences. For example, a higher socio-economic status could 
provide individuals with more access to learning superior skills (in case of prestige). 
Being in an environment in which dominance behaviour is prevalent could 
strengthen the relationship between the dominance motive and dominance ranks 
(e.g., in imprisoned gang members; Wood & Dennard, 2017).  
Another interesting line of research involves the relationship between testosterone 
and the DoPL motives. For a long time scholars linked testosterone solely to 
aggression and dominant behaviour. However, such effects have been largely 
intermittent in the literature (Archer, Birring, & Wu, 1998; Dabbs, Carr, Frady, & 
Riad, 1995; Dabbs & Hargrove, 1997). Recently, Eisenegger, Haushofer, and Fehr 
(2011) suggested that testosterone might be linked to a desire to increase one’s rank 
in a hierarchy. Assuming different kinds of social hierarches, this could sometimes 
show in aggression (e.g., dominance hierarchy) but could also show in prosocial 
behaviour (e.g., prestige hierarchy). Preliminary support for this hypothesis comes 
from two economic exchange game studies in which participants showed increased 
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selfish/dominant behaviour as well as increased generous behaviour after being 
administered testosterone (Dreher et al., 2016; Eisenegger, Naef, Snozzi, Heinrichs, 
& Fehr, 2010). Only one study so far has tested the interplay between individuals’ 
dominance and prestige and testosterone. In this study, Johnson, Burk, and 
Kirkpatrick (2007) measured men’s self-perceived dominance and prestige and found 
that baseline testosterone levels were unrelated to self-perceived dominance and 
negatively related to self-perceived prestige. These findings were somewhat 
surprising, however, might be due to confounding having dominance and prestige 
with desiring dominance and prestige. Moreover, testosterone might represent a 
dynamic marker of motivation (Schultheiss & Wirth, 2008), thus might only show 
once a motive is aroused. The DoPL motives provide a novel framework to test these 
relationships between testosterone and the distinct desires to rise in social 
hierarchies.  
 
10.6 Concluding remarks 
Social hierarchies have been prevalent throughout human history and determine the 
way we are influenced by our football captains, our teachers, our managers, our 
politicians. In times in which socially regressive forces are again gaining ground it 
appears especially pressing to understand what drives people to advance in these 
omnipresent social structures. Where does power come from? Which structural 
components provide those people with influence who support our values? What 
determines who will emerge as our leaders? An investigation into motives to rise in 
social hierarchies constitutes an essential step towards answering these questions and 
we hope that the theory and findings in this doctoral thesis both inspire and support 
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Table A1.1. Factor loadings of the refined three-factor solution including 19 out of 
28 focal items with loadings < .25 omitted. Reverse scored items are marked with #. 
 Prestige Dominance Leadership 
I feel sad if nobody recognises my unique talents and 
abilities. 
0.53  -0.31 
I like it when others look up to me. 0.57   
Be respected and admired by other people. 0.93   
To be well-known to a lot of people. 0.65   
A position with prestige. 0.60   
Be held in high-esteem by those I know. 0.90   
It is not important to me that others value my 
opinion.# 
0.37   
I am happy to do people favours as long as they 
respect me. 
0.28   
High social status. 0.49 0.28  
I try to control others rather than permit them to 
control me. 
 0.58  
I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.  0.61  
Others know it is better to let me have my way.  0.82  
I often try to get my own way regardless of what 
others may want. 
 0.97  
I like to have the final say.  0.45  
I would like to be an executive with power over 
others. 
  0.61 
I have little interest in leading others.#   0.92 
I feel confident when directing the activities of others.   0.76 
I do not enjoy having authority over other people.#   0.85 
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The opportunity to exercise control over an 
organization or group. 
 0.27 0.45 
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13.1 Study 1 
Table A2.1.1. Factor loadings of the five-factor solution including all 57 focal items 
with loadings < .25 omitted. Reverse scored items are marked with #. The loadings 
on factor F4 seem to underlie no distinct pattern. The factor F5 seems to represent a 
method factor with high loadings of the goal items. 
 
 Dominance Leadership Prestige F4 F5 
I enjoy manipulating others. 0.66   -0.26  
I enjoy bending others to my will. 0.79     
I try to control others rather than 
permit them to control me. 
0.56     
I am willing to use aggressive 
tactics to get my way. 
0.66     
If people don't think highly of me, 
I don't help them. 
0.53     
When people challenge me I want 
to put them down hard. 
0.85     
I want to twist others around my 
little finger. 
0.79     
Others know it is better to let me 
have my way. 
0.79     
Putting people in their place is 
often necessary. 
0.72     
It's probably a good thing that 
certain groups are at the top and 
other groups are at the bottom. 
0.52     
I often try to get my own way 
regardless of what others may 
want. 
0.84     
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Dominating others. 0.70    0.32 
Getting others to do what I want. 0.58     
I relish opportunities in which I 
can lead others. 
 0.69    
I like to be in charge of others.  0.70    
I have little interest in leading 
others.# 
 0.82    
I want to be in a position in which 
others look to me for direction. 
 0.53    
I feel confident when directing the 
activities of others. 
 0.79    
I do not enjoy having authority 
over other people.# 
 0.68 0.25 -0.28  
I am often the leader.  0.85    
I avoid positions with 
responsibility over others.# 
 0.84    
When things need to be changed in 
the group, I step up and do it. 
 0.62    
I make a good leader.  0.90    
I would like to be an executive 
with power over others. 
0.32 0.52    
Strong leadership.  0.71    
I like it when others look up to me.   0.65   
I want to be held in high-esteem by 
others. 
  0.62   
I like it when others compliment 
me on my curriculum vitae. 
  0.65   
I am willing to work harder if this 
earns me more recognition from 
others. 
  0.55   
I feel sad if nobody recognises my  -0.27 0.61   
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unique talents and abilities. 
I am happy when I can present my 
achievements to others. 
  0.55   
It doesn't matter if I don't get the 
credit for my work.# 
  0.67 -0.34  
It is not important to me that others 
value my opinion.# 
  0.56   
Recognition from others.   0.69  0.32 
Be respected and admired by other 
people. 
  0.57  0.31 
Being respected by others is often 
payment enough. 
   0.63  
It's not good to dominate others.# 0.47   -0.28  
I am happy to do people favours as 
long as they respect me. 
  0.43 0.32  
I get a lot of enjoyment out of 
winning an argument. 
0.33  0.50   
The world needs good leaders. -0.30  0.28 0.26  
I don't like if somebody challenges 
my authority. 
0.42     
The best thing in life is to be a 
good leader. 
 0.27  0.40  
Good leaders are more important 
than good workers. 
0.40   0.36  
I often share with others when I 
achieved something great. 
  0.38   
I celebrate my own successes with 
others more often than theirs. 
0.50     
Success means being respected.   0.30 0.45  
The best people in life are those 
who have the respect of others. 
   0.45  
Being unnoticed by others is a   0.47  0.25 
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terrible thing. 
Some people have to be in control 
over others. 
0.39     
If I am with other people, it is 
mostly me who makes the 
decisions. 
0.42 0.37  0.26  
I want to be well-known to a lot of 
people. 
  0.32  0.38 
I can easily detect when people 
want to challenge me. 
0.33 0.31   -0.26 
I like it when I have the final say. 0.46  0.26   
High social status. 0.27  0.27  0.47 
To be in a leadership position in 
which others work for me. 
 0.49   0.35 
The opportunity to exercise control 
over an organization or group. 
0.34 0.38   0.34 
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Table A2.1.2. Factor loadings of the refined three-factor solution including 43 out of 







It's not good to dominate others.# 0.53 
  I enjoy manipulating others. 0.70 
  I enjoy bending others to my will. 0.80 
  I try to control others rather than permit them to control me. 0.54 
  I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way. 0.65 
  When people challenge me I want to put them down hard. 0.75 
  I want to twist others around my little finger. 0.82 
  Others know it is better to let me have my way. 0.73 
  Putting people in their place is often necessary. 0.65 
  I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want. 0.81 
  Dominating others. 0.78 
  Getting others to do what I want. 0.63 
  Some people have to be in control over others. 0.40 
  It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other 
groups are at the bottom. 0.50 
  I like it when I have the final say. 0.40 
  I like it when others look up to me. 
 
0.66 
 I am happy to do people favours as long as they respect me. 
 
0.62 
 I want to be held in high-esteem by others. 
 
0.73 
 I like it when others compliment me on my curriculum vitae. 
 
0.66 




 I often share with others when I achieved something great. 
 
0.52 
 I feel sad if nobody recognises my unique talents and abilities. 
 
0.57 
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The best people in life are those who have the respect of others. 
 
0.53 
 Being unnoticed by others is a terrible thing. 
 
0.61 
 I am happy when I can present my achievements to others. 
 
0.68 
 Recognition from others. 
 
0.73 
 Be respected and admired by other people. 
 
0.70 
 Being respected by others is often payment enough. 
 
0.46 
 It doesn't matter if I don't get the credit for my work.# 
 
0.39 
 I want to be well-known to a lot of people. 
 
0.48 
 It is not important to me that others value my opinion.# 
 
0.41 
 A position with prestige. 
 
0.48 
 I relish opportunities in which I can lead others. 
  
0.66 
I like to be in charge of others. 
  
0.68 
I have little interest in leading others.# 
  
0.79 
I feel confident when directing the activities of others. 
  
0.76 
I do not enjoy having authority over other people.# 
  
0.65 
I am often the leader. 
  
0.81 
I avoid positions with responsibility over others.# 
  
0.83 
When things need to be changed in the group, I step up and do it. 
  
0.58 
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Table A2.1.3. Factor loadings of the two-factor solution including all 57 focal items 
with loadings < .25 omitted. Reverse scored items are marked with #. Factor F1 
shows a mix of prestige and leadership items, factor F2 is mostly related to 
dominance items. 
 F1 F2 
I like it when others look up to me. 0.748  
I relish opportunities in which I can lead others. 0.762  
I am happy to do people favours as long as they respect me. 0.501  
I like to be in charge of others. 0.693  
The world needs good leaders. 0.549 -0.374 
I want to be held in high-esteem by others. 0.79  
I like it when others compliment me on my curriculum vitae. 0.582  
I am willing to work harder if this earns me more recognition from others. 0.577  
I have little interest in leading others.# 0.689  
I want to be in a position in which others look to me for direction. 0.769  
Being respected by others is often payment enough. 0.524  
Success means being respected. 0.554  
I feel confident when directing the activities of others. 0.711  
I do not enjoy having authority over other people.# 0.622  
I am happy when I can present my achievements to others. 0.643  
I am often the leader. 0.708  
I avoid positions with responsibility over others.# 0.635  
I want to be well-known to a lot of people. 0.518  
When things need to be changed in the group, I step up and do it. 0.638  
I make a good leader. 0.818  
I would like to be an executive with power over others. 0.548 0.377 
Strong leadership. 0.726  
Recognition from others. 0.621  
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Be respected and admired by other people. 0.733  
To be in a leadership position in which others work for me. 0.578 0.34 
A position with prestige. 0.622  
It's not good to dominate others.#  0.533 
I enjoy manipulating others.  0.708 
I enjoy bending others to my will.  0.801 
I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.  0.525 
I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.  0.647 
I celebrate my own successes with others more often than theirs.  0.527 
When people challenge me I want to put them down hard.  0.757 
I want to twist others around my little finger.  0.84 
Others know it is better to let me have my way.  0.752 
Putting people in their place is often necessary.  0.65 
It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are 
at the bottom. 
 0.511 
I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want.  0.82 
Dominating others.  0.791 
Getting others to do what I want.  0.63 
I get a lot of enjoyment out of winning an argument. 0.34 0.286 
I don't like if somebody challenges my authority.  0.305 
The best thing in life is to be a good leader. 0.469  
Good leaders are more important than good workers.  0.407 
I often share with others when I achieved something great. 0.455  
If people don't think highly of me, I don't help them.  0.499 
I feel sad if nobody recognises my unique talents and abilities. 0.291  
The best people in life are those who have the respect of others. 0.438  
Being unnoticed by others is a terrible thing. 0.33  
Some people have to be in control over others.  0.394 
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If I am with other people, it is mostly me who makes the decisions. 0.431 0.386 
It doesn't matter if I don't get the credit for my work.# 0.271  
I can easily detect when people want to challenge me. 0.302  
It is not important to me that others value my opinion.# 0.382  
I like it when I have the final say. 0.367 0.4 
High social status. 0.391 0.394 
The opportunity to exercise control over an organization or group. 0.45 0.45 
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Table A2.1.4. Factor loadings of the one-factor solution including all 57 focal items. 
No factor loadings omitted in this output, however, only one item showed a loading 
below < .25. Reverse scored items are marked with #.  
 F1 
I like it when others look up to me. 0.56 
It's not good to dominate others.# 0.38 
I relish opportunities in which I can lead others. 0.73 
I am happy to do people favours as long as they respect me. 0.31 
I like to be in charge of others. 0.78 
I get a lot of enjoyment out of winning an argument. 0.55 
I enjoy manipulating others. 0.44 
The world needs good leaders. 0.21 
I want to be held in high-esteem by others. 0.59 
I don't like if somebody challenges my authority. 0.37 
I enjoy bending others to my will. 0.57 
I try to control others rather than permit them to control me. 0.56 
I like it when others compliment me on my curriculum vitae. 0.39 
I am willing to work harder if this earns me more recognition from others. 0.65 
I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way. 0.63 
The best thing in life is to be a good leader. 0.59 
Good leaders are more important than good workers. 0.49 
I often share with others when I achieved something great. 0.33 
If people don't think highly of me, I don't help them. 0.32 
I have little interest in leading others.# 0.63 
I feel sad if nobody recognises my unique talents and abilities. 0.44 
I want to be in a position in which others look to me for direction. 0.78 
I celebrate my own successes with others more often than theirs. 0.57 
Being respected by others is often payment enough. 0.30 
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Success means being respected. 0.57 
When people challenge me I want to put them down hard. 0.47 
I want to twist others around my little finger. 0.52 
I feel confident when directing the activities of others. 0.64 
I do not enjoy having authority over other people.# 0.65 
The best people in life are those who have the respect of others. 0.43 
Being unnoticed by others is a terrible thing. 0.41 
Others know it is better to let me have my way. 0.55 
Putting people in their place is often necessary. 0.55 
Some people have to be in control over others. 0.40 
If I am with other people, it is mostly me who makes the decisions. 0.71 
I am happy when I can present my achievements to others. 0.58 
It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
0.42 
I am often the leader. 0.72 
I avoid positions with responsibility over others.# 0.46 
It doesn't matter if I don't get the credit for my work.# 0.31 
I want to be well-known to a lot of people. 0.63 
I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want. 0.57 
I can easily detect when people want to challenge me. 0.47 
When things need to be changed in the group, I step up and do it. 0.62 
I make a good leader. 0.72 
It is not important to me that others value my opinion.# 0.25 
I like it when I have the final say. 0.66 
I would like to be an executive with power over others. 0.81 
High social status. 0.68 
Dominating others. 0.66 
Strong leadership. 0.73 
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Recognition from others. 0.69 
Getting others to do what I want. 0.67 
Be respected and admired by other people. 0.65 
To be in a leadership position in which others work for me. 0.81 
The opportunity to exercise control over an organization or group. 0.78 
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13.2 Study 2 
Strategy to determine final DoPL scales 
In Study 1 we determined 10 items to measure each of the DoPL motives. These 
items constituted the preliminary core items of the DoPL scales and were chosen on 
the basis of high factor loadings in Study 1, an even spread of affective, behavioural, 
cognitive, and desire aspects (ABCD; Wilt & Revelle, 2015), as well as a broad 
coverage of the underlying concept. However, we also tested several factor analyses, 
exchanging core items with additional “reserve” items (5 dominance, 8 prestige, 0 
leadership items) which yielded essentially identical three-factor structures. As we 
aimed to create 3 10-item scales for each the DoPL motives consisting of items that 
uniquely load on a single factor in both Study 1 and Study 2 we would replace any 
core item showing cross-loadings > .25 with a reserve item of the same ABCD 
category. This resulting set of items would then constitute the final DoPL scales. 
Note that this item selection was completely independent from the hypothesis tests 
described in Table 4.3.1. 
This description can also be found in our preregistration (https://osf.io/2w647/). 
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Table A6.1. Linear regression models predicting the proportion of money (in 
pennies) out of 2 GBP (lab-based study) and 3 GBP (online study: neutral condition) 
given to another participant by the dominance and prestige motives. 
  Lab-based study  Online study  
 b SE t p b SE t p 
Intercept 89.82 4.70 19.10 < .01 105.76 4.27 24.76 < .01 
Dominance -17.65 5.03 -3.51 < .01 -11.35 4.65 -2.44 .02 
Prestige 5.65 5.03 1.12 .27 2.84 4.65 0.61 .54 
 
Table A6.2. Linear regression models predicting the proportion of money (in 
pennies) out of 2 GBP (lab-based study) and 3 GBP (online study: neutral condition) 
given to another participant by the prestige and leadership motives. 
  Lab-based study  Online study  
 b SE t p b SE t p 
Intercept 89.82 4.95 18.14 <.01 105.76 4.28 24.69 < .01 
Prestige 3.49 5.20 0.67 .51 2.87 4.79 0.60 .55 
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Table A6.3. Linear regression models predicting the proportion of money (in 
pennies) out of 2 GBP (lab-based study) and 3 GBP (online study: neutral condition) 
given to another participant by the dominance, prestige, and leadership motives, 
gender (effect coded; -.5 for males), and the interactions between dominance and 
prestige motives and gender. 
  Lab-based study  Online study  
 b SE t p b SE t p 
Intercept 89.40 4.95 18.07 < .01 107.13 4.40 24.33 < .01 
Dominance -17.28 5.20 -3.33 < .01 -10.19 4.76 -2.14 .03 
Prestige 4.85 5.31 0.91 .37 2.28 4.81 0.47 .64 
Gender 1.40 9.89 0.14 .89 11.98 8.81 1.36 .17 
Gender*Dominance 7.95 10.39 0.77 .45 8.29 9.52 0.87 .38 
Gender*Prestige -6.82 10.63 -0.64 .52 -6.56 9.62 -0.68 .50 
 
Table A6.4. Linear regression models predicting the proportion of money (in 
pennies) out of 2 GBP (lab-based study) and 3 GBP (online study: neutral condition) 
given to another participant by the dominance, prestige, and leadership motives, 
gender (effect coded; -.5 for males), and the interactions between prestige and 
leadership motives and gender. 
  Lab-based study  Online study  
 b SE t p b SE t p 
Intercept 91.54 4.81 19.04 < .01 106.75 4.31 24.78 < .01 
Prestige 3.33 4.96 0.67 .51 2.68 4.95 0.54 .59 
Leadership -17.81 5.16 -3.45 < .01 -10.00 4.79 -2.09 .04 
Gender -3.96 9.62 -0.41 .68 15.01 8.62 1.74 .08 
Gender*Prestige -14.53 9.92 -1.47 .15 -7.47 9.91 -0.75 .45 
Gender*Leadership 30.81 10.31 2.99 < .01 11.29 9.59 1.18 .24 
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Table A6.5. Multilevel model with by-participant random intercepts and by-
participant random slopes for experimental condition predicting the amount of 
money (in pennies) out of 3 GBP given to another participant in an online DG. The 
independent variables included the dominance and prestige motives, gender (effect 
coded: males = -.5), experimental condition (effect coded: neutral = -.5; arousal = .5), 
and all second order interactions between gender, condition and dominance and 
prestige motives as predictors.  
 b SE t Bootstrapped 95% CI 
Intercept 90.65 4.24 21.39 [82.41, 99.02] 
Dominance -11.79 4.58 -2.58 [-20.61, -2.63] 
Prestige 0.38 4.62 0.08 [-8.67, 9.47] 
Gender 7.39 8.47 0.87 [-9.07, 23.87] 
Condition -33.77 4.56 -7.40 [-42.48, -24.86] 
Gender*Condition -9.38 9.34 -1.01 [-27.90, 9.06] 
Gender*Dominance 11.92 9.16 1.30 [-5.98, 29.96] 
Condition*Dominance -3.15 5.04 -0.62 [-5.98, 29.96] 
Gender*Prestige -6.01 9.24 -0.65 [-23.87, 12.03] 
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Table A6.6. Multilevel model with by-participant random intercepts and by-
participant random slopes for experimental condition predicting the amount of 
money (in pennies) out of 3 GBP given to another participant in an online DG. The 
independent variables included the prestige and leadership motives, gender (effect 
coded: males = -.5), experimental condition (effect coded: neutral = -.5; arousal = .5), 
and all second order interactions between gender, condition and prestige and 
leadership motives as predictors. 
 b SE t Bootstrapped 95% CI 
Intercept 89.80 4.19 21.45 [81.68, 98.05] 
Prestige -0.35 4.81 -0.07 [-9.75, 9.29] 
Leadership -8.56 4.65 -1.84 [-17.79, 0.53] 
Gender 11.05 8.37 1.32 [-5.74, 27.33] 
Condition -33.69 4.56 -7.38 [-42.51, -24.81] 
Gender*Condition -8.00 9.14 -0.87 [-26.19, 10.06] 
Gender*Prestige -1.80 9.62 -0.19 [-20.60, 17.14] 
Condition*Prestige -6.70 5.07 -1.32 [-16.66, 2.95] 
Gender*Leadership 2.90 9.31 0.31 [-15.19, 20.86] 
Condition*Leadership 2.46 5.07 0.49 [-7.64, 12.52] 
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Preregistered sampling plan 
 
Sample size:  
Sample size will be determined by the sequential analysis of Bayes Factors. The 
maximum sample size for this study is n = 550, however, we take the liberty to 
increase this sample size in increments of n = 25 if the Bayes Factors are close to our 
predefined requirements (see below). 
 
Sample size rationale:  
We are also collecting data for another analysis in the same survey. In this analysis 
we want to be able to detect a correlation of r = .2 with alpha = .05 (two tailed) and 
statistical power of beta = .80, yielding n = 191. Thus we will, at minimum, collect n 
= 200 participants in condition 1 to be able to perform this analysis. 
 
Stopping rule:  
The stopping decision will be made on the basis of Bayes Factors as well as the 
maximum sample size. Bayes Factors will be calculated as probability tests of the 
following linear regression models: 
M1: amount donated predicted by intercept only (only using participants in condition 
1) 
M2: amount donated predicted by dominance and leadership motive (only using 
participants in condition 1) 
M3: amount donated predicted by dominance, prestige and leadership motive (only 
using participants in condition 1) 
M4: amount donated predicted by dominance, prestige and leadership motive, and 
dummy coded variable representing the experimental condition (condition 1 = 0) 
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M5: amount donated predicted by dominance, prestige and leadership motive, and 
dummy coded variable representing the experimental condition (condition 1 = 0) as 
well as the interaction between the prestige motive and the experimental condition 
variable. 
  
We will first collect data of participants in condition 1 and sample so long until both 
of the following requirements are met.  
1. Bayes Factor1: M3/M1 > 6 
2. Bayes Factor2: M3/M2 > 6 
Once both requirements are met we will collect participants for condition 2 and 
sample so long until either the maximum sample size (n = 550) is reached or both of 
the following requirements are met: 
3. Bayes Factor3: M5/M1 > 6 
4. Bayes Factor4: M5/M4 > 6 
 
Using Sequential Bayes Factor is a procedure introduced by Schönbrodt 
(Schönbrodt, F. D., Wagenmakers, E. J., Zehetleitner, M., & Perugini, M. (2017). 
Sequential hypothesis testing with bayes factors: efficiently testing mean differences. 
Psychological Methods, 22(2), 322-339.). Bayes Factors of > 6 represent satisfactory 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis/model (see paper). 
Bayes Factors will be calculated using the BayesFactor package (Morey, Rouder, & 
Jamil, 2017) in the statistical software R using the regressionBF() function with all 
default priors. 
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Item 4 
Table A5.1. Cognitive dissonance as measured by item 4 (preference voting for 
women, see Table 8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting preference (Trump = 
0), study part (pre-election = 0) and any interaction between these variables as well 
as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 3.39 0.15 23.29 < .01 
Dominance 0.26 0.12 2.15 .03 
Voting preference -1.20 0.17 -6.97 <.01 
Study part 0.01 0.18 0.05 .96 
Voting preference*study part -0.16 0.21 -0.75 .46 
Dominance*voting preference -0.06 0.15 -0.39 .70 
Dominance*Study part -0.11 0.15 -0.71 .48 
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.32 0.19 1.65 .10 
Prestige 0.01 0.05 0.12 .90 
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Table A5.2. Cognitive dissonance as measured by item 4 (preference voting for 
women, see Table 8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting preference (Clinton = 
0), study part (post-election = 0) and any interaction between these variables as well 
as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 2.04 0.06 32.09 < .01 
Dominance 0.41 0.07 5.71 <.01 
Voting preference 1.36 0.13 10.89 < .01 
Study part 0.15 0.11 1.34 .18 
Voting preference*study part -0.16 0.21 -0.75 .46 
Dominance*voting preference -0.26 0.12 -2.21 .03 
Dominance*Study part -0.21 0.12 -1.77 .08 
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.32 0.19 1.65 .10 
Prestige 0.01 0.05 0.12 .90 













Appendix 5: For Chapter 8 
209 
Item 5 
Table A5.3. Cognitive dissonance as measured by item 5 (unequal campaign 
funding, see Table 8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting preference (Trump = 
0), study part (pre-election = 0) and any interaction between these variables as well 
as controlling for prestige and leadership motives.  
 b SE t p 
Intercept 3.18 0.14 22.36 < .01 
Dominance 0.11 0.12 0.97 .33 
Voting preference -0.67 0.17 -3.95 <.01 
Study part -0.91 0.18 -5.15 <.01 
Voting preference*study part 0.90 0.21 4.35 <.01 
Dominance*voting preference 0.04 0.15 0.28 .78 
Dominance*Study part 0.08 0.15 0.55 .59 
Dominance*voting preference*study part -0.04 0.19 -0.21 .84 
Prestige 0.17 0.05 3.47 <.01 
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Table A5.4. Cognitive dissonance as measured by item 5 (unequal campaign 
funding, see Table 8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting preference (Clinton = 
0), study part (post-election = 0) and any interaction between these variables as well 
as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 2.51 0.06 40.42 < .01 
Dominance 0.20 0.07 2.83 <.01 
Voting preference -0.24 0.12 -1.92 .05 
Study part 0.01 0.11 0.05 .96 
Voting preference*study part 0.90 0.21 4.35 <.01 
Dominance*voting preference 0.00 0.11 -0.03 .97 
Dominance*Study part -0.04 0.12 -0.37 .72 
Dominance*voting preference*study part -0.04 0.19 -0.21 .84 
Prestige 0.17 0.05 3.47 <.01 
Leadership -0.21 0.05 -4.28 <.01 
 
 
Figure A5.1. Cognitive dissonance as represented by Item #4, #5 and #6 (see Table 
8.2) predicted by dominance motive, voting preference, and study part (see Tables 
A5.1 to A5.4). 
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Analysing subset of participants who took part in both studies 
This analysis only includes the n = 160 participants who took part in both the pre and 
post-election part of the study. Cognitive dissonance is represented as the sum score 
of the cognitive dissonance items #1 to #3 (see Table 8.2). Note that although b and t 
values were somewhat smaller, due to the decreased statistical power, results 
essentially mirrored the results reported for the full sample in Table 8.4 & Table 8.5. 
 
Table A5.5 Cognitive dissonance predicted by dominance motive, voting preference 
(Trump = 0), study part (pre-election = 0) and any interaction between these 
variables as well as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t  
Intercept 12.52 0.44 28.67 ** 
Dominance 0.96 0.35 2.73 ** 
Voting preference -4.39 0.51 -8.54 ** 
Study part -0.12 0.39 -0.32  
Voting preference*study part 0.58 0.46 1.27  
Dominance*voting preference -0.79 0.43 -1.86 . 
Dominance*Study part -0.63 0.33 -1.90 . 
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.68 0.44 1.56  
Prestige 0.28 0.20 1.37  
Leadership 0.00 0.22 0.01  
Note that the lmer function in R’s lme4 package does not provide p-values, however, based on the 
assumption that a t-distribution with df > 30 is approximately normally distributed t > |1.96| 
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Table A5.6. Cognitive dissonance predicted by dominance motive, voting preference 
(Clinton = 0), study part (post-election = 0) and any interaction between these 
variables as well as controlling for prestige and leadership motives. 
 b SE t  
Intercept 8.59 0.28 31.03 ** 
Dominance 0.22 0.31 0.71  
Voting preference 3.81 0.51 7.42 ** 
Study part -0.46 0.24 -1.87 . 
Voting preference*study part 0.58 0.46 1.27  
Dominance*voting preference 0.12 0.46 0.25  
Dominance*Study part -0.05 0.28 -0.18  
Dominance*voting preference*study part 0.68 0.44 1.56  
Prestige 0.28 0.20 1.37  
Leadership 0.00 0.22 0.01  
Note that the lmer function in R’s lme4 package does not provide p-values, however, based on the 
assumption that a t-distribution with df > 30 is approximately normally distributed t > |1.96| 
corresponds to p < .05 (*); t > |2.58| corresponds to p < .01 (**); t > |1.65| corresponds to p < .10 (.). 
 
 
 
 
